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FBIS-EEU-96-133 CONTENTS *10 July 1996*

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ALBANIA

Albania: Delegation Head Addresses OSCE Assembly *[ATA]* 1
Albania: Legislator Interviewed on OSCE Meeting Results *[ATA]* 1
Albania: Meksi Concludes Talks on Forming Government *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 9 Jul]* 2
Albania: National Front Agrees To Participate in Government *[ATA]* 2
Albania: Berisha's Talks With 'Rabbit Hutch' of Parties *[POLI I QENDRES 6 Jul]* 2
Albania: Editorial Supports Socialist Party Reform *[ZERI I POPULLIT 6 Jul]* 3
Albania: Importance of Unity Within PS Analyzed *[KOHA JONE 7 Jul]* 6
Albania: Assembly Passes 2d Law Privatizing Dwellings *[ATA]* 6

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Commentator Accuses Skopje of 'Balkan Obstinacy' *[DUMA 9 Jul]* 8
Bulgaria: National Security Director Gives Interview *[STANDART NEWS 4 Jul]* 8
Bulgaria: Lilov Presses Demand for New BSP Cabinet *[STANDART NEWS 8 Jul]* 12
Bulgaria: DPS Chief Reportedly Purging Party *[168 CHASA 8-14 Jun]* 12

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Comment on 'Vacillation' Over NATO Expansion *[RESPEKT 8-14 Jul]* 14

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Meciar's Failure To Take U.S. 'Advice' Noted *[SME 9 Jul]* 15
Slovakia: Hillary Clinton Visit 'Another Fiasco' for Country *[PRAVDA 9 Jul]* 15
Slovakia: Commentary Views White House 'Message' for Meciar *[NARODNA OBRODA 9 Jul]* 16
Slovakia: HZDS Official Views Memorial Building by Hungarians *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 9 Jul]* 16
Slovakia: MK Officials View 'Autonomy' in Budapest Declaration *[SME 9 Jul]* 17
Slovakia: Cabinet Statement Condemns Hungarian Demands *[Bratislava Radio]* 17
Slovakia: Call for Hungary To Apologize for WW II 'Cruelties' *[SME 8 Jul]* 18
Slovakia: SNS Warns Hungary Unleashing Nationalist Insanity *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 9 Jul]* 19

HUNGARY

Hungary: Budapest Conference on Extraterritorial Hungarians *[Budapest Radio]* 20
Hungary: Foreign Affairs Spokesman on Conference Statement *[Budapest Radio]* 20
Hungary: MDF Official Comments on Hungarians Beyond Borders *[UJ MAGYARORSZAG 5 Jul]* 21
Hungary: Financial Reasons Delay Defense Procurements *[Budapest Radio]* 21
Hungary: Survey Shows Drop in MSZP Popularity *[NEPSZAVA 8 Jul]* 22

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: President Izetbegovic Comments on Defense Law *[Sarajevo TV]* 23
B-H: Gen Delic Views Passing of Federation Defense Law *[DNEVNI AVAZ 10 Jul]* 23
B-H: Silajdzic Seeks Changes to IFOR Mandate *[BH PRESS]* 23
B-H: Commentary on Silajdzic, U.S. Administration's 'Man' *[SVIJET 27 Jun]* 23
B-H: Preelection Roundup; Silajdic Seen as 'U.S. Candidate' *[TANJUG]* 24

B-H: Spain's Aznar Discusses IFOR, NATO, Mostar, ETA *[Madrid ABC 9 Jul]* 25
B-H: Voter Registration Procedures Outlined *[SVIJET 6 Jun]* 26
B-H: Russian IFOR Officer: No Future in NATO Peacekeeping *[AFP]* 28
B-H: Spanish IFOR General Prefers Troops To Remain in B-H *[Madrid EL MUNDO 8 Jul]* 28
B-H: Serbs, Muslims Disagree on Brcko Arbitration *[SRNA]* 28
B-H: Serbs, Croats, Muslims Meet To Discuss Brcko Elections *[SRNA]* 29
B-H: Commentary Attacks Statements by U.S. Official, Bildt *[Pale Radio]* 29
B-H: Koljevic Interviewed on Dayton's Relevance *[NIN 17 May]* 30
B-H: Family of Late Serb General To Bring Lawsuit Against Hague *[SRNA]* 33
B-H: BETA Suggests Pale Serbs Considering Election Boycott *[BETA]* 33
B-H: SDS Protests OSCE Actions To Deny Electoral Rights *[SRNA]* 34
B-H: Pale 'Source' Says 'Senate' To Start Work After Elections *[AFP]* 34
B-H: SBiH Official Denies Alleged Plans for Convention in Pale *[DNEVNI AVAZ 8 Jul]* 34
B-H: SGV Supports Joint List, Banja Luka Coalition in Elections *[Sarajevo Radio]* 35
B-H: Finnish Forensic Experts Stopped From Working at Srebrenica *[AFP]* 35

CROATIA

Croatia: Tudjman Addresses Croatian World Congress *[Zagreb Radio]* 37
Croatia: Suspect in Ahmici 'Massacre' To Be Sent to Hague *[AFP]* 48
Croatia: Granic Denies Media Reports of Conflict With Susak *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 7 Jul]* ... 48
Croatia: Hadzic Accuses UNTAES of Biased Decisions *[Beli Manastir TV]* 49

POLAND

Poland: Visit of Hillary Clinton Reviewed *[POLITYKA 14 Jul]* 50
Poland: Weekly Comments on Kwasniewski's U.S. Visit *[WPROST 14 Jul]* 50
Poland: President Comments on European Security Before U.S. Visit *[POLITYKA 13 Jul]* 51
Poland: Restructuring of Defense Ministry Detailed *[Warsaw TV]* 51
Poland: Cimoszewicz Promises Help for Croatian Reconstruction *[Warsaw TV]* 52
Poland: White Book on Oleksy Case Due Out in Aug *[SZTANDAR 9 Jul]* 52
Poland: Old Nomenklatura Being Named as Ambassadors *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 9 Jul]* 52
Poland: Rifts Within SLD Examined *[SZTANDAR 1 Jul]* 54
Poland: Coalition Partner Fears Return to One-Party Rule *[Warsaw Radio]* 56
Poland: Jewish Monument Destroyed in Kamien Pomorski *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 9 Jul]* 56
Poland: Bishops Protest Wiesel Speech at Pogrom Celebrations *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 9 Jul]* 56

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Milosevic, OSCE Official Discuss Bosnian Elections *[TANJUG]* 58
FRY: Kontic on Importance of Attendance at Salzburg Forum *[Belgrade TV]* 58

Serbia

Serbia: OSCE's Frowick, Milosevic Discuss Karadzic's Future *[AFP]* 58
Serbia: SRS Asks Officials To Warn Tudjman Over Krajina Serb *[BETA]* 59

Kosovo

Kosovo: Albania Said To Open New Terrorist Training Camp *[POLITIKA EKSPRES 6 Jul]* .. 59

Albania: Delegation Head Addresses OSCE Assembly

AU1007071296 Tirana ATA in English 1640 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 9 (ATA)—Head of the Albanian parliamentary delegation Genc Pollo addressed on Monday the 5th plenary session of the annual permanent committee of the OSCE [Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Parliamentary Assembly.

The discussions were focused on the situation in former Yugoslavia and were opened by the OSCE mission chief in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ambassador Robert Frowick, who briefed the session on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the work of the mission for organisation, supervising and monitoring of first postwar elections there.

Pollo congratulated Ambassador Frowick on the report and all the work of the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He expressed the readiness of the Albanian parliament to contribute to this monitoring mission. Pollo focused on the Kosova problem. Referring to the draft resolution submitted to the Assembly by 23 parliamentarians including four members of the Albanian delegation, Pollo invited the hall to vote in favor of this resolution which is another clearly political message this forum sent to Belgrade on the situation in former Yugoslavia and especially in Kosova.

He dwelt at length on the severe repression exerted against Albanians in Kosova, the total negation of their political, national and human rights. Pollo said that there will be no lasting peace and solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia if the Kosova problem is not considered urgently and seriously in order to find a right solution through an unconditional dialogue between the legitimate leadership of Albanians in Kosova and Belgrade with the mediation of a third party.

After the discussion the resolution on former Yugoslavia was approved with a majority of votes. This resolution includes a number of paragraphs on the situation in Kosova which express the regret for the violation of human rights in former Yugoslavia and the increasingly tense situation they have brought about especially in Kosova. The resolution blamed the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic for this situation. It expressed, among others, the great concern about the attacks and killings in Kosova in April this year and appreciated the opening of a U.S. information office in Pristina which will contribute to attract attention to the region and ease the possibility of dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade.

Albania: Legislator Interviewed on OSCE Meeting Results

AU1007070896 Tirana ATA in English 1520 GMT 9 Jul 96

[Interview with Genc Pollo, head of the Albanian delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, to ATA via telephone from Stockholm; date not given]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 9 (ATA)—[ATA] Which was the content of the article approved by the OSCE [Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Parliamentary Assembly regarding the elections in Albania?

[Pollo] This text is an extract of the report of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly delegation which monitored the elections of May 26 in Albania and evaluated them positively. It considered the Albanian electoral law a basis for free and fair elections and said that the law on elections was fairly applied and there is no doubt about the legitimacy of the newly-elected parliament. The report called on all Albanian political parties to consider holding new elections.

[ATA] What is your opinion on the approved text or paragraph?

[Pollo] All the resolutions of this kind are of a consulting character. This is a suggestion for Albanian political parties and I think that every party has its own view. As for the Democratic party, the party of the majority, I can say that it thinks that the new elections should be held in 2000 and I have a strong impression that there will be no parliamentary election before this schedule.

[ATA] Who proposed the amendment?

[Pollo] The proposers were only some Socialist deputies and left-wing ones as well as any U.S. congressmen, whose links with the extremists of the Greek lobby are known.

[ATA] What was the attitude of the U.S. delegation?

[Pollo] I met some U.S. congressmen such as Laughlin from Texas who said to me that they had voted against this amendment because they thought that the elections were fair and the democratic forces in Albania should be backed.

[ATA] Which was the way of voting?

[Pollo] First, it was voted in the first Assembly Committee and was approved by a difference of three votes. The voting in the Assembly was similar. All the centre and right-wing parties opposed this amendment.

[ATA] What is your opinion about the Assembly's proceedings?

[Pollo] The proceedings were very good. The Albanian delegation took an active part in them. The resolution on Kosova was very positive. Regarding the problem of the latest elections in Albania, I think that the OSCE session closed the cycle of European institutions' statements on the elections. In the next four years, both the Albanian parliament and new government, be announced shortly, will focus on sorting out different problems facing Albania.

Albania: Meksi Concludes Talks on Forming Government

AU1007113796 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 9 Jul 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Meksi Concludes Consultations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—"The Government is taking shape. Wait till Thursday." This message came from the lips of Prime Minister Meksi yesterday. His statement promises new steps toward naming the future ministers. "I guarantee all our partners in the talks that their suggestions and views will be borne in mind in forming the new cabinet." Tritan Shehu said this following seven days of meetings with the 10 political parties that expressed their options for the future of the country's government. The last three contributors to sit down with Meksi and Shehu at the discussion table were Durollari of the Legality Movement, Xhuveli of the Agrarian Party, and Ndreu of the Democratic Union, who thus closed the marathon cycle of talks on the new government. Durollari put on Meksi's table his idea for a referendum on the monarchy; Ndreu asked for participation in the new administration at the level of ministry director; "We are not ready to take part in the government," Xhuveli of the Agrarian Party confirmed. According to him, a proper composition for the government is more important than its green tinge. The list of names of those were discussed at noon yesterday will soon give way to another list of names, those who will make up Meksi Cabinet II.

Albania: National Front Agrees To Participate in Government

AU1007071696 Tirana ATA in English 1818 GMT 9 Jul 96

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 9 (ATA)—The leading Board of the National Front (Balli Kombetar) in today's meeting at the Palace of Congresses decided with a majority of votes to participate in the country's co-governing. "The interest of the country, nation and promotion of democracy urges a cooperation in government," Hysen Selfo defined the formula found after the disputed debate in the party National General Council on a participation in government together with the Democratic Party (DP).

Balli Kombetar thinks that it can give a governmental contribution regarding its program on ownership, emigration, national issue and support for the politically persecuted strata.

Selfo defined its party as a right-wing nationalist democratic party different from chauvinist nationalists and said that the party leading council will consider a mixed parliamentary group together with the Republican Party. "A mixed parliamentary group is necessary for us to be represented as a parliamentary group," he said.

Selfo added: "Ermenji has been and will be the head of the Balli Kombetar." He referred to the leader of the party Abaz Ermenji who offered his resignation after the elections of May 26 and left for France, where he has stayed during the time of communist dictatorship in Albania. Selfo reiterated the demand for Ermenji's return to Albania. "We have urged Abaz Ermenji to return and are looking forward to seeing him," he said.

Albania: Berisha's Talks With 'Rabbit Hutch' of Parties

AU0907082596 Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian 6 Jul 96 p 3

[Commentary by P. Nesturi: "The Democratic Party Rounds Up the Rabbits"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The meetings initiated by the Meksi-Shehu duo with the leaders of parties who some time ago accepted the Democratic Party [PD] as their "big brother" are almost finished, and it has been announced that the names for the new government will be put forward next week. Representatives of these parties have not been backward in turning up to these meetings, but we cannot conceal a degree of surprise at their being invited to discuss the formation of the government, The PD will its astronomical majority of 90 percent of the parliamentary seats cannot have any need of those whose role in political life was only slightly above zero. One can easily see that the PD is not cosseting its allies and semi-allies in order to sound their opinions and objections over the best possible operation of its government. The parties that have been invited to these meetings have even felt disappointed in their hopes of the PD creating scope for their greater representation following the opposition's boycott of the elections. The PD had in its hands the mechanism to adjust the figures, but in its own great greed gave away almost nothing. There was no pleasing anybody with the leftovers the PD still possessed, and thus, just as revolt was about to break out in its own "back yard," the PD sent out invitations a few days ago for this government banquet, recreating the former family atmosphere.

This logic would show the PD in the light of a benefactor, if one were to forget that this move on the part of Berisha's party is less for the sake of unity than to soften the party's grim totalitarian image in the international arena. Sensing that his large-scale manipulation will never be accepted as a victory, and that foreign institutions and foreign ministries will only deliver harsher and more direct blows, Berisha is preparing for a second opening of parliament in which he will no longer have to obstinately insist that "The elections were free and honest." The opposition does not recognize the results of the elections and is asking for the creation of a roundtable of the parties to discuss a solution to the political crisis according to the recommendations of the European parliament and the Council of Europe. It appears that the Albanian president is trying to test how far Europe's spite will extend, and has so far not paved the way for dialogue.

Nevertheless, discussion tables have been created for form's sake. After the table of parties taking part in the parliament, another one was created, dressed up as discussions about the government. There can be no question of the Shehu-Meksi duet deciding off its own bat, but in "discussion" with them, the representatives of the "consultative" parties, who know quite well that decisions are made up above, will be freer in their demands.

Indeed, Laco, forgetting the "betrayal" of the PD, which gave him only 1.9 percent of the vote and not a single seat in the parliament, was the first to propose that his "party," as before, should be in the government. His reasoning was that "The PD still needs us;" his laconic mode of expression is very significant, if unlikely to make an impression on Berisha's mind.

Selfo, who has suddenly remembered that the National Front is unused to parliamentary life, has found it difficult to change his mind about the work of the government, although he has for the moment latched onto an expression about "the constructive role of his party."

Godo has long been using this term, and, with his policy of "now you see me now you don't," is not committing himself to participating in the government, but is continuing with his jests by suggesting that, according to the Republican Party, the government must reorganize its ministries, as if this were the most important problem and Godo were really racking his brains how to solve it.

Meanwhile, the Christian Democrats appear to be content with the local government that the PD allocated to them in Puke, and appear to be frightened of going too far by asking for more. Anyway, Bushati has remembered that their membership of the European Christian-Democratic Union makes them a natural ally of the PD, and they must therefore not be forgotten when the government cake is shared out.

It is in the meantime not known which ministry the Green Party will take, now that it has become well known purely from the PD's schedule of meetings.

The zigzag discussions with the chairman of the Human Rights Union are of a special kind. After Sunday's meeting [30 Jun] at Sarande, Melo seems to have withdrawn from participation in the government. However, feeling the burden of the failure of two of his party's deputies to attend the parliament, he is under an obligation not to talk as he would like but to read out and comment on the standpoints adopted by the party's presidium. By leaving to one side suggestions to join the new government, Melo is bound by his demands for guarantees for the freedom of the minority and the enforcement of the agreement on Greek-language schooling. He therefore has little room for maneuver, because it is clear to him that he is on probation.

As one can see, there is no way Berisha can feel comfortable in discussions with such people. It is clear to him that he has filled a rabbit hutch full of rabbits that might escape at the first opportunity. He might be able to please them in some way, but that changes nothing. Those that he really has to persuade will not be taken in by such maneuvers, It is therefore clear to Berisha what step he must take next.

Albania: Editorial Supports Socialist Party Reform

AU1007092496 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 6 Jul 96 p 1

[Unattributed editorial: "Reforming the Socialist Party for the Sake of Political Success"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [We first must consider that] debate is an expression of the party's vitality. Considering the reasons for this country's deep political crisis, which were created as a result of the Democratic Party's [PD] theft of the free votes of the people on 26 May, the Socialists must not fail to look at their own role in Albanian politics over the past four years and especially during the recent election campaign. This becomes imperative on the threshold of the upcoming Socialist Party [PS] congress that will "dot the i's" of many issues connected with the party's work. This congress will produce analyses and conclusions on whether the party's strategic views, activities, and tactics have been fair and carefully considered. As a party, we will take stock of our achievements, but also our failings, with the aim of improving the party's work in the future. The congress will approve the party's basic political documents and will elect new management structures. These are the primary issues in the party's life.

In this context, the last few days' open debate on the proposals for the future congress has been extremely worthwhile. All echelons of the party have now been included in this debate. The publicity this debate has received in the press indicates the vigorous and decisive role the PS plays in the country's life and the hopes that the Albanian electorate place in it. The party has lost nothing from this debate. On the contrary, it is preparing to embark successfully on a new phase in its life.

Secondly, what needs to be corrected? An analysis of the 26 May elections, seen from different points of view, is expected to be the focus of discussion at the next party congress, both because of the importance of this event to the country's life and because of the significance of the PS as a political force. The PS's stand on these elections is now well-known. The PD conceived the elections as an operation against the Socialists and against the opposition, and they culminated in an antidemocratic coup d'etat. The ruling party prepared this operation with a series of anti-Socialist and antidemocratic measures, starting with the laws it approved that were aimed directly against the PS, such as the "Antigenocide Law," the Law on Screening of Official Figures, the Electoral Law itself; and the finale: the unprecedented diversionary tactics of the campaign itself. The ruling party's press, Albanian Radio-Television, foreign guests, and even international forums were enlisted to produce a PD electoral victory at all costs, while the PD also spread a phobia about the return of primitive communism if the Socialists were to win. The atmosphere of instability and the glittery events organized by the ruling party to make up for its inability to meet the people face to face led to a strained electoral campaign in which no political party, including the PS, could communicate naturally with the voters.

While holding the PD responsible for what happened on 26 May, the PS and the opposition must examine their responsibility toward preventing this affront to the free votes of the people. The PS attempted to set itself against the scenario that had been devised against it. It coordinated its preelectoral activities with the other opposition parties, mainly the Social-Democratic Party and the Democratic Alliance, but it did not succeed in convincing the electorate. At the same time, taking a "no" on the referendum of the draft constitution [November 1994] as a "no" to the PD government, although 17 months had passed, the PS allowed itself to submit to a feeling of euphoria in its preparations for the great election campaign. This sapped the strength of its political work at home and abroad. Also, growing support from the European left led the PS, so to speak, to the gates of Europe—but did not ensure it the necessary credibility to enter Europe. The reason for this lies not only in the influence of the anti-PS propaganda that the PD managed to spread even among European socialists, but in a certain hesitancy by the PS to make a clear and firm break with the past.

Under these circumstances, many European governments were not enthusiastic about a PS electoral victory. They openly supported Berisha, and it was this support that emboldened him and the PD to embark on the adventures of 26 May, which Europe found unacceptable. This is one of the lessons from which the PS must draw in connection with its responsibilities for 26 May.

Further, the growing discontent of Albanians with the PD government and its burgeoning corruption, back-scratching, and abuses of power could not be viewed as support for the PS, as some Socialists interpreted it in their forecasts. Indeed, social groups that had exploited the absence of legislation during the transition period to give breathing room to the small businesses that have been so vital to hauling the country out of economic collapse, and who became used to this climate of anarchy, viewed with reservation and even fear the possible arrival in power of the PS, which had not succeeded in properly explaining its policy for the establishment of a market economy. This too might be a matter for analysis.

The PS has often stated that it has dissociated itself from the communist past of the Albanian Workers Party, but this dissociation has neither been natural nor credible while the party continues to hesitate to remove people from the old regime from positions of leadership; this today seems a natural and urgent task.

Third, at this point in the PS's life, the electorate at home and democratic forces abroad are still expecting that the PS will carry out reforms for the sake of political success. An analysis of the causes of the 26 May event does not show the PS to have borne the main burden of responsibility in this dangerous situation. However, the emotional atmosphere that prevailed in the PS before the elections, which has now turned into despair at the results, has not helped us carry out the serious and complex analysis that the party requires. One of the questions that recent developments in the PS and national politics have raised is to what extent should an analysis of the political situation after 26 May be balanced against an analysis of internal developments toward reform in the party, within the framework of preparations for the party congress. Should the movements within the party distract attention from the political situation in the country in the wake of the 26 May elections and on the threshold of new local government elections?

The best answer to this question is that preparations for the party congress must be part of the party's political struggle toward its defined objectives, and party reform is for the sake of the party's political success. This is the path the PS must follow. It is part of the logical development of the country and the role of the PS. The events of 26 May and the renewal of the party cannot be viewed separately from the times. The PS is like a living organism and as such it has a constant need for new, adequate, and healthy nourishment in order to confront major problems that emerge. In this sense, its reform is vital.

Fourth, the PS is now debating to what extent it should reform. In fact, this debate began long ago. It has however now become more urgent, because the party congress will approve changes to party documents and party leadership. The current regime has also entered the race to offer "advice" on the extent of the reform, always with the aim of striking against the PS. We on the other hand are engaged in a debate inspired by sincere goodwill toward and aspirations for the PS, from whatever side. In this sense, the daily press has also included, along with objective analysis, some well-intentioned naivety that shows ignorance of the party's life and work so far.

In any case, several directions of PS reform are now no longer contested by any of those taking part in the debate. The majority of the party's members support the idea of more radical and deeper party reform. This will involve a reform of entirely new dimensions, a process that cannot be conceived in the shape of a campaign and will not be completed by a certain deadline. It will affect all the party's structures, and will bring more intellectuals into the party leadership. It will involve changes to the statute and the program and will enrich these with more modern ideas. This will create a new mentality of social-democratic parties. This idea is opposed by some who say that the PS, with the support of its electorate, must continue its campaign to sensitize international organizations in order to find a fast political solution; otherwise, if it starts concentrating on its own reform, it will neglect the serious crime that was committed. [They say that] this crime will go unpunished or uncorrected, and a dangerous precedent will be created for the local elections that are on our doorstep. Why such a hurry over reform?

We think that this view is based on a mistaken idea of what reform means to a serious political party. Reform is a process as protracted as it is vital for the PS, which under pluralism emerged from the old former-communist party as a Western-European-style social-democratic party. This breach, with the creation of a party that is new in its program, its statute, its composition, and in the ideas and alternatives that it has unfolded, has been of historic importance for the entire development of democracy in our country. The reform of this political party has a starting point, but it cannot be completed overnight or within one year. It is absurd to impose it from another political force or from someone in power, even if he is a republic's president. It cannot be the task of a few individuals in the leadership; it impacts upon every member.

The reform is therefore not a struggle among groups within the PS that the ruling party and its leadership has provoked. It is a contest within a context of diversity, and the final clarity will objectively lead to stronger unity and a fuller and more up-to-date vision of the party's historic role. Nobody needs unity among party ranks that is merely formal, and even less the serried ranks of the former Albanian Workers Party, as the sole way to counter the PD's diversions. This would lead the party into becoming an exclusive sect.

The fifth point: What distinguishes the PD from the PS? It is something entirely normal and democratic either to approve and to oppose a motion as a whole, or to approve or oppose the individual theories and solutions that the motion puts forward. [sentence as published] The disaster would be if people were to shout "Form ranks!" at the request of a chairman or deputy chairman, as if on a military exercise, with the penalty being expulsion from the party. The case of the motion raised by some founding members of the PD in August 1992 is familiar from Albanian political history. Recalling the meeting of the party's National Council and the breaches of democratic principles that were observed at it, this has been remembered as the first major case in which Mr. Berisha's iron fist descended on the ruling party. The expulsion of the "motionists" [Gramoz Pashko and other founding members of the Democratic Alliance] from the ranks of the PD, the names they were called, and the entire atmosphere that dominated this settling of Berisha's accounts within the PD showed that the diktat and the behavior of the PD and its leader were to become the starting point for authoritarianism in democratic garb, not only within the party but for the country's entire political life.

Meanwhile, in the PS, diktat and any absence of dialogue, openness, and consensus have been alien since the party was formed; the party has been distinguished for its social and free spirit in all branches of its organization. In the last few days, the ruling party's press has been spreading the idea that this is an omen of the end of the PS, and the PD has even been rubbing its hands and counting the days that remain. This attitude was inspired long ago by Sali Berisha himself. It is a typically Enverist attitude in its quest for the elimination of an opponent by antidemocratic methods. We are confronting a crime that has now been given rights of citizenship in the propaganda of the ruling party. However, we express the conviction that its culprits will be disappointed. From the analyses of its work that it has carried out, the PS has been enriched with new ideas, has better displayed its social-democratic profile, and has become more credible to the people.

Albania: Importance of Unity Within PS Analyzed

AU1007122396 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 7 Jul 96 p 5

[Article by Fatos T. Lubonja: "Thoughts About Fatos Nano's 'Motion for Debate'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If the Socialist Party [PS] is unable to engage in dialogue, it will show that it is unable to produce a better alternative to Berisha. On 26 May, Albania failed its test of democracy. Regardless of the fact that Berisha bears the main responsibility for this failure, it seems to me that the PS and the other opposition parties must also feel their own responsibility. This also obliges them to make the corrections that this analysis entails. As far as I can see, Nano's motion essentially expresses this need. Moreover, the motion appears to have stirred up the waters of the PS and brought to the surface factions or individuals with different ideas and attitudes and even the idea that the party presidium must be changed. This seems to me normal. Anything else would seem to me to be abnormal, i.e., if, even after what happened, the PS were to continue to do nothing else but throw all the blame onto Berisha. However, in the meantime, the appearance of symptoms of an old ailment of Albanian politics has led us to watch these normal events with anxiety. My belief is that the evil comes from the fact that Albanian political history has no tradition of dialogue, but only of conflict. Traditionally, different political groups in Albania have not been able to correct or improve themselves through a confrontation of arguments, but only by fighting and eliminating each other. The same has happened even within a single political group or party. The Albanians have never been able to look at each other in the eye as equals, but only from above to below or vice versa. Also, as far as I can remember, we have not seen any Albanian politician ever openly confessing his mistakes or voluntarily dismounting from his steed. This political culture, which arises from our culture in the broadest sense of the term, has spawned authoritarianism. The example of Berisha is the most recent one and his experience indeed explains to us many things that have happened in history, which we have not lived through ourselves. My anxiety, from what I have gathered from the press, is that there is a danger of this same scenario repeating itself in the Socialist Party. According to what we now read plainly or between the lines, the atmosphere that the motion has created in the PS resembles preparation for a conflict. It seems to me natural that some should sign and some should not sign Nano's motion, but what is most dangerous is if this signing or not signing is performed with hands trembling with hatred or hostility for one another. It appears to me that the manner in which the PS approaches this motion is of an importance that transcends the fate of any individual party, and yet many members of its presidium are unaware of the historic moment we are experiencing. Bearing in mind Berisha's marked authoritarian and monopolistic tendencies, it has been in my opinion fortunate that a powerful PS has existed as a factor of balance. From this point of view, now that Berisha has become even more authoritarian, the existence of a powerful opposition party becomes even more important. I would even say that a coalition of opposition parties is necessary in order to balance Berisha. Viewed from this angle, what is happening in this party today concerns the fate of Albanian democracy. The democratic Albanian and international public are asking the opposition to demonstrate that it is able to build a democratic alternative to Berisha's authoritarianism. If this party, following this motion that comes at a critical moment for it, is unable to conduct a dialogue, to change, and to admit factions, especially when it seems that the majority are aware of the need for reform, the party will then prove that it is not able to build a better alternative to Berisha. If it is able to conduct dialogue and to renew itself without splitting into hostile groups, this will be a greater cultural victory than any verbal condemnation of Enverism, and will be a victory for all Albanians, for democracy, and for Albania itself.

Albania: Assembly Passes 2d Law Privatizing Dwellings

AU1007072096 Tirana ATA in English 1818 GMT 9 Jul 96

[Report by A. Sakja]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 9 (ATA)—The Albanian parliament reconsidered the law on privatisation of state-owned dwellings after two decrees of the

Albanian president which included some supplements to this law. The decrees give a solution to citizens which were not included in the category of privatisation.

The decree on examining the non-privatised state-owned dwellings which was approved today is related to the administration and maintenance of the non-privatised dwellings. A certain percentage of flats which for justified reasons, such as judicial conflicts, refugees' flats, were not privatised according to the law on privatisation of state-owned dwellings issued in 1992, were included in this decree.

According to this decree, the administration of these dwellings was put under the control of local government and not under the National Dwelling Institution. The rent will be cashed to the account of municipalities or communes which will also be responsible for their maintenance.

A number of decrees of the President of Republic which complete, clarify and supplement some laws were put on the table.

The parliament also approved the decree on exclusion of machineries and technological equipment used to clean the Tirana city from customs tariffs. The decree on competencies and determining of wages which was approved today gives greater competencies for wage increase to those state enterprises (particularly economic enterprises of chromium, oil, energy), which record a production increase and profits.

The legal framework on registration of banks as anonymous associations is completed with the approval of the decree on a supplement to the law on transformation of state-owned trade banks in trade companies and their privatisation.

Bulgaria: Commentator Accuses Skopje of 'Balkan Obstinacy'

AU0907141396 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 9 Jul 96 p 7

[Commentary by Ventseslav Karaivanov: "Skopje Has Isolated Itself"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For several days now, the press of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] has been attempting to blame Bulgaria for Macedonia's refusal to participate in the Sofia meeting. Commentators in Skopje permitted themselves to advise their government to limit its relations only to states that recognize the name Republic of Macedonia. Once again, senseless Balkan obstinacy has raised its head, although the participants in the Sofia meeting repeatedly expressed regret at the absence of the Skopje representative and described the decision as a mistake. Further, they reached a compromise by including in the final document ideas and proposals put forward by Macedonia in their original form.

Our neighbors forget that Bulgaria was the first to recognize their country. However, the United Nations gave it the temporary name—The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—and Skopje has accepted this fact by participating in a number of international meetings under this name. By their refusal to come to Sofia, the Skopje politicians are trying to blackmail the Bulgarian Government into arbitrating their dispute with another Balkan state, and even with international organizations.

In the Macedonian press, crude attacks and flagrant slander have, lately, appeared more frequently against the country that during Skopje's most difficult days showed goodwill and opened its borders and routes to alleviate the consequences of the embargo placed on it by Athens.

The nature of some of the recent accusations and slander against Bulgaria are indicative of a guilty conscience, because there is no other way to describe the writings of some retired general claiming that there are numerous Russian military bases in Bulgaria, manned and guarded by Russian personnel. Moreover, these claims are made at the very time when Skopje is granting military bases and training grounds to the United States and NATO.

It is difficult to accept the appeals of Skopje politicians for a "Europeanization" of relations between the Balkan states, when at the same time they themselves display Balkan obstinacy. The politicians are shortsighted, hoping to resolve their open questions with their neighbors, yet failing to use the opportunities offered by the Sofia meeting. This meeting proposed a comprehensive program for strengthening good-neighborliness, security, stability, and cooperation in the region, from which Skopje has merely isolated itself. Let us hope that the optimistic expectations of those who attended this meeting and of Theodhoros Pangalos, the next host, are realized—that the Macedonians will also attend next year's meeting in Athens, ignoring the problem of the name of their state. This is in the interest not only of Skopje, but of all the countries in the region.

Bulgaria: National Security Director Gives Interview

AU0507124796 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 4 Jul 96 pp 9-10

[Interview with Yuliy Georgiev, director of the National Security Service, by Violeta Veselinova and Vasil Zakhariev; place and date not given: "It Is Time To Make it Clear Who Is Who in Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [STANDART NEWS] Mr. Georgiev, since you became head of the National Security Service [NSS], Bulgarian counterintelligence has scored a considerable number of successes: An illegal ring dealing in cesium was discovered in Albena, several attempts to smuggle large amounts of money have been foiled, and so on. What, however, have you failed to accomplish?

[Georgiev] It is wrong to judge the work of the National Security Service only from what you read in the press. You must agree that only a small part of our work becomes public knowledge. Unfortunately, the things that demonstrate the power of the Bulgarian counterintelligence officers are precisely the things that remain unknown to the public at large. This is one of the most important principles of our profession. One gets accustomed to it. One must accept that this principle must never be violated, because the consequences will not only affect a single individual, but can harm the state.

Recently we have been trying to be more open, more transparent on the visible side of our activities. It gives me some satisfaction to confirm that our attempts are enjoying increasing success. Now people less often confuse us with the National Investigation Service or mix our regional structures up with those of the police, and reports on our operations are appearing more frequently in the media.

If we have succeeded in anything during the last 10 months, it is that we have overcome the stagnation; our service has acquired a clearer image; it has gradually started to extend the scope of its activities and bring its investigations to a conclusion. This is something that we have almost forgotten, for well-known reasons.

What have we failed to accomplish so far? If I have to answer in a phrase, I am tempted to say that we have failed to carry our a "clean hands" operation. To reassure certain people, I will try to explain: We have not planned such an operation, and it is not within the powers of the NSS alone. If the public or its representatives have a strong interest in such a thing happening, they should announce their wishes clearly and unambiguously. We will then sit down for a serious discussion. In this course of this, questions will probably be raised concerning the limited powers of the security services, the legality of the incomes and property holdings of many of the leading people in the land, and not only them, immunity privileges, the scope of the law, and many other things. It is high time to make it clear who is who in Bulgaria. I hope that what I am saying does not sound frightening to you. Every country has its own forces and instincts of preservation that come into play at moments of an apparent impasse. For Bulgaria, apparently, this moment has not yet arrived.

Apart from this digression, I will permit myself to express my great, purely human satisfaction with the way in which the National Security Service has started to function. The tempo of work and the results achieved are encouraging. I am grateful to my colleagues for their work. Nevertheless, we are still lagging behind in the fight against corruption, crime in the apparatus of state, and in introducing law and order in the border zone.

In the border area, clashes occur between varied economic, and sometimes political interests. I do not say that we are powerless against them, rather we are ineffective, because we often feel we have been betrayed. As part of our free discussion, I will add that we have a ceiling on our resources and capabilities. I do not see it possible to maintain day-to-day checks on every official and every worker engaged in issuing permits or regulatory documents, so that we are sure of his loyalty. Why is the law on state officials delayed? Repression is not the only method of regulating society and personal behavior.

[STANDART NEWS] Are you optimistic about the country's future?

[Georgiev] I would describe myself as a moderate optimist, but my own personal assessment is not so important. It is more important for honest people in Bulgaria not to lose faith in the state and start seeking a brighter future because time is not standing still. We have fallen behind in drafting the rules of behavior in market conditions and applying them. We are wasting time in unnecessary squabbling and futile displays of oratory, instead of strengthening the state and the economy and rehabilitating the control organs, and thus leaving broad spaces for tricksters big and small to operate. Unfortunately, both the state with its institutions and individual citizens still retreat in face of the effrontery and cynicism of the powers in the shadows. The honest man begins to feel like an Indian at the time when capital first began to be accumulated. I find it difficult to explain why this is happening....

[STANDART NEWS] In your view, are you sufficiently effective in combating foreign intelligence activities on Bulgarian soil? Which of our former friends are now spying on us?

[Georgiev] An assessment that is not supported by open evidence, which unfortunately I cannot provide, must be a subjective one. However, please allow me to think aloud. The National Security Service [illegible] powers and responsibilities that are precisely defined by the law. Article 3, Paragraph 1, of the Law on the National Security Service states that the NSS, independently or jointly with other state bodies, observes, establishes, restricts, and opposes activities that are connected with gathering information for the benefit of foreign powers. The lawmaker has instilled profound meaning in these few lines. Apart from individual cases, under present-day conditions the counterintelligence service must accept, whether it likes it or not, that intelligence activities against the state are something inevitable that can only be limited, but never eliminated entirely. It is obvious that quantitative measurements are inappropriate in this field. People are not on piece work and do not have to account for every penny. A permanently functioning security system has been built up in which state institutions, bodies, and individuals are involved. One can judge the efficiency of this system by a number of features, without applying a specific methodology. If we try to apply the assessment criteria used prior to 1989, we will find ourselves in a ridiculous situation, because now Bulgaria has no enemy and is not a member of a system of opposing blocs. One of the features by which we can judge and which provide grounds for a positive assessment of our work is the change in the approaches used by foreign intelligence services; in other words, in some cases we have managed to read their handwriting, and this has forced them to change their methods. When this happens, we adapt again, and so it goes on. One gets a dialectical unity between two opposites—intelligence and counterintelligence.

There are also other features that can be used to judge the efficiency of our work. One of them is that recently our contacts with foreign special services have become more frequent. Our cooperation with them in combating terrorism, narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, and arms trading is beginning to acquire concrete dimensions. It is well known that no one wants a weak player as a partner, even in a game of chess.

The second part of your question requires a categorical answer. Intelligence-gathering activities are carried out on Bulgarian territory by our former Warsaw Pact partners, and the requirements of Article 3, Paragraph 1, of the Law on the NSS apply equally to this. Naturally, we report on the activity of the special services working against us, the severity of their operations, and the extent of the threat to our security, and counteract them with adequate forces and means. However, you prompt me to make a necessary comment. We live in a new time, in new conditions both at home and abroad. I hope that no one will criticize the NSS for the fact that there have been no highly publicized spy cases in recent years.

[STANDART NEWS] In your own opinion, was Douglas Bailey, about whom such a fuss was made, a spy or not?

[Georgiev] Douglas Bailey failed to observe the Bulgarian laws, and thus created a threat to the country's security. An administrative penalty was imposed on him in accordance with the Aliens' Residence Act. He was also prohibited from visiting the country for a certain period. We handed over our materials on the case to the National Investigation Service, which is conducting an inquiry. Only the court is competent to pronounce on whether Bailey was a spy or not, and until then all assertions have no serious basis. Personally, I do not allow myself to play about with this concept, and I do not know of any other NSS officer who has declared him to be a spy. Here it is appropriate to mention that the noise created in the press was quite unnecessary. Many journalists who enjoy my respect surrendered to the lure of old stereotypes and by inertia stirred up a campaign on this case which, as I said before, was quite unnecessary.

[STANDART NEWS] There have been several reports in the media that Kurdish terrorists have bases in Bulgaria. Is this true?

[Georgiev] I have publicly stated our position on this issue. I have also given explanations to the Parliamentary Commissions on National Security and Foreign Policy. We have not altered our assessment. There exist in Bulgaria no bases for giving training, medical treatment, and support to members of the Kurdish Workers Party. Let us not complicate our relations with Turkey and other countries by giving currency to claims that are not supported by sufficient facts and evidence.

[STANDART NEWS] Since you assert that our former Warsaw Pact partners are spying in Bulgaria, does this mean that our contacts have been broken off with Russian counterintelligence and the special services of the former socialist countries?

[Georgiev] We are developing good relations with some of them. We are cooperating with them in fields in which we share common interests, as I have already mentioned, and we are also working with our Western colleagues. However, in so doing, we have to abide by the rule of infringing the interests of a third country. This is stated in every cooperation agreement signed by the Interior Ministry. A further point that we regard as extremely important is that we exclude counterespionage from the topics covered by international cooperation both as a subject for joint work and even as a topic for discussion. Our foreign partners also pay heed to the same rules.

[STANDART NEWS] Did the meeting at Tsigov Chark, which took place when Yordan Sokolov was interior minister, between the entire senior staff of the NSS and your American colleagues help or hinder your work? How do you fulfill your missions now that the Americans know who all your people are?

[Georgiev] It is true, as you say, that in 1993 a small course was held at Tsigov Chark for the initial training of a group of newly appointed NSS officers, which was conducted by Bulgarian and English lecturers. Yordan Sokolov had no connection with the course, and should not be criticized in this connection. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, I can assert that we have no need for this kind of cooperation. Our training school is a good one, and examples of its practical work have earned respect. Another form of exchanging experience and improving the skills of our officers has proved more effective. I refer to periodical seminars on specific topics, conferences, and meetings of experts, in which our trained experts participate on an equal basis with our hosts from the Western special services. As for those who completed the course at Tsigov Chark, I can say that some of them have left the service, dissatisfied with the working conditions and pay, while others are developing as specialists, and we are pleased with their work. I do not hold any prejudices.

[STANDART NEWS] Are the staff who have left the service in recent years and who are fully informed about your methods and means not now working against you?

[Georgiev] I am not in the business of making generalizations. How a man behaves depends on the conditions in which he is placed or puts himself. Some of our former colleagues, when removed from their natural environment, have found themselves like fish out of water. Others have made progress in business, while yet others are roaming God knows where.... I am left with the impression that not everyone of them can be persuaded to turn his back on the principles to which he previously submitted himself for a certain time, despite the fact that some former colleagues are like that. Our attitudes to them are clear: If they commit crimes, we bring matters to a conclusion in the right place—with the investigation or prosecution service. Reports on such cases periodically appear in the press.

However, I would not say that they work against us, rather they earn money with the skills they acquired as service officers. It is a matter of public interest to redirect their present opportunities from providing services for bank and company owners to more important fields, such as fighting corruption, crime in the apparatus of state, and so forth.

[STANDART NEWS] The case of the "555" cigarettes was described by National Assembly deputies as a scandal. The names of NSS officers were involved....

[Georgiev] This affair will be cleared up completely. The Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office is conducting an investigation. When it is completed, it will become clear whether NSS officers have committed any illegal acts. I will tell you something else. Some of your press colleagues sometimes permit themselves to make too free interpretations regarding the special services and, it seems to me, often make mistakes. Instead of writing ridiculous reports, not to say nonsense, about Yuliy Georgiev's involvement in some kind of grain speculations, it would be better to ask for a meeting so that things can be cleared up.

[STANDART NEWS] What would you say to them?

[Georgiev] In the same style as they use, I would tell them that the NSS director is not a small chicken farmer, however much some people would like him to be. Our actions are corroborated by many documents issued by various officials. The NSS is very precise in conforming to the letter of the law. We are ready to be examined on every aspect of our work, including a parliamentary inquiry, if necessary.

[STANDART NEWS] Do you receive sufficient information from abroad, given that your colleagues in the National Intelligence Service come under the president, you answer to the Interior Ministry, and military intelligence and counterintelligence are subordinate to the Defense Ministry?

[Georgiev] The fact that we are subordinate to different bodies does create problems. Some of them we overcome by joint efforts, others not. I think that the time is ripe to create an intelligence community in Bulgaria. However much one improves the exchange of information between the special services, which operate independently of one another, one cannot compensate for the absence of a common strategy and joint work on task of national priority for the country. The decisions and practical steps in implementing state priorities in the security field must be based on a single scheme and be coordinated. However, this is only one viewpoint. Fears exist that the information will be concentrated in certain sections of the power institutions at the expense of others, that the existing status quo and relative weight of the special services will be changed, and so forth. It seems to me more rational to concentrate on the practical side of the problem, as they do in countries that in many respects we have accepted as models for imitation.

[STANDART NEWS] Do you think that the demand to close down the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant is, in fact, an attempt by the Western special services to destroy Bulgaria's power in the energy field?

[Georgiev] I do not regard the special services as independent agents in international relations, nor do I overestimate their role. You often read that in many places they are subjected to criticism, demands are made to reduce their size, and parliamentary debates are held.... The special services are only one of the tools for implementing the state's military-political and economic strategies. It is quite possible that certain intelligence services are involved in carrying this out, but we should not exaggerate the situation. Sometimes there are other explanations. For example, sometimes an immense human potential—of specialists and experts in a particular field—is committed, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations, public movements, politicians, journalists, and influential lobbies from many countries are activated, and all this is done for the purpose of dislodging a major, traditionally strong market competitor. One should not disregard the strength of the transnational organizations and their present influence in the world. However, let us regard what I have said merely as a possible hypothesis. Of course, this does not mean that we underestimate the problem.

[STANDART NEWS] Do you have any information that other important Bulgarian companies have attracted similar attention on the part of foreign special services?

[Georgiev] We regard as a matter of some concern the accumulation and concentration of destructive factors in sectors and installations of the Bulgarian economy that we define as of strategic importance. The foreign intelligence services have not stopped and will not stop keeping watch on them and gathering information about them. However, these services are not the chief and not the only reason for the situation in which we find ourselves now.

[STANDART NEWS] Finally, two personal questions. Are you afraid for your job?

[Georgiev] A man is afraid who is driven into a corner, with no way out, no alternative, and without friends or family. In the spring of last year, there were moments when I thought that I had overestimated myself and the capabilities of my other colleagues, with whom we took on the task of setting the service back on its feet. Now, however, I feel calm. We have emerged from the crisis, and the personnel changes, whatever they may be, cannot have the same importance that they had previously. It is difficult to halt the movement forward. This is what seems important to me, while the rest, even when viewed quite personally, is pure emotion. Emotions are quickly forgotten....

[STANDART NEWS] Do you regard yourself as the best-informed person in the country?

[Georgiev] As NSS director, I am sufficiently well informed.

Bulgaria: Lilov Presses Demand for New BSP Cabinet

AU0807164796 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 8 Jul 96 p 3

[Report by Khristo Khristov and Neda Popova from Stara Zagora and Sofia]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lilov declared war on Videnov in Stara Zagora. There he told the local party activists that the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] must prepare a new cabinet, irrespective of the result of the presidential elections.

Last week, a close associate of Lilov, political scientist Dimitur Gronev, told a Russian newspaper that the Strategist [Lilov's nickname as director of the BSP's Center of Strategic Research] will overthrow the government in the autumn. However, he later denied having made that statement.

This is the second time Lilov has attacked the young prime minister. He floated the idea of a new cabinet at the beginning of the year. In Lilov's opinion, the changes in the cabinet, which cannot be delayed, should be made after a comprehensive analysis, not impulsively or under pressure.

Professor Lilov warned the Stara Zagora Socialists that a political disaster will cause the BSP to explode spontaneously. He reminded his audience that the BSP must convene an extraordinary congress or national conference to review its election campaign platform.

Lilov's attack against the cabinet is due to its right-wing policies. The early forum that he advocates will have no reason to deal with the BSP program, Lilov emphasized. He was forthright in declaring that shortsightedness in the selection of cadres had caused the party's failure in government.

Neshka Robeva [BSP National Assembly deputy associated with Lilov] told STANDART NEWS that during the winter the gravest and most unpopular measures adopted in implementing the structural reform would fall on the BSP's like a ton of bricks. She believes Lilov is the man who will rescue the BSP from the crisis. Asked by a journalist whether Pirinski would win the presidential election if he convinced Robeva to run for the vice presidency, Aleksandur Lilov answered in the affirmative. However, he said he was concerned by certain incorrect conclusions she has reached in certain situations.

Bulgaria: DPS Chief Reportedly Purging Party

AU0907172196 Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian No. 28, 8-14 Jun 96 p 13

[Article by Milen Dimitrov: "Dogan Begins Purge in Rights and Freedoms Movement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The ranks of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] are gradually being purged, a DPS National Assembly deputy has complained. According to the source, Ahmed Dogan is personally managing the operation to remove disobedient members. In accordance with the plan, Guner Tahir has already been removed from the post of DPS deputy chairman, while Kemal Eyup has bid farewell to his post as DPS district leader in Silistra.

Dogan allegedly began the purge as a result of his displeasure with the so-called young peoples group in the DPS, which he believes has discredited him in the eyes of the electorate with its unremitting criticism. Apart from this, by making personnel changes he hopes to restore his own position, which has been shaken since the presidential primaries.

After Tahir and Eyup, the next head expected to roll is that of Kurdzhali National Assembly Deputy Remzi Osman, informed sources predict. Dogan reportedly wants to have a loyal man from Kurdzhali in parliament, and he still has not forgotten that Remzi abandoned him for a while to join Mehmed Hodja's group in the last National Assembly.

The unexpected reelection of Ahmed Yusein as DPS district leader in Kurdzhali is regarded as the start of the campaign in that town. Yusein gained a reputation three years ago when, unhappy about the powers being granted to Dogan, he led the Kurdzhali delegates in a walkout from the DPS national conference. However, according to those who attended the election meeting, Yusein has now transferred into Dogan's camp.

Yusein is said to have had a seven-hour confidential conversation with Dogan before his reelection as Kurdzhali chief. The two are thought to have spent the time bargaining for mutual support. Dogan reportedly promised to get Yusein elected to Remzi Osman's seat in the next parliament and asked in return for Yusein's support at the forthcoming DPS national conference, at which calls are expected to be made to limit Dogan's powers and distribute his functions among the DPS deputy chairmen. It is very likely that Dogan's own resignation as DPS chief may be demanded, which is why he has hastened to ensure the support of the strongest DPS district organization.

Czech Republic: Comment on 'Vacillation' Over NATO Expansion

AU1007082596 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 8-14 Jul 96 No 28, p 3

[Commentary by Jaroslav Spurny: "A Neighbor in the Antechamber"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Something is happening, but it is happening rather slowly," said Vaclav Havel 10 days ago, following his return from an international NATO conference in Warsaw. His remark expresses precisely the feelings of the countries applying for membership in the alliance. That is, the Warsaw meeting and its stellar complement of three presidents, the NATO leadership, and a number of military and political experts again brought only new assurances that NATO will soon be enlarged. This is a bit too little. Namely, just last year, Brussels promised that it would decide on when the alliance will enlarge and by whom before the end of this year. Six months ago, the date was pushed back to January of next year, and in Warsaw there were allusions to next spring.

Dialogue, Dialogue

The repeated shifting of the date caught the two Czech negotiators—Deputy Ministers Petr Necas and Alexandr Vondra—a little by surpris, but they both continue to be full of optimism. The "intensive dialogue" with the alliance is apparently still gathering momentum, and its military experts are already interested in such details as, for example, the kinds of fuel dumps or the exact parameters of the military airfields. Indeed, during the past 10 months, almost a dozen visitors from the military circles of the countries of the North Atlantic alliance have in turn come to the Czech Republic. A tangible outcome is, for example, the promise made in Prague by U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary Franklin Kramer: The United States will give our Army money to build radar control centers. Even the fact that Czech pilots, at the air show in Hradec Kralove last week, tested the F-16 aircraft for the first time, aircraft with which our Army will probably be reequipped, is not without interest.

Every coin, however, has two sides. How much NATO is interested in us is one thing, the standard of our replies to the questions from Western military experts another. We are trying to be "diligent pupils," who do their homework immediately, but, at the same time, we are not capable, for example, of adopting a constitutional law on the defense forces that the other laws concerning the Army should follow up on. The Czech Republic still has nothing resembling a national defense strategy on whose basis the Army should be structured conceptually, and it goes without saying that there is no plan for modernizing the Army. The military knows that it needs to establish command, control, and communications computer systems, purchase new aircraft, including air traffic control, and modernize or replace the tanks and thus fulfill a basic task—increase the so-called mobility of the units. But they can only guess at what should come before what and, mainly, whether they will get any money at all for such broadly conceived Army modernization.

A Back Door

The Czech Republic has now landed itself in a paradoxical situation. Two months ago, we handed NATO representatives the discussion materials that explain why we want to join the alliance and how prepared we are for admission, while, currently, talks are being held on the technical incorporation of our units into the NATO structure. In the meantime, however, a parliament has been elected in which parties opposed to direct entry into NATO have a majority.

The communists and republicans, as is known, utterly rule out membership in the alliance. Zeman, with his yes, is preserving his "West European" face but is keeping the back door open with a demand for a referendum. (Moreover, it is impossible to call a referendum at the moment because there is no appropriate constitutional law on a popular plebiscite). Only the parties in the minority governing coalition endorse entry into NATO without a referendum. Their arguments are simple: Membership in a defensive alliance is not a curtailment of state sovereignty (such as, for instance, membership in the EU), and, moreover, it is not only a political, but also an expert military and strategic issue. Therefore, within the framework of the campaign prior to the referendum, for example, it would be impossible, because of secrecy, to explain fully all of the details of membership in the alliance—it would be as if people were voting in the referendum on, for example, the number of military aircraft and the routes for their flights.

Officially, the results of our elections did not alarm NATO in any way. Seen through the eyes of Brussels, however, it is impossible to be too surprised at the vacillation and constant shifting of the day on which the date for NATO enlargement will be announced. We would also probably not rush twice into admitting into our apartment an impoverished neighbor who, cap in hand, knocks loudly on the door, but, at the same time, says that, when it is opened to him, he will think everything over once more.

Slovakia: Meciar's Failure To Take U.S. 'Advice' Noted

AU0907135896 Bratislava SME in Slovak 9 Jul 96 p 4

[Commentary by Marian Lesko: "When the Prime Minister Will Not Take Any Advice, the Country Cannot Be Helped"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hillary Clinton and Madeleine Albright spent four days in Prague. Before leaving for Budapest for three days, they stopped in Bratislava for seven hours. This very fact speaks for itself. And, what is more, the ladies were not silent.

They spoke about the Czech Republic as the shining example of a transforming country. To Hungary, they read Clinton's message that it is "progressing on the correct road ahead to again assume its due place in the family of nations." In Slovakia, on the other hand, they sent out an "unusually sharp signal," as THE WASHINGTON TIMES wrote on Sunday. It was precisely here that the U.S. President's wife mentioned that people "doing what they consider to be correct for the benefit of their country do not wish to be subjected to necessary criticism that goes hand in hand with democracy." World news agencies immediately described her statements as the most aggressive diplomatic step within the framework of her tour of seven European states.

While Hillary Clinton spoke clearly about people, Madeleine Albright was speaking very clearly with people: "I was very frank with the prime minister, because I think that it is important that there be no doubts about what we feel regarding our support for Slovakia." The Clinton administration's ambassador to the United Nations reiterated once again what the U.S. Administration has been saying for a few years—the United States is interested in Slovakia becoming part of the Western community. However, it will support its integration only when it meets the conditions. The "primary one is genuine democratization," Madeleine Albright reiterated. According to her, the prime minister "also heard what I said." The U.S. Administration thought so also one year ago, when it stated in a demarche by what the Slovak Government was diminishing its chances of attaining its proclaimed goal: "It seems to us that the government coalition's intolerance of opposition views is growing, an atmosphere of political intimidation is developing, and the party-controlled method of the government's decisionmaking in privatization jeopardizes the market reform." As no corrective steps were taken, the U.S. ambassador has now recalled the same things once again and, probably, for the last time. When the Slovak prime minister will not take any advice, the country cannot be helped either.

Slovakia: Hillary Clinton Visit 'Another Fiasco' for Country

AU0907140896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 9 Jul 96 p 4

[Commentary by Jan Skoda: "Seven Hours in Slovakia and Enough?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If President Havel said that the visit by the U.S. first lady to Prague was of a "slightly official" nature, then we can state that Hillary Clinton's seven-hour visit to Bratislava was an official opportunity to point out to Slovak politicians what Slovak democracy needs to have so that it is not always spoken about in dark tones.

It is to the detriment of Slovak foreign policy that, this time, senior figures from the biggest world power had to tell us this in "our kitchen," while Ambassador Madeleine Albright, a member of Clinton's cabinet, repeated it several times when she emphasized that "the primary condition for admission into NATO is genuine democracy" and not an army's readiness. At the same time, we can only speculate on the subject of her "private" conversation tete-a-tete with President Kovac. Obviously, it is unnecessary to convince anyone that it was nothing pleasant for the image of Meciar's Slovakia abroad.

The wife of the U.S. President also came to Slovakia with a positive message of support for democracy, which also, according to the more than 200-year-old U.S. Constitution, proceeds from the citizen. If we were to grade her visit by the time spent on our territory, obviously, we would not be too successful. It definitely has more meaning for politics to grade the gradable; in this case, the specific results and the overall social impression from this event. Unfortunately, even in this regard, we do not have much to boast about, although we were given a great deal of praise for the activity of our troops in eradicating the consequences of the war in Bosnia and in Eastern Slavonia.

With this one exception, it was another fiasco for Slovakia's international standing. However, this cannot be blamed on the representatives of the more than 20 civic associations who attended a round table with Mrs. Clinton or even on the participants in the other informal meetings with M. Albright, for example, that at Comenius University, at which more complaints about the legislation undermining democracy and the civic initiatives were made. Responsibility here must also be borne by the person who gave vent to such developments in our country.

It is also necessary to look there for the reasons why—just as Czech Foreign Minister Zieleniec could venture to declare with self-confidence—we cannot boast publicly that relations with the United States form a pillar of Slovak foreign policy. Obviously, this is because the perception of democracy and of the contents of a civic society is different in our countries. And, despite her brief visit, Hillary Clinton must have understood this too.

Slovakia: Commentary Views White House 'Message' for Meciar

AU0907132196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Jul 96 p 9

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Message From the White House"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bratislava stopover of a mere seven hours by Hillary Clinton, the U.S. President's wife, and Madeleine Albright, the overseas power's ambassador to the United Nations, sharply contrasted with the length of their visits to the neighboring countries. This very fact is a tactful yet clear diplomatic signal for the present Slovak ruling team of how it is being evaluated in the White House, not to mention the contents of their talks with President Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, which also differed from their debates in Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest.

Vladimir Meciar, because he was the main addressee of the tactful pointers from overseas, should not overestimate the fact that the two ladies did visit Slovakia, after all. The visit by the U.S. first lady was not the trip by a pampered presidential wife aimed at getting to know the beauties of central European capitals or buying typical local souvenirs, but a diplomatic mission with a precisely defined message.

The message from the White House was unequivocal, just like the message from the EU, presented by the French and German state ministers in charge of European affairs during their visit last week. Slovakia, if it does not want to miss the chance to become a member of the Euroatlantic structures, must change its present political culture, which is rather typical of habits from childhood games.

Ambassador Albright also defined very precisely the time frame for improving the situation in Slovakia. The December meeting of NATO will adopt the itinerary for its expansion and, toward the end of the first half of 1997, candidates will be named who will be invited to become new members of the alliance.

Knowing the Slovak prime minister's temperament, it is to be expected that, after the summer recess, he will attempt a regular political somersault to prevent not only himself, but also the state he represents and runs, from remaining isolated in this region. This is borne out also by his comment that the central European zone should not remain in a political vacuum.

The question remains, however, whether he will succeed in this way in mending all the china that he has broken over the last two years and whether his expected somersault will help him gain the necessary level of credibility among the future partners. Vladimir Meciar does not have many alternatives in the foreign policy sphere, however, as he himself has a habit of saying. Now it is only a question of—either, or.

Slovakia: HZDS Official Views Memorial Building by Hungarians

AU1007092896 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 9 Jul 96 pp 1, 3

[Commentary by Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Foreign Affairs Committee: "Outrageousnesses in Installments"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What would the Hungarian Government say if the remainder of the assimilated Slovaks in Hungary came up with a demand to commemorate Slovak settlements in the area of Blatensky Lake, excuse me, Balaton, settlements that were there before the arrival of the ancestors of today's Hungarians in this territory? According to National Council of the Slovak Republic Deputy [for the Hungarian Coexistence Movement] E. Rozsa, they would have a claim to such a memorial, and it would be legally warranted. This is how he argued on Slovak Television in the case of the Velke Kapusany and other memorials [marking the 1,100th anniversary of the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian basin].

I am not going to look for examples from other parts of Europe and the world. At any rate, nowhere have occupiers demanded such a "service" from the domestic, occupied, population.

Not even the Austrian, German-speaking population of the Italian province of Alto Adige, known as southern Tyrol, demands that memorials celebrating the Hapsburg occupation of the territory of today's Italy be erected on this territory, which it inhabits to this day. If some nationalist extremist, some south Tyrolean equivalent of "Csemadok" [ethnic Hungarian Slovak cultural organization], demanded something like that, he would meet with the appropriate response from the highest Italian authorities, if not with the banning of such an extremist nationalistic association. I know the situation in southern Tyrol, I know that even in southern Tyrol, there are extremist deputies of the German-speaking population demanding the annexation of this territory to Austria. But even these fighters for the past have not dared open the issue of memorials, as representatives of the "Hungarian community" in Slovakia have done.

Our irredentists, or maximalists, who demand collective rights, autonomy, and a never-dreamed-of standard of minority rights that no binding world or European documents confirm, simply outdo everyone else. If they believe that it is possible to achieve something against Slovakia in this way, by demanding unrealistic extra rights, they are mistaken. The sooner they realize this, the better. Especially for them.

Slovakia: MK Officials View 'Autonomy' in Budapest Declaration

AU1007094696 Bratislava SME in Slovak 9 Jul 96 pp 1-2

[Report by "(sp)": "Coexistence Insists on Intensifying the Self-Administration Principle, Otherwise It Will Acknowledge Autonomy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—According to its leader M. Duray, Coexistence favors regulating the status of Hungarians in Slovakia by intensifying the self-administration principle in decisionmaking on public issues. If this does not prove successful in the foreseeable future, M. Duray conceded that Coexistence will "become active" on the issue of establishing autonomy for Hungarians in the Slovak Republic. He said this yesterday in an interview for SME in connection with the final declaration issued on Friday [5 July] by the Budapest conference Hungary and Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders. M. Duray took part in it along with representatives from the other parties in the Hungarian Coalition (MK). The declaration also refers to the need to establish autonomy for Hungarians living outside the Hungarian Republic. "I think the spirit of the declaration lies within the meaning of the Slovak-Hungarian interstate treaty," said M. Duray.

In this context, however, Slovak Foreign Ministry State Secretary J. Sestak described the references to autonomy as alarming and expressed his concern about infringing on the basic treaty between Slovakia and Hungary. According to M. Duray, autonomy as a term in the declaration "appears in general without describing its specific type." In reply to a question on whether the view within the MK on the form of autonomy in Slovakia is unanimous, M. Duray said: "Coexistence has drafted a concept for the status of Hungarians in Slovakia in the form of a symmetrical self-administrative system. That is, we view intensifying the self-administration principle as the primary solution. If, however, this is impossible, we will have no other choice but to become active in keeping with the establishment of autonomy."

Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] Deputy Gy. Bardos said there are differences within the MK on the possible form of autonomy: "These differences should be resolved soon and, following consultations, the MK should adopt an unequivocal point of view. In the opinion of the MKDH, jurisdiction in the spheres of education and culture should be the priority; it should also be in the sphere of self-administration." The Hungarian Civic Party's central secretary, K. Petocz, thinks that "the propaganda surrounding the infringement of the basic treaty between Slovakia and Hungary is a game that is aimed at concealing the real nonadherence to its stipulations." He cited as examples the language law, the nonexistence of a law on the use of minority languages, and the law on the territorial-administrative arrangement.

Slovakia: Cabinet Statement Condemns Hungarian Demands

LD0907213196 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 9 Jul 96

["Full text" of government statement adopted on 9 July in response to a joint communique issued at a joint meeting of the Hungarian prime minister's office and the Office of Hungarians Beyond the Borders held in Budapest on 4 and 5 July; read by Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk on 9 July in Bratislava—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the last elections in Hungary, the Government of the Slovak Republic welcomed the favorable atmosphere that was created for constructive and pragmatic relations between Slovakia and Hungary in a spirit of the values of modern civilization. Consequently, led by the joint interest of contributing toward stabilizing the situation in the region and, at the same time, of enhancing the readiness of the two countries for their integration into euroatlantic structures, it actively supported the successful talks that culminated in the conclusion and ratification of the Treaty on Good-Neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary.

The Government of the Slovak Republic states with satisfaction that despite some open issues, Slovak-Hungarian relations have achieved the best ever intensity and constructive level, and are on a path of continuing to improve dynamically. The Government of the Slovak Republic confirms its readiness to continue to contribute toward this development.

For this reason, the Government of the Slovak Republic has received with surprise and concern reports about the joint communique adopted at the conference entitled Hungary and Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders, held in Budapest on 4-5 July 1996, with the participation of representatives of the Hungarian Government, Hungarian parliamentary political parties, and political and other bodies of ethnic Hungarian minorities living outside Hungary. The Government of the Slovak Republic regards the joint communique as a step against the trend of positive development of mutual relations.

The key demand of the joint communique is to establish ethnic autonomy and local governments on other states' territories which contain an ethnic Hungarian minority.

It is not only the Slovak Government, but also the international community— for example, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]—which has not adopted this principle, in the form of universally accepted international legal standards, as a way of dealing with the minorities issue.

There is no relevant international document, political or legal, that codifies the idea of ethnic autonomy. For this reason, to refer to, quote, the spirit of international norms, unquote, as is done in the joint communique, is misleading.

The Slovak Republic has never accepted the concept of ethnic autonomy, which can ultimately lead to a segregation of citizens who are equal before the law, to separatism, and even to the creation of ethnically pure territories, which strengthens nationalism.

In all the binding international documents, including the basic treaty with Hungary, the Slovak Republic has adopted the concept of individual rights of people belonging to ethnic minorities and implements it generously in practice. By doing so, it guarantees all the legitimate rights designed to preserve and develop their culture, customs, and language as the main elements of their identity.

However, it can never support the division of its citizens according to their ethnic origin, which prevents members of ethnic minorities from integrating into the life of society and carrying out fully a whole range of civic functions.

The Government of the Slovak Republic has yet another reason to regard the communique as a matter of serious concern: pushing for the establishment of ethnic autonomy on the territory of other sovereign states cannot but have a destabilizing effect and is at variance with the current efforts of the international community—including the pact of stability—to strengthen cooperation, stability, and good and friendly relations between neighboring countries.

The Government of the Slovak Republic is therefore obliged to state that such steps are at variance with, quote, an interest in increasing security and stability in the region, unquote, which is being proclaimed in the joint communique. Quote, a permanent solution to the situation of the Hungarian community living beyond the borders, unquote, as the joint communique demands, will not only be very unfortunate but also very dangerous since it contains potential conflicts in the short term. The fact that the representatives of the Hungarian Government put their signatures to the joint communique, thus rendering it legitimate, cannot be understood by the Slovak Government in any other way than as a signal that the Hungarian side is beginning to take concrete steps that go against the spirit and the letter of the Treaty on Good- Neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary as well as the Council of Europe's framework agreement on the protection of ethnic minorities.

The joint communique unequivocally violates the basic treaty between the Slovak Republic and Hungary. It tries to promote such unacceptable principles as putting ethnic affinity above civic allegiance, as well as—and again at variance with its proclamations—putting the Hungarian community above integration of countries into euro-atlantic structures.

The joint communique, at variance with the basic treaty which stresses unequivocally that members of ethnic minorities are primarily citizens of the state in which they live and that it is the responsibility of that state to guarantee individual civic and human rights, sets a precedence of interfering in the internal affairs of other states. Neither the basic treaty nor international legal practice allows this.

The Government of the Slovak Republic resolutely rejects all attempts to destabilize the region and abuse the issue of human and ethnic minority rights to the benefit of the interests of individuals. It confirms its readiness to cooperate constructively in all areas.

Slovakia: Call for Hungary To Apologize for WW II 'Cruelties'

AU0907111696 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by "rzi": "Demand for Hungarian Parliament Members' Apology Signed by 44 Deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—During the last item on the agenda of the 16th National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] meeting—deputies' interpellations—Zora Lazarova (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia

[HZDS]-Slovak Green Alternative), chairwoman of the NRSR Environment Committee, introduced the "Appeal by a Group of NRSR Deputies to the Deputies of the National Assembly of the Hungarian Republic." The Appeal states that the Slovaks' historical experience from coexistence with Hungarians is not good and describes the "gross violence and lawlessness on the occupied territory" during the "Hungarian occupation of the territory of southern Slovakia installed after 5 November 1938." The 44 deputies who signed the Appeal call on the deputies of the Hungarian parliament to "apologize to the Slovak nation for the wrongs it suffered during the occupation of southern Slovakia." According to Zora Lazarova, the Appeal is the first accommodating step toward enabling the development of Slovak-Hungarian cooperation. "Why should the Slovaks be the only nation to whom no one apologizes for the cruelties perpetrated against them?" Lazarova asked. "I really do not know why this should be done precisely in this way," NRSR Deputy Chairman Augustin Marian Huska (HZDS) said. "Nothing is worse than the combination of endless hatred of Hungarians with stupidity," commented Arpad Duka-Zolyomi, deputy for the Hungarian Coalition.

[Bratislava PRACA in Slovak on 6 July on page 2 carries a 600-word Frantisek Melis report on the NRSR session where the above "Appeal" was discussed. The report specifies that the appeal was signed by 26 HZDS deputies, 8 Slovak National Party deputies, 8 Association of Workers of Slovakia deputies, and two independent deputies—Lubomir Roman and Miroslav Kocnar.]

Slovakia: SNS Warns Hungary Unleashing Nationalist Insanity

AU0907162696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 9 Jul 96 p 2

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA report: "Stop Hungarian Chauvinists from Unleashing Nationalistic Insanity; Statement by the SNS Political Board"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Slovak National Party [SNS] Political Board has issued a statement, delivered to us yesterday by SNS Chairman Jan Slota, expressing its dismay at the text of the joint statement of the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office, the Office of Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders, and representatives of Hungarian minorities living in neighboring countries, which states that the Hungarian Government will comprehensively support the efforts of its minorities to gain autonomy in the countries in which they live.

The SNS warns all international institutions, government bodies of the Slovak Republic, and, above all, citizens of the Slovak Republic that this sort of expansionist policy of the Hungarian Republic is conspicuously reminiscent of the policy of Nazi Germany and fascist Horthyite Hungary before World War II. Through Slovak deputies in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the SNS will vigorously request that the European community stop the Hungarian chauvinists from unleashing nationalistic insanity. The SNS also appeals to citizens of Hungarian nationality living in Slovakia to not let themselves be dragged into this dangerous political game of the Hungarian Republic, the consequence of which could be, according to the SNS, the incitement of an armed conflict in Central Europe.

Hungary: Budapest Conference on Extraterritorial Hungarians

LD0907125196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 8 Jul 96

[Statement issued by Budapest conference entitled "Hungary and Extraterritorial Hungarians" on 5 July]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. The principle of responsibility toward extraterritorial Hungarian communities, as laid down in the Hungarian Constitution, has to prevail unreservedly in the development of relations between Hungary and the Hungarian communities living in neighboring countries.

2. In the interest of more efficient enforcement of the nation's interests in bilateral state relations, it is necessary to reach the best possible political consensus between Hungarian political parties, the Hungarian Government, and the political organizations of extraterritorial Hungarian communities.

3. The participants confirm that the creation of self-government and autonomy in accordance with current European practice and in the spirit of international standards is a fundamental condition for the preservation of the identity of extraterritorial Hungarians, their survival and development as a community, and their survival in their homeland. Therefore, in line with the above principles, coordinated support is to be given to the efforts of extraterritorial Hungarian communities to achieve autonomy as a means of settling their situation based on their equality guaranteed by the Constitution. Besides the Hungarian Government's steps in the international political arena with regard to this issue, the conference attaches particular importance to any such work carried out at international party forums and in nongovernmental organizations.

4. The participants agree that from the point of view of Hungary and the future of the Hungarian nation, the earliest possible accession to the organizations of European integration is of decisive importance. That is in the interest of every Hungarian living in the various countries in the Carpathian Basin, and it is also a chance for Hungarians to come together. The participants confirm the need to develop neighborly links simultaneously and with equal importance and for these links to be represented in the Hungarian Republic's foreign policy alongside the euro-atlantic integration endeavors. These foreign policy endeavors cannot push into second place the basic interests of extraterritorial Hungarian communities.

5. The participants support the admission of all Hungary's neighbors to NATO and to the European Union [EU], in the belief that in the countries concerned, through the fulfillment of the conditions of accession and in addition to the undisturbed operation of the institutions of democracy and market economy, the endeavors of the Hungarians communities to achieve special legal status will also succeed, in accordance with the positive practice of the EU member states.

6. The participants condemn politics which set at odds the interests of Hungary and extraterritorial Hungarian communities.

7. The Hungarian Government and Hungarian political parties consider the legitimate extraterritorial Hungarian organizations as partners, and they support their presence at international forums.

8. The political parties of Hungary urge the strengthening of links with democratic forces in neighboring countries and cooperation based on mutual interests with the organizations and institutions there. This endeavor is identical with the intentions of extraterritorial Hungarian organizations. At the same time, dialogue and consensus between the governments of the states concerned and the legitimate representatives of the minorities are indispensable.

9. The Hungarian parliamentary parties pledge that in the course of legislation they will consult with extraterritorial Hungarian organizations on issues affecting these communities.

10. The participants agree that extraterritorial communities are entitled to a certain percentage of Hungary's annual budget.

11. The participants consider a continuous exchange of information, consultation, and coordination to be necessary in the interest of better cooperation between Hungary and extraterritorial Hungarian organizations.

The participants decided to meet again before the end of the year and to examine possible ways of creating a more institutionalized framework of consultation.

Hungary: Foreign Affairs Spokesman on Conference Statement

LD0907164496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The foreign affairs spokesman [Gabor Szentivanyi] does not wish to react to a call by a group of Slovak deputies asking Hungary to apologize for the reannexation of the Upper Region to Hungary in 1939. Istvan Kulcsar reports on the spokesman's briefing:

[Kulcsar] It is up to the politicians what they come up with, Gabor Szentivanyi said. The Foreign Ministry will only deal with this kind of matter if something is raised at the level of governments.

The foreign affairs spokesman made certain comments on the statement issued at the Budapest meeting held with the participation of representatives of Hungarians living beyond the borders last week and foreign reactions to it. He said the aim of the meeting was to continue dialogue between the Hungarian Government, the Hungarian parliamentary parties, and Hungarian organizations beyond the borders, to have a better understanding of their positions, to clear up possible misunderstandings, and to dispel concerns. He said the joint statement reflected the position taken by the participants as a result of a compromise. He stressed the statement did not mention collective rights and autonomy was mentioned in the statement only in a way as ethnic minority autonomy existed, for example, in Finland or Russia, in line with European standards.

Szentivanyi also said the Foreign Ministry's new administrative state secretary, Sandor Papp, and Deputy State Secretary Gabor Bagi, who were to supervise departments dealing with Eastern and Central Europe, had started their work.

Hungary: MDF Official Comments on Hungarians Beyond Borders

AU0807194196 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 5 Jul 96 p 3

[Interview with Gyorgy Csoti, foreign affairs spokesman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF, by Zoltan Udvardy; place and date not given: "Union of All Hungarians Could Be the Final Goal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Udvardy] You mentioned the "uniform national strategy" for the first time in your speech on the occasion of the 1100-year anniversary of the Hungarian state held in Vojvodina. What does this concept mean?

[Csoti] We must start from the premise that the Hungarian nation is one and indivisible and the torn parts of our nation have mutual responsibility toward one another. This is very important because we must give up the practice used so far, whereby ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders formulate their goals and we support these goals by all means. Our illusions that emerged at the time of the change in the regime in 1989 have faded, and it has become clear that not a single community is able to formulate its goals in its own country alone, even with support from Budapest, because the circumstances or their own interests do not allow it. Therefore, the political forces in Budapest and the political forces of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders should jointly formulate our goals in the framework of a common national strategy jointly worked out by the political parties in Hungary, the political parties of the Hungarians living beyond our borders, and the prevailing Hungarian Government.

[Udvardy] To what extent can the treatment of special problems of the various communities of ethnic Hungarians abroad be adapted to fit a uniform concept?

[Csoti] It is the task of the ethnic Hungarians to decide when, where, and how to achieve their personal, territorial, or cultural autonomy. We must openly say that our participation in the integration process should not be hindered by the fact that we are living in various countries; on the other hand, the scenario of integration should make sure that no part of the Hungarian nation suffers any hindrance as a result of this integration process. Therefore, it is important that the signing of interstate treaties between Hungary and its neighbors should only take place with the involvement of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders.

[Udvardy] How would this national unity be implemented in practice?

[Csoti] National institutions could play an important role in this process. It is important, for example, that a professor from Sabadka or a scientist from Bratislava can become members of Hungarian Academy of Sciences. It should also be part of this strategy that ethnic Hungarians living in the neighboring countries recover their property both institutionally and personally.

[Udvardy] This is not quite in harmony with the ideas of the present government....

[Csoti] The prime minister and the foreign minister say that the three-part priority is temporarily upset and we should focus on integration. We do not think that this can happen, even temporarily. All the opposition parties and 10 organizations of ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders—mostly parliamentary parties—agree on this. I am also certain that most opposition parties support the formulation of a national strategy.

Hungary: Financial Reasons Delay Defense Procurements

LD0907123196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense procurements have been delayed for financial reasons. The Defense Ministry would like to purchase new missiles and a locator system for the air defense units on long term loans, through tenders.

The ministry needs 30 billion forints for this. However, the banks will only provide loans to the Defense

Ministry against the Finance Ministry's guarantee. The Finance Ministry is in the process of examining the question of credit guarantees, since paying off the loan, which is necessary for the procurements, would burden the defense budget for the next ten years.

Hungary: Survey Shows Drop in MSZP Popularity

AU0907132496 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 8 Jul 96 p 4

[Correspondent's report on results of opinion poll survey on the popularity of political parties in Hungary: "Dropping Camp of MSZP Supporters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a Marketing Centrum opinion poll at the beginning of June, the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] is beginning to climb out of the pit it led itself into after the "government farewell" meeting on 14 March. Our April poll showed that close to one-third of its supporters left the FKGP while some formerly disappointed voters again started to support the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP].

The number of MSZP supporters dropped by 3 percent between May and June 1996, while 6 percent fewer people oppose the FKGP categorically than last month.

The changes are even more striking among sure voters: Support for MSZP decreased by 7 percent, while support for the FKGP increased by 3 percent. Thus, the number of supporters of the five opposition parties in Parliament again considerably exceeds the number of supporters of the two governing parties among the sure voters.

At the same time, almost no change has been registered in support for the other parties and in the various parties' sympathy index. If this index is under 50, this means that people have more antipathy than sympathy toward the given party.

Regarding the level of their support, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] have been on position 3, 4, and 5 respectively for many months. At the same time, their sympathy index is bigger than that of the MSZP and the FKGP, parties that occupy the first and second position respectively. This is possible because the most supported government party and the most supported opposition party divide the public very much. Only these two parties make people to take a strong position, and there are more people who reject these parties than people who support them.

At the same time, the FIDESZ sympathy index exceeds 50 points both in the camp of KDNP and Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] supporters, and the KDNP index is also above 50 points among the MDF and FKGP supporters, while the SZDSZ is outright popular among the MSZP supporters.

It is also worth noticing that the sympathy index of the SZDSZ and MDF is smaller among their supporters than the same index of other parties among their supporters. This shows that MDF and SZDSZ supporters are emotionally less bound to their elected parties than the FKGP or FIDESZ supporters.

It also transpires that the FKGP, the KDNP, and the MDF are definitely more popular in the provinces than in the capital city, and they are also more popular in villages than in towns. Ladies are angrier at the FKGP than the gentlemen; at the same time, the two liberal parties and the MSZP are somewhat more popular among women than among men. FIDESZ continues to be the youngest among the voters. Among university graduates, the sympathy index of every party is somewhat lower than the average, with the exception of the SZDSZ. University and college graduates almost unanimously reject the FKGP. Opposition parties are somewhat more popular among poorer people. This is particularly true of the FKGP. However, people of higher income find the MSZP and the SZDSZ more attractive.

B-H: President Izetbegovic Comments on Defense Law

LD0907205196 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The defense law of the federation has finally been passed. The 15th session of the constituent assembly will be remembered for its good results. They were achieved in a very short time, which is not exactly the norm for sessions of the assembly. However, one should not forget that the passing of the law is a temporary solution. The final solution is to be expected after the September elections. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] [Defense] Minister Soljic noted there was a lack of linguistic clarity, after which Alija Izetbegovic, president of the presidency, said there was no vagueness and that the original version existed in English.

President Izetbegovic, stressing the importance of the law, which he said was designed to be durable apart from Article 22, which has been resolved in a temporary manner and which relates to the command of the army—pointed out the vital need for terminological adjustments to the section on the competence of the defense minister and his deputy.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] If we say that a minister and his deputy control a ministry, perhaps we are interfering a little in some constitutional provisions on the running of ministries. However, we are not seeking this. We demand that the tasks set out in Article 27, where it says that the ministry carries them out—here it should state at the end, because it is not clear who does this—that these tasks set out in Article 27 are to be carried out by the minister and his deputy in agreement with each other. [end recording]

[Correspondent] There was virtually no debate on this point. [passage omitted]

B-H: Gen Delic Views Passing of Federation Defense Law

AU1007104596 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jul 96 p 4

[Report by Sead Numanovic: "Possibility of New Agreements Initiated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have been waiting for this in order to be able to start constituting the Federation Army and realizing the aid the United States is offering. The United States is ready to train and equip the Federation Army. What remains to be done is to implement the Defense Law. Of course, this opens the possibility of new agreements regarding setting up and the future image of the Federation Army, General Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff, said.

B-H: Silajdzic Seeks Changes to IFOR Mandate

LD0907211496 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1709 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 9 Jul (BH PRESS)—Dr. Haris Silajdzic, chairman of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received Yves Gaudeul, French ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Dr. Silajdzic said that the international community cannot and should not be blamed for everything in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that it is a fact that the international community is overseeing the violation of the Dayton agreement. Noting that people are still being forced out of the Serb entity, Dr. Silajdzic stressed that it is necessary to work on changing the mandate of the Implementation Force [IFOR], otherwise, the elections could result in the legalization of the consequences of aggression.

Silajdzic said that in proposing that the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) should be prevented from taking part in the elections if Radovan Karadzic is not removed, Ambassador Frowick is falling into a trap which, if Karadzic is removed, would mean the legalization of a terrorist organization responsible for 200,000 victims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the statement of the Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina says.

B-H: Commentary on Silajdzic, U.S. Administration's 'Man'

AU0307140096 Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jun 96 pp 10-11

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "Flag on the Head"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The name of the little Bosnian town of Cazin became famous in the world overnight. Now everybody knows that Haris Silajdzic [former prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina], the leader of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, was attacked and injured there. Although every act of political terror attracts the attention of the media, the impression is that this incident was given publicity that considerably exceeds the seriousness of the case itself. In the Russian presidential campaign, Mihail Gorbachev experienced a real shock in Omsk: A drunken Russian came up to him and slapped him in the face in front of the television cameras. However, the media registered that incident only as a bizarre preelection episode from today's Russia. Silajdzic is not Gorbachev, but the pole with which he was hit over the head in Cazin got more space in the Western press than the slap on the face in Omsk.

Lesson

That is probably because in the eyes of the West, Gorbachev is a man of the past, and Silajdzic, at least as far as Bosnia is concerned, is perhaps a man of the future. Besides, the U.S. interest in the events in Bosnia has, through the Dayton agreement, been given the form of obligatory supervision of the "Bosnian pot" [famous Bosnian dish] to ensure that they will not have to pay one cent more than was planned for the installation of peace. Under that supervision the Cazin incident was interpreted as a sign that political violence of the Latin American type had been detonated in Bosnia, with beatings, assassination attempts, and subversion. Some people in the U.S. political establishment were by now uttering the heaviest accusations against Alija Izetbegovic and his party, attributing to them "violence against political opponents."

At first sight the United States has made it clear that it will be brutally open and obtrusive in giving lessons on democratic behavior within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That would by all means make some sense if the U.S. pressure were equally distributed. But what about the other two ruling parties? In the empire of power, the spiritual monarch of which is the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], there is no room for any other political party, and yet Washington is not much worried about that. The situation in the Serb Republic, more precisely in Banja Luka, is only a little bit different. There are some opposition parties, of which two were installed by Milosevic for the needs of the later annexation of half of Bosnia by Serbia, while all the power is still in the hands of the nationalist Serbian Democratic Party [SDS].

Yet some things are clearer now. It was known from before that the Americans had chosen Silajdzic as their man in Bosnia. The only thing they were bothered by was how to eliminate Izetbegovic as painlessly as possible, a man who not only has authority as the leader of a majority of the Bosniak people, but also strong ties with the Islamic world. The attack on Silajdzic in Cazin enabled Washington to openly stand on the side of the former Bosnian prime minister, and promote him as their man in the September elections. For that purpose a political and media stereotype has already been created, according to which Silajdzic is for an integral and multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Izetbegovic allegedly is not. Although none of them have yet given any evidence of the positions attributed to them by these stereotypes, that does not mean that there are no big differences between their political concepts. However, the problem lies in the fact that Silajdzic cannot keep Bosnian multiethnic unless Serbs and Croats want that, too, just as Izetbegovic alone cannot destroy it.

Mass of Madmen

The essence of the matter is not in this or that person, but in a state of mind. When a critical mass is reached in which madmen establish their opinion as the ruling one, it decides everything. [passage omitted]

Guns and Uniforms

The leaders of the opposition parties in Sarajevo reacted in attributing to the ruling party a political conspiracy, and to the Cazin police indifference and inefficacy. Such a reaction, formally seen, could be pleasant to the ears of Western democracy, but in Bosnia it has no greater significance than that of an amusing political intrigue. It must be pure amateurism. Because, as clever people have already stated numerous times, this is no parliamentary struggle for power, but the expedited cementing of a single national power. On the other hand, if the Bosnian Army has factually become a party institution, then the police are even more so. Bosnia-Herzegovina is, in fact, so militarized and politically disintegrated that it will be ruled by guns and uniforms for a long time to come. And in such surroundings, civilian life will be a thing of secondary significance.

B-H: Preelection Roundup; Silajdic Seen as 'U.S. Candidate'

LD1007123296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1142 GMT 10 Jul 96

[By Zdravko Milanovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, July 10 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic and top Bosnian Croat and Serb officials Kresimir Zubak and Momcilo Krajisnik, respectively, will most likely be elected to Bosnia's future tripartite presidency.

Such outcome of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina scheduled for mid-September is indicated by lists of candidates that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) electoral commission has received.

As many as 9 parties will take part in the elections. Of this figure 22 parties are from the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska and 27 from the Moslem-Croat Federation.

A major issue with which opposition leaders in the Moslem-Croat Federation are confronted is how to secure victory over parties organised along ethnic lines and responsible for war tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Moslems' ruling Party of Democratic Action (SDA), believed to be the strongest in the Moslem-Croat Federation, is on the offensive in both entities with its list of 4,960 candidates.

Izetbegovic, Moslems' charismatic leader who has managed to unite their national interest, is the SDA's candidate for presidency.

The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), second-strongest party in the federation organised along ethnic lines, has also shown with its list of 70 candidates that it intends to fight for the equality of Bosnian Croats.

This is also reflected in Bosnian Croats' refusal to abolish their state of Herzeg-Bosnia as provided for by the Dayton peace accords.

The HDZ's major candidate for presidency is Kresimir Zubak, current federation president and a number-one man in Herzeg-Bosnia.

A five-party coalition with a joint list of candidates will be a major rival to parties organised along ethnic lines.

The coalition, which was a fiasco in local elections in Mostar because of its pro-Yugoslav orientation, has nominated Ivo Komsic and Sead Avdic for the presidency.

The Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina has nominated its leader Haris Silajdzic. Analyses show that Silajdzic is Izetbegovic's sole rival for membership in the presidency.

A number of analyses have shown that Silajdzic rates higher than Izetbegovic, but his campaigning activities are receiving poor media coverage.

Many however believe that he is 'a U.S. candidate' that will show all his power and receive full media attention in the next two months.

B-H: Spain's Aznar Discusses IFOR, NATO, Mostar, ETA

BR1007085096 Madrid ABC in Spanish 9 Jul 96 p 23

[Report by Cristina de la Hoz: "Aznar Announces in Bosnia That He Is Personally Negotiating With the Opposition Spain's Full Integration into NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Medjugorje—President Jose Maria Aznar has already begun contacts with the other opposition political forces to reach a consensus on Spain's realignment in the Atlantic alliance; that is, although he did not use this term, full integration "into a new NATO." The head of government, who made these statements in the Bosnian locality of Medjugorje, also stated that it is possible that as from 20 December—the date when the UN mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina expires—it may be necessary to prolong the international forces' presence in the area.

The president of the government stated that the negotiations with the opposition "are going very well," and that he hopes that "they will culminate successfully" in September. Aznar, who did not specify with which political forces he has talked—although it may be emphasized that he recently met with Jordi Pujol, for example—said that he is conducting these talks personally, "because I believe that it is a very important decision for our country," the head of government stated. In any event he emphasized that "the important thing is that the decision be made before the end of the year," and so, in his view, there is time to reach a consensus on a stance.

Reform of NATO

The president of the government, who did not use the expression "full integration," did explain that Spain's participation in the process of reforming NATO, which he defined as "a new alliance in a new scenario," while highlighting the process of the professionalization of the Spanish Armed Forces, is vital.

In addition, asked about the scenario which could develop in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 20 December—the date when, according to the Dayton agreements, the international forces' mandate expires—the president of the government stated that "the desirable thing would be for everything to go so well that a complete withdrawal of the forces will take place." However, he added that it is necessary to work "on a scenario in which there could be a certain post-IFOR (Atlantic alliance forces) presence; a presence which in any event should be much more limited and not lasting, in his view."

Asked how he had found the troops' morale, Jose Maria Aznar remarked that morale "is as it should be," and that it would be absurd for his visit to Bosnia to be interpreted in that light. "That would be as absurd," he said, "just as it would be if I had to receive a visit to raise my morale." Aznar stated that the Spanish troops carrying out their mission in this area have worked "outstandingly."

The president of the government also said that the desirable thing would be for there to be no war criminals at large, and for the problem which has arisen with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic "to be resolved." Nevertheless, he asserted that these two criminals' detention "is not easy, either from the operational viewpoint or from that of the legal framework."

Aznar had previously laid a floral tribute in Mostar to the 17 Spanish servicemen killed in the conflict. To extend this appreciation to all the young people deployed there, he broadcast a radio message from the Spanish brigade's detachment in Medjugorje. The president of the government told the servicemen that "you are representatives of Spanish young people who are magnanimous to the extent of laying down your lives. You are working in a self-sacrificing and quiet manner which the Spanish people value and understand. I am proud of these young people committed to solidarity and justice."

Aznar, who constantly said that he was speaking on behalf of the entire Spanish people, added that "you are ambassadors of Spain's international commitment. As president of the government I feel proud that our flag and our uniform are here. You are the vanguard of our culture of tolerance, magnanimity, and solidarity. Your president values your know-how and honors your values."

The head of government, who was accompanied by Defense Minister Eduardo Serra, went to the Spanish base of Mostar, which is on the line of confrontation which divided Muslims and Croats in the past conflict. In that place, where the buildings are still in ruins, the president of the government reviewed a company of the Paratroop Brigade and unveiled a plaque in memory of the 17 Spanish servicemen who have lost their lives in Bosnia between 1993 and 1996.

With Mostar's Mayors

Aznar also had the opportunity to meet with Mostar's two mayors—Croat Mijo Brajkovic and Bosnian Safet Orucevic. Both politicians gave thanks for the Spanish head of government's presence in the city and highlighted the work of our country's forces in the area. Specifically, the Bosnian mayor stated that "thank heaven, our problems are those of peace, not those of war."

For his part, Aznar told Brajkovic and Orucevic that Spain will follow closely developments in Mostar, that although the country is prepared to support the cooperation projects political matters are in the two mayors' hands, and that the EU's response will depend on that stance.

ETA Members' Statements to EGIN "Do Not Change Government's Stance At All"

The president of the government asserted that the statements made by three hooded ETA [Basque Homeland and Liberty] members to the Basque newspaper EGIN "do not change the government's stance at all." The head of government, who made these statements during his visit to the Spanish troops deployed in Bosnia, added that the next 10 July meeting of the representatives of the democratic parties in Spain will represent "a positive and very sound step." At the same time, the head of government urged that the Madrid Pact advance the democratic parties' unity and international cooperation.

On Sunday [7 July] the newspaper EGIN published a lengthy interview with three hooded ETA members in which the terrorist gang said that it is "humiliating" that the release of prison official Jose Antonio Ortega Lara should be made a condition for resolving the conflict.

B-H: Voter Registration Procedures Outlined

96BA0352A Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jun 96 pp 30-31

[Article by S.K.: "How to Reach the Ballot Box"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The big preparations for the elections have begun, through the registration of voters mostly scattered throughout the world. Everyone, however, will have a chance to get to the ballot box. How?*

According to a decision by the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] provisional electoral commission, the registration of voters for the upcoming general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina began on 3 June and will be finished on 19 July. This deadline, however, applies to those municipalities in which local electoral commissions have been trained and established, according to the OSCE public communique issued in Sarajevo last Thursday.

The provisional list of voters will be available to voters, who can check whether their names are on it and whether changes are needed in connection with it. According to the same communique, the municipalities that now meet the conditions for starting this job and in which the registration of voters can begin on 3 June are:

—the Sarajevo region, 10 municipalities: Ilijas, Novi Grad, Vogosca, Centar, Stari Grad, Ilidza, Hadzici, Novo Sarajevo, Trnovo, and Gorazde;

—the Tuzla region, 15 municipalities: Gracanica, Tuzla, Gradacac, Lukavac, Kalesija, Odzak, Orasje, Zivinice, Tesanj, Zavidovici, Breza, Olovo, Visoko, Kladanj, and Srebrenik;

—the Mostar region, eight municipalities: Jablanica, Konjic, Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, and Kresevo;

—the Banja Luka region, 14 municipalities: Celicac, Kotor Varos, Srpski Brod, Derventa, Prnjavor, Teslic, Srbac, Knezevo, Banja Luka, Gradiska, Novi Grad, Kostajnica, Samac, Pelagicevo;

—the Sokolac region, 30 municipalities: Bijeljina, Lopare/Celic, Ugljevik/Teocak, Zvornik/Sapna, Sekovici, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Srebrenica, Sokolac, Han Pijesak, Pale, Trnovo, Rogatica, Visegrad, Cajnice, Rudo, Nevesinje, Kalinovik, Gacko, Foca/Srbinje, Ljubine, Bileca, Trebinje, Berkovici, Milici, Stari Grad/Lukavica, Srpsko Gorazde/Kopaci, Srpski Mostar, Srpska Ilidza, and Srpsko Novo Sarajevo.

The names of these municipalities are written as the authorities of the two entities delivered them to the OSCE. In the rest of the municipalities, local electoral commissions should be established and trained by 8 June at the latest, after which voter registration will begin, and the responsibility for establishing the commissions lies with the local authorities.

According to the rules which, in accordance with annexes 3 and 7 of the Dayton agreement, were established and announced by the provisional electoral commission, the following should be kept in mind:

1. Any citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina who is 18 or older, and whose name appears in the 1991 Bosnia-Herzegovina census, will have the right to vote in accordance with the electoral rules and regulations.

—The commission announces the provisional list of voters, based on the 1991 census, updated as much as possible so far in accordance with the data available to the State Statistics Institute and other competent bodies in both entities, taking into account: those who have reached 18 since the census, those who have changed their names through marriage or in some other legal way; those who have died.

Copies of this list are made available to all municipalities in both entities and all places outside Bosnia-Herzegovina where refugees live. Those who are qualified to vote will have a period of six months from the date of the list's publication to check on whether their names are on the list, and if they want to, they can submit an application for a change to the list.

2. It is expected that a citizen who no longer lives in the municipality in which he lived in 1991, as a general rule, will vote in person or in absentia in that municipality, provided that it is determined that his name is registered in that municipality. International organizations will try to ensure the necessary permits to facilitate the return of citizens to the municipalities where they were registered in 1991 so that they can vote in person. Those who cannot do that will be allowed to vote in absentia, after submitting an application. In the event of a dispute between the local electoral commission and the provisional electoral commission in connection with voter registration, the provisional electoral commission's decision will be final.

3. A citizen who cannot vote in his own municipality can, however, submit an application to the commission to vote in another place. As an exception to the general rule, the commission will give the right to change the place of registration in the following circumstances:

a) Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who changed their place of residence between the 1991 census and 6 April 1992 can be registered to vote in the municipality in which they lived on 6 April 1992, and can vote there in person or in absentia;

b) Individuals who were citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April 1992, and who changed their place of residence after that date, either voluntarily or by force as a result of the war, can be registered to vote in the municipality where they now live and intend to continue living; they can vote there in person and not in absentia;

c) Refugees and displaced persons who do not want to exercise the right offered to them by article 1 of annex 7 to the Dayton agreement "to return freely to their homes" can be registered to vote in the municipality in which they intend to live in the future, and can vote there in person and not in absentia.

4. Refugees' exercising their right to vote will be interpreted as confirmation of their intention to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Refugees should have the right to vote in elections and not lose their refugee status even without an obligation to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately.

5. In the electoral rules and regulations, the commission can allow citizens who are not in the 1991 census to vote. During the period of six months after the publication of the provisional list of voters, those citizens can apply to the provisional electoral commission to be added to the list, if they can prove that they were accidentally omitted from the list, if they have reached 18 since the 1991 census, or if they changed their name by marriage or by some other legal means.

During the same period, any person or organization can submit an application to the commission to have a certain name deleted from the list because the person in question is deceased, or because he or she did not have Bosnia-Herzegovina citizenship during the 1991 census.

According to the OSCE's statements, these rules are in accordance with the Dayton provisions "to promote free, fair, and democratic elections and to create a basis for representative government, and to ensure the progressive achievement of democratic goals throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina," and that "all refugees and displaced persons have the right to return freely to their homes."

B-H: Russian IFOR Officer: No Future in NATO Peacekeeping

AU1007071196 Paris AFP in English
0250 GMT 10 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ugljevik, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 10 (AFP)—NATO has "no future" in peacekeeping operations, despite its successful record in Bosnia, the commander of the Russian brigade helping to implement the Bosnia peace, said here.

"We are civilised enough to undertake multi-national missions without having to call on this machine," General Alexander Lenchov told journalists, referring to NATO's leadership of peace Implementation Force (IFOR).

He agreed with U.S. military leaders that cooperation between the former Cold War foes in Bosnia was going well, though it was clear that in Moscow and Washington this success was interpreted differently.

For Washington and the NATO leadership, future relations between NATO and Russia should mirror the kind of cooperation achieved in Bosnia—in other words a stable relationship based on mutual trust.

In the Russian view however, the Bosnia operation demonstrates that Russia can work with the United States, rather than with NATO.

"We have shown that Russians and Americans can work together" at military level, Lenchov said at a meeting with the press at his headquarters in Ugljevik in northeastern Bosnia.

He said there was therefore no reason why NATO should seek to expand into eastern Europe.

"If the alliance has money to burn, then let it expand," he ironised.

Lenchov was critical of officials on the civilian side of the Dayton peace accords, who he said were content to "observe" while not doing enough.

"Just when we need strong support from the press and from television in preparing the elections due in September, all the media is talking about is the battle between Carl Bildt (the top official in charge of civilian affairs) and Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic," Lenchov said referring to the two Bosnian Serb leaders charged with war crimes and genocide.

Lenchov said IFOR troops had done what was expected of them whereas the civilians were well behind schedule.

Asked if he believed one year—the length of IFOR's mandate—was enough to pacify Bosnia, Lenchov said it was impossible. "At the end of the year, nobody will be able to say the job is done," he said poiting to the antagonism persisting between Serbs, Croats and Muslims.

B-H: Spanish IFOR General Prefers Troops To Remain in B-H

BR0807125696 Madrid EL MUNDO in Spanish
8 Jul 96 p 17

[Unattributed report: "NATO Should Not Leave, According to Spanish Military Chief"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Medjugorje—The chief of the Spanish brigade deployed in Bosnia, General Luis Fernando Carvajal, said yesterday that he "personally" believed that NATO should remain in Bosnia after the elections on 14 September because peace is far from having been consolidated "although this is a political decision which it is not up to me to make."

Asked also about the possibility of arresting Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who is charged with war crimes, Gen. Carvajal limited his reply to repeating the official position that, in the course of IFOR's operations, whenever a war criminal is located he will be captured "as long as this does not imply a military disaster."

Furthermore, he indicated that "a military operation to arrest war criminals will never be organized" expressly by the international peacekeeping forces.

The Spanish command has expressed "slightly more optimistic" views on Mostar's pacification following the recently held local elections, in which the Muslim political force won by a narrow margin.

B-H: Serbs, Muslims Disagree on Brcko Arbitration

LD0907175096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1604 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Brcko, 9 Jul (SRNA)—The Muslim demand to the arbitration council for Brcko refers to 12 square km encompassing the town center, the Sava port, the railway and road junctions, and all business facilities in the town.

This is what Ahmed Ribic, deputy chairman of the Party of Democratic Action, said at an IFOR [Implementation Force] base in [Bosanski] Brod, during a meeting between political parties from the Serb Republic and the federation from the Brcko area.

He said the Muslim demand for the federation in the Brcko area is either 4 km along the Sava river and 3 km deep into Serb Republic territory, or 5 km along the Sava and 2.5 km deep into Serb Republic territory.

The policy of the Serb Republic is that only part of the interentity line south of Brcko and the widening of the corridor from the current 3 to 20 km, as discussed at Dayton, can be subject to arbitration.

International mediators urge that Brcko be an open city, under international protection and with the deployment of 3,000-5,000 members of the international police, the head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] office in Orasje, Michael Hen has confirmed.

B-H: Serbs, Croats, Muslims Meet To Discuss Brcko Elections

LD0907180796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1604 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Brcko, 9 Jul (SRNA)—Speaking in Brcko today, high-level representatives of the Implementation Force [IFOR] and the OSCE refused to take responsibility for the security of Croats and Muslims who may wish to cast their votes in the September elections in the municipality of Brcko.

"If you have armored buses and sufficient courage, only in that case and at your own risk can you go to the polling stations in the town," IFOR commander in Brcko, Lieutenant Colonel Kukolo, told Croats and Muslims.

Representatives of all political parties of the Serb Republic and Croat-Muslim federation from the region of Brcko held talks today at the IFOR base in Brod on the September elections.

Apart from parties from the Serb Republic, representatives of parties from the Croat-Muslim federation have also submitted electoral lists at municipal level to the OSCE center in Banja Luka. These are: the Party of Democratic Action, the Muslim Bosniak Organization, the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, the Croatian Democratic Union, and the Croatian Party of Rights.

Parties from the Croat-Muslim federation have said that they will boycott the local elections, calling for them to be held after the decision of the arbitration council.

According to OSCE representative Michael Hen [spelling as received], voting will take place abroad on 25 August, and on 14 September all data will be sent for central counting in the Sarajevo headquarters.

There are currently three electoral units in the region of the Brcko municipality—the town itself, the Muslim district of Rahic, and the Croat district of Ravne in Dubrave.

If the OSCE accepts the demand of the parties from the Croat-Muslim federation and postpones local elections in Brcko, they will be held only after 14 December, which is the deadline for the arbitration council to reach a decision.

B-H: Commentary Attacks Statements by U.S. Official, Bildt

LD0907215696 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Jul 96

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] While the Serb Republic and its ruling Serb Democratic Party [SDS] are preparing for the September elections, stressing that everything will be done to ensure the elections are held in the most regular and democratic atmosphere possible, Robert Frowick, the U.S. representative in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] [as received], is waging a private war against the president of the Serb Republic and chairman of the SDS, Radovan Karadzic, thus raising the possibility that elections may not be held at all in the Serb Republic. Zoran Zuza comments:

[Zuza] After yesterday's statement by the head of the OSCE mission to the Serb Republic and Muslim-Croat Federation, U.S. Ambassador Robert Frowick—the essence of which was that he would use all means available to him to prevent the SDS from participating in the September elections if Dr. Karadzic remains at its head—we rightly begin to ask ourselves: Does the so-called international community and U.S. Administration, which heads it, really want peace in this region? How else are we to understand the completely contradictory statements of the international mediator, the latest blackmail, except as an attempt, just two months ahead of the scheduled elections, to again completely destabilize the situation on the ground, to create an atmosphere of general confusion, and make the elections, if they are held at all in such an atmosphere, entirely irregular.

All these emissaries of war, and not peace, who we are sure fully understand the situation here, should be fully aware that the Serbs are up against a wall, that they will not accept the latest ultimatum, and that they will not take part in the elections if they are not allowed to vote for the party whose leader they have supported numerous times in plebiscites and many other ways, and whom they elected as their president in the prewar elections.

After Frowick's statements, it has become quite clear to the Serb people and their leaders that the provisions of the Dayton agreement, Clinton's showpiece, are binding only insofar as they are in accordance with U.S. interests in the region, which is the only way to explain the fact that Carl Bildt supported Frowick's statements only a few days after Bildt said the position of chairman of the party, which Dr. Karadzic holds, was not a public position and was not contrary to the Dayton Agreement. Bildt, who has demonstrated a rather low level of political refinement, yesterday denied his own words when he said that he would not be happy with Dr. Karadzic even as president of a Serb collectors' society. It has been clear to us for some time that Bildt is keen to remain in his present post at any cost by defending U.S. interests and to continue realizing his sick political ambitions, but it is unclear how the chairman of the OSCE, Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti, will react to Frowick's statement, having said on Friday that the OSCE parliamentary assembly in Stockholm had decided that the SDS should take part in the elections.

The U.S. dictate, as can be seen from the statements of several top European officials, has also disgusted the Europeans, who conclude that the behavior of the Americans has reached a point where it can be said that their policy towards the former Bosnia-Herzegovina may lead to fresh conflicts. Whatever the case, if the U.S. threat is realized, the provisions of the Dayton agreement will be completely undermined and the September elections will remain a dream for those forces in the international community who genuinely wanted to implement them.

B-H: Koljevic Interviewed on Dayton's Relevance

96BA0344A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
17 May 96 pp 22-24

[Interview with Serb Republic Vice President Nikola Koljevic, by Jovan Janjic; place and date not given: "Three War Partners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *I think that the real government is on the road between Pale and Banja Luka. There is very frequent communication.*

University professor Dr. Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Republika Srpska, has participated in almost all the talks that have concerned Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the ones in Dayton.

[Janjic] How do you interpret Carl Bildt's statement that the leadership of the Republika Srpska is the main obstacle to implementation of the Dayton agreement and that there can be no compromise regarding the departure of Karadzic and Mladic for The Hague?

[Koljevic] I consider this statement primarily political pressure, as we consider the recent American statements about the possibility of renewed introduction of sanctions to be certain political pressure. I would remind Carl Bildt about what was signed in Dayton regarding The Hague. This was signed: "The requirement of cooperation and collaboration with The Hague tribunal." Cooperation, by definition, presupposes the collaboration of two sides. We have never rejected the review of documents on proven war criminals, but we have believed that this is within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, or court institutions. I needn't remind Mr. Bildt publicly that one of the elementary features of Western democracy is the division of power among the judicial, executive, and legislative branches, a division that assumes the independence of the legislative power. I think that collaboration must be within this institutional plan, and I have not yet had the opportunity to assure myself that collaboration on this plan has indeed begun and has indeed developed. Moreover, individual meetings have been held with people who do not belong to the legislative branch.

[Janjic] What is your view of The Hague court? The trial of Dusan Tadic has begun there....

[Koljevic] First of all, The Hague tribunal was established at a historic juncture, chosen without any basic legal logic. Why wasn't it the Korean War, why wasn't it the Vietnam war, why wasn't it the war in Iraq, instead of your war in Bosnia-Herzegovina? That is what lends political qualification, political character to this court. The only similar court, as far as I know, was the Nuremberg tribunal. Naturally, the victors held it and judged the vanquished. The basic criminal judged at the Nuremberg court was a criminal against peace. That meant passing judgement on those who caused the war. Therefore, there also exists in international law a provision for the phrase "criminal against peace," but The Hague tribunal does not have this category. The categories "war criminals" and "crimes against humanity" exist. This is still another element that indicates that this court has been adapted to certain political circumstances, in order to arrive at a situation where many people are involved in it, specifically, those from the European Union who have themselves said, on several occasions, that they have contributed to, but not caused, the recognition of the secession, the beginning, and the breakout of war in Bosnia.

[Janjic] What connection does everything that is happening have with what Bildt often stresses "establishment of a multiethnic Bosnia"?

[Koljevic] Bildt often recognizes in his request for a multi-ethnic Bosnia, and even in such a plan, sport. Several days ago he stated in Banja Luka that in his opinion national teams would be possible that could represent the Bosnian side, but on a national basis from both entities. Therefore, let's overcome somehow the sport of borders too....

Peace is everyone's goal. That is one of the most important aspects of the Dayton agreement. Due to the fact that peace was established after four terrible blitzkriegs, time is required for things to settle down, for time to have its effect. Time in the Dayton agreement was left for time after the elections, for unresolved problems to be solved. That is what is forward-looking, I think, about the Dayton agreement—leaving the resolution of those questions that are very sensitive now.... In this context, I think that Bildt's statements are premature because the Dayton agreement assumes that these relations be regulated supplementally and that unitarianism not be prejudiced now, so that, for example, the Muslim side might accept something more easily that it now accepts with difficulty. And it is accepting with difficulty many things that were agreed in Dayton, so some kind of attempt is being made to grant a concession to the Muslim side. Therefore I think, as paradoxical as it sounds, that we must constantly recall the Dayton agreement, because every step back from the Dayton agreement, I'm afraid, will be to our detriment.

[Janjic] When you say that, do you also have in mind preventing the return of the refugees?

[Koljevic] The return of the refugees, as you have seen, has proceeded with difficulty and is proceeding with difficulty, because people are involved who were fighting a war up until yesterday. That is an obvious reason. Another reason is the question of organization. I discussed this with many of Bildt's colleagues. It isn't a problem if a smaller number of people come and if this is announced ahead of time, so that it doesn't resemble some attempt at unarmed or allegedly peace-creating invasion of the Republija Srpska territory. Unfortunately, it has often resembled precisely that thus far. There have been incidents in Doboj, in Brcko.... Also, one mustn't forget that we had an incident a few days ago in Hadzici; we had an incident in Tarcin on St. Mark's Day, when Serbs wanted to visit graves—and everybody knows that this is a much older and more more frequent custom with us—therefore, it isn't some political pretext. They were prevented in this; there was an incident in which international police forces intervened.

[Janjic] Therefore, we have incidents on both sides. How can they be prevented?

[Koljevic] They can be prevented, first, with organized visits. Things must go gradually. And second, I think that they can be prevented by increased respect for the Dayton agreement. Here I am thinking of the following: The Dayton agreement, word for word, says the following: "Return of refugees or fair compensation."

Where have you heard up to now that a single meeting has been held regarding the means of organizing fair compensation? These two agreements in the Dayton agreement are completely equal. We believe this should be done on a national level, that it is not between individuals but is institutionalized; this would be far more regular.

The question of fair compensation does not mean that people, under the pressure of departing, must sell their property for a song, but that a civilized agreement be reached. As soon as you have a choice—either to return, or just compensation—you have a chance at freedom.

By chance I know of an example from a town in the vicinity of the Drina. I won't name the town, or the man, or the Muslim woman who came to return to her house. I want to give an example where I was a witness. She came alone, by bus, and said: "I want to return." And these people said: "But, you know, we don't have anywhere to go, we have to come to an agreement." She said: "Fine, if I can't return...but our governments insist that we not accept an exchange, except in Sarajevo, but that we return." Being present at this scene, I had the impression that this was a person who did not come with the true wish of returning, but who wanted to say to her authorities: "Excuse me, I was there, but the Serbs won't give it to me," in order not to suffer any pressure or I don't know what kind of consequences. Therefore, things are approached politically, instead of being approached civilly, democratically.

[Janjic] You are, first of all, for fair compensation?

[Koljevic] Well, fair compensation must be treated equally. It gives people freedom. You don't have to know much about psychology, that every bird flies to its flock. There are birds that want to live and fly with another flock, but I don't know a large number of such birds. There are several things here that are at least paradoxical, not to say contradictory. A multiethnic Yugoslavia couldn't, but a multiethnic Bosnia must.

Secondly, all European states began first as national states, and then, when they gained their national status, they accepted other people, who simply came, included them in their culture and their state. Therefore, that is a process that has passed in Europe and they are now criticizing us, because of delay, of some inhumanity in this plan.

Viewed as a whole, Bosnia is multiethnic. When you look at the phenomenon of multi-ethnicity, you will see that the more extensive the plan, the better it functions. When you come from the level of a republic or region, to the level of a town, then the need appears all at once for people of a different culture (ethnicity comes from the Greek word "ethnos," a custom from which a culture comes) to live in different districts. People in Paris, where there is an Arab quarter, know this very well. It is known where there is a Chinese quarter—Chinatown," where Harlem is, what happens in Chicago when Hispanics, or Mexicans, settle in one part of the city. Therefore, there is a natural need for personal privacy, even in a family—that a man have his own room—and so a wish for ethnic privacy, that a man behave freely within the framework of his customs.

[Janjic] What do you expect from the elections?

[Koljevic] I expect a minimum of legalization and pacification of this situation, which is still weak. The best thing about the elections is that the mandate lasts two years. I don't think I'm being cynical, but I think that elections in this kind of situation cannot be perfect. Naturally, other elections will be different, I hope.

One day Mr. Ganic attacked a part of the draft Election Law, precisely the most valuable and practical part. The alternative was that people could vote where they lived in 1991 or where it is determined that they will live. This greatly simplifies the situation. People who left Krupa neither feel safe nor have a wish to go to Krupa to vote; they want, to give an example from our side, to remain in Prijedor.

Countless examples, I am convinced, can be found on the Muslim side because not only an ethnic, national factor exists, but also a social factor. The dream of many Muslims from Rogatica, for example, was to come and live in Sarajevo, for social reasons. Therefore, you see, that makes possible just what the Muslim guard [as published] is attacking. This is one of the most acceptable factors in the elections. They are constantly trying to return to the situation in 1991, but war began in 1991 because of that situation....

[Janjic] Which of you, of the current Republika Srpska leadership, will participate in the elections?

[Koljevic] That decision, as far as I know, has not been made yet. Because of the fact that interparty elections are being held, only when they are over will this decision be made. However, I am particularly pleased that you asked me that question, because you probably also know how often reporters, especially foreign ones, particularly after Paris, have asked me about candidacies, whether I will campaign. I know the media well enough that I wouldn't wonder much about such provocative and sensational questions. I have answered most often in jest. I replied to Peter Snow of the BBC that I am indeed a candidate for president, but of the local bridge club in Banja Luka. He couldn't do anything with this, even prepare an excerpt for television.

But the devil took the joke and made various forecasts, not very patriotic guesses, I would say, and thus I will answer this question seriously and in a little more detail. First of all, as far as I know, a man never offers himself as a candidate, but others, or political parties, nominate him. If you believe that I will go to the people and collect signatures—I wouldn't think of it. And I do not believe that any other serious person in the Republika Srpska would either. Therefore, this question has been sent to the wrong address. If it wasn't well intended, and I fear that this has often been the case, then I must say that the people in the Republika Srpska will not accept the candidacy of anyone "from the top" or "from the side." Not only that he should put himself forward, but, I am convinced, that he will propose himself in a manner that is in line with, and has been in line with, election laws and democratic practice.

[Janjic] Charges are constantly coming in from the Socialist Party that adherents of national parties are hindering them in their activities.

[Koljevic] I think that this matter, first, regarding the current leadership, is not organized. Second, this naturally does not create a democratic atmosphere and, as far as I know, Prime Minister Kasagic, after the incident at Sokoc, demanded to know who was responsible and to have the incident investigated. I think it is necessary to leave the complete freedom of democratic assemblies and agreements, because I deeply believe that the national reason for that party will be more important than the ideological, or I am perhaps too great an optimist. But, it seems to me that it would be logical to expect this and that this would be a logical position. And next, what will we do in our homes and how will we agree, on anything. And that can be democratic.

[Janjic] What is the influence of the media in Serbia on the voters? It is evident that the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] is considerably forcing itself.

[Koljevic] I don't think this is particularly productive. If you ask me, as a man who has had little to do with the media (I worked a little for American television, for broadcasts on Yugoslavia, that was—to be sure—their educational television), I don't think much can be gained with that. But, there is another media drama, I would say, that exists especially in Banja Luka and that region. Croatian television is very well received, Sarajevo television is very well received, but our television is not even very well received outside Banja Luka, and in Semberija neither Pale nor Banja Luka television is received....

[Janjic] Is Belgrade television received throughout the Republika Srpska?

[Koljevic] It is. We didn't want to interrupt it, even when there was the blockade. We thought we shouldn't add oil to the fire from our side. Moreover, there is an old Serbian proverb I like: Whoever knows better, has a broad field. I think this is also some kind of proof of our preparedness for democracy and competition.

[Janjic] Does the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] cooperate with one of the parties on the Muslim and Croatian side?

[Koljevic] As far as I know, not at the moment; this doesn't mean that if there are signs of good will on the other side and signs of good will on our side, that won't happen.

[Janjic] And how was it that Silajdzic was in Banja Luka the other day?

[Koljevic] Silajdzic was in Banja Luka due to the intervention of Carl Bildt and his team. I think that they are trying to create some balance between between meetings in Sarajevo and meetings in Banja Luka because Banja Luka is, after all, the largest city in the Republika Srpska. Perhaps there is some other reason....

[Janjic] Where is the real power of the Republika Srpska now—in Pale with president Karadzic or in Banja Luka with Prime Minister Kasagic?

[Koljevic] Well, I think it's on the road between Pale and Banja Luka. There is frequent communication. I met Prime Minister Kasagic yesterday in Banja Luka, and the day before, I know I was in Pale. Naturally, it's no secret that various opinions exist and that, by the way, is a democratic phenomenon, especially after the war. Because before the war or during the war any variation in one's opinion is a great danger and a great risk. It's a question of authority, therefore, the establishment of boundaries for the involvement of the president of the government and the government itself, of the president and the members of the presidency, or of the vice president. I think that now, at the moment—I'm being realistic—there is little consensus.

[Janjic] For what position will Dr. Radovan Karadzic be a candidate?

[Koljevic] I don't know. No decision has been made about this, as far as I know.

[Janjic] And you don't know if he will be a candidate?

[Koljevic] No.

B-H: Family of Late Serb General To Bring Lawsuit Against Hague

LD1007144396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1310 GMT 10 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 10 Jul (SRNA)—At the request of the family of the late General Djordje Djukic [Bosnian Serb general indicted by the Hague tribunal, then released owing to poor health—he died recently] and other people who have found themselves targeted by the Hague tribunal, a group of lawyers from Belgrade launched an initiative to bring this court before [words indistinct].

The lawyers are looking into ways of bringing charges against the United Nations as the founder of the tribunal—the charges would be passed to the competent court in New York as the court with local jurisdiction.

The proceedings would be officially instituted by New York lawyers, in line with the U.S. justice system, claiming compensation amounting to millions of dollars.

The Belgrade lawyers intend to base their lawsuit on irregularities in the legal procedure of the Hague tribunal and procedural irregularities during the abduction of the late Gen. Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic.

The lawsuit would include the mistaken identity of Goran Lajic, who was recently released, the inhumane treatment of Gen. Djukic in prison, and other procedural irregularities.

B-H: BETA Suggests Pale Serbs Considering Election Boycott

AU0907190496 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1535 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 9 July (BETA)—By adopting the decision to call the elections in the Serb Republic (RS), the RS Assembly ended its 61st session in Pale today.

The session has concluded that the RS authorities will do their utmost for the elections to be held in a normal and democratic atmosphere. However, it was pointed out that the elections could significantly be endangered by the international community's new pressure.

Yesterday's statement by Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Bosnia, that the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) will not be allowed to run in the elections if Radovan Karadzic remain at its helm, has encounter much opposition in the political circles of the ruling party and the RS leadership, and among the ordinary people.

A possibility of Serbs boycotting the elections has been mentioned if the ruling party is not allowed to run. This could lead to the deterioration of the general situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: SDS Protests OSCE Actions To Deny Electoral Rights

LD0907214796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2050 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Visegrad, 9 Jul (SRNA)—The regional headquarters of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] for the preparation of elections in Romanija and Podrinje issued a protest at its session today against OSCE attempts to deny the right of the ruling party in the Serb Republic to participate in the elections.

It was said that such moves represent a violation of the fundamental principles of democracy and that they are aimed against the interests of the Serb nation.

The party also called on the Implementation Force [IFOR] to stop displaying force in the Serb Republic and to bring the behavior of its members in harmony with the Dayton agreement.

The regional SDS headquarters also calls on all citizens of Romanija and Podrinje to check whether their names are included in electoral lists so as to secure their participation in the September elections.

B-H: Pale 'Source' Says 'Senate' To Start Work After Elections

AU0907192396 Paris AFP in English 1852 GMT 9 Jul 96

[Report by Jacques Charmelot]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, July 9 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs created a new powerbase for their leader Radovan Karadzic Tuesday [9 July] in a move to thwart measures to oust him from power as a dozen corpses were unearthed from a mass grave linked to the rebel chief.

The defiant manoeuvre, designed to circumvent international efforts to remove him from a position of power, comes as war crimes investigators turned up the first bodies of Bosnian Moslems believed to have been slain by Serb forces during the fall of Srebrenica last July.

Karadzic's new political forum, of which he will be chairman, was created by the Bosnian Serb parliament meeting at his stronghold in Pale, just east of Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

Muddying the waters further, a source close to the Bosnian Serb authorities in Pale said later Tuesday that Karadzic would not in fact head the "senate" since the body would not come into being before the September 14 nationwide elections, from which Karadzic is officially barred. [passage omitted]

B-H: SBiH Official Denies Alleged Plans for Convention in Pale

AU0807135996 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jul 96 p 6

[Report by S.M.: "Convention in Pale?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] electoral rules, political parties in the Federation will have an opportunity to present themselves on the Serb entity's television, just like political parties in the Serb entity will have a right and opportunity to present themselves on the Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Despite this, however, various rumors are circulating in Sarajevo that the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina [SBiH] will hold a convention in Pale, thereby trying to secure votes in the Serb entity for the upcoming elections.

We tried, yesterday, to get an answer to these rumors at the headquarters of the SBiH in Sarajevo. Of the party's officials, we managed to get in touch with Muharem Cero, who stated the following for DNEVNI AVAZ:

"As for parties' presentations on the television of the Serb entity, I have received secondhand information that, of the Federation's parties who will present themselves on the Serb entity's television, we are scheduled to appear 22d. The decision on which SBiH official will go to the Serb entity to take part at the party's presentation has not been made yet."

As for the alleged convention of the SBiH in Pale, Cero told us:

"This is the first time I have heard about any such idea. I do not know who is launching such stories. At this stage, I cannot really tell you anyhing about it. As far as I know, such an idea has never been discussed in the party, or, at least, I was not present there if it was discussed," Cero claims.

B-H: SGV Supports Joint List, Banja Luka Coalition in Elections

AU0907191296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 9 Jul 96

[Report by Aida Seldimehic on a news conference by Mirko Pejanovic, ethnic Serb member of the B-H Presidency and chairman of the Serb Civic Council, in Sarajevo on 9 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Seldimehic] Speaking at a news conference, Mirko Pejanovic, chairman of the Serb Civic Council [SGV] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stressed that the convention will debate three documents: The reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the interests of the Serb nation, and the elections 1996.

Dr. Pejanovic had this to say in connection with the first document:

[Pejanovic] The SGV's peacetime goal is the reintegration of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina on four main principles: The first is the economic reconstruction of the country, the second is the return of the refugees, the third is the democratization of the state, and the fourth is the reestablishment of interethnic confidence.

We in the SGV, as a democratic movement, have from the start been promoting the defense of multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, an integral state within its internationally recognized borders, a democratic secular state, and a state with a pluralistic democracy, and we have been promoting the equality of nations and human rights. These ideas of ours are the main trump card in the struggle for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Seldimehic] Speaking about the SGV's visits to Gorazde, Ustikolina, Tesanj, Bugojno, and Banja Luka, Mr. Pejanovic added:

[Pejanovic] Everywhere, in every place, people [words indistinct] at the level of ordinary people there is an interest and readiness to communicate, but the authorities do not allow this.

[Seldimehic] The Serb nation cannot have peace in the future unless it links its fate to a multiethnic and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina and that is why political forces have the task to ensure for the Serb people the cooperation with the political forces of the other two nations to have all the displaced people and refugees able to return home and start living normally again, Pejanovic said.

The SGV promotes the following views in the third document:

[Pejanovic] The SGV remains a democratic movement. It will not become a party, but it will participate in the elections by taking an active approach toward them [words indistinct] contribute to as many Serb citizens as possible [words indistinct] civic, democratic, and multiethnic parties. These people will have our support.

Our primary interest is in supporting, and we do, the Joint List of five opposition parties. We also support the bloc of opposition democratic parties in Banja Luka under the name of Alliance for Peace and Progress, consisting of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, the Social Liberal Party, the Party of Independent Social Democrats, and the United Left, as I believe it is called.

[Seldimehic] Let us just add that the third convention of citizens of Serb nationality will be held in the congress hall in the Holiday Inn at 1000 on Sunday [14 July].

B-H: Finnish Forensic Experts Stopped From Working at Srebrenica

AU1007112596 Paris AFP in English 1113 GMT 10 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, July 10 (AFP)—Finnish forensic experts working to recover the remains of around 100 Moslems killed near the eastern Srebrenica enclave have stopped work because of obstruction by Bosnian Serbs, a UN spokesman said Wednesday.

"The team has effectively ceased work in the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic] because of the obstructive attitude of the Republika Srpska authorities," UN spokesman Alexander Ivanko said.

The Finns had been due to collect the remains of around 100 Muslims scattered on the hillside in the Kravice region, close to the former Muslim enclave of Srebrenica which was overrun by Serb forces a year ago, Ivanko added.

At least 3,000 Muslim men of draft age are believed to have been murdered in the Srebrenica area following the enclave's fall last July, and another 5,000 men have remained unaccounted for.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his army commander Ratko Mladic have been indicted on genocide charges by a UN war crimes court as a result of the killings. The court, based in The Hague, is expected to issue international arrest warrants for the pair later this week.

The Finns left Srpska—the Serb entity within Bosnia-Hercegovina created by the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia—on Tuesday evening, said Ivanko.

"All the promises, guarantees that were given—surprise, surprise—did not materialize on the ground," he said.

"Thanks to the Republika Srpska authorities another humanitarian project was not allowed to proceed."

The team, which includes six Bosnians and 20 Finns and which was escorted to the site by unarmed UN police monitors, had demanded precise security guarantees from the Serbs.

After a delay the Serbs gave the necessary guarantees, both to the UN Centre for Human Rights which is organizing the project, and the office of Carl Bildt, the top civilian official in Bosnia.

Although the team was never physically prevented from working the promised guarantees never materialized so the team "felt they were just wasting time sitting in a hotel, and most of them will be gone by next Wednesday," Ivanko said.

Five team members will stay to work on the identification of 25 bodies collected so far, which are being examined in a hospital in the nearby Muslim-controlled town of Tuzla, he added.

The Finns were planning to work on the site for four weeks but have been able to work only one day at the site, "which suggests that a lot of the remains are still where they were a year ago," Ivanko added.

A team from the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague has been working unobstructed at a suspected mass grave site in the Srebernica region since Sunday.

But the ICTY team is escorted by troops from the NATO-led peace force (IFOR) [Implementation Force] because there is a memorandum of understanding between the ICTY and NATO on how the peace force should support the work of the UN court.

"The UN Centre for Human Rights does not have such a memorandum with the NATO," Ivanko said.

The failure of the Finns to complete their project "does send a very bad message to any other country that is willing to fund the humanitarian project of such importance," Ivanko added.

The work of the Finnish team was funded by the Finnish and Dutch governments.

Croatia: Tudjman Addresses Croatian World Congress

LD0907152196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2018 GMT 6 Jul 96

[Address by President Franjo Tudjman to the Croatian World Congress in Brioni on 6 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ladies and gentlemen, dear Croatian brothers and sisters, it gives me a great pleasure to be able to greet you all, participants in the third convention of the Croatian World Congress, as the state leader of the free, independent, and sovereign Croatian state. I take this opportunity to greet and thank all Croatian emigrants.

As we heard from Simun Coric, the president of the congress, unfortunately there are as many of us all over the world as in the homeland. Croatian emigrants are the embodiment of the whole tragedy and greatness of Croatian history. Tragedy because from the 16th century, in the face of the Ottoman advance and antipeople regimes, Croatian people were forced to leave their homeland and go first to European countries such as Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia, and then across the ocean in the last and this century before World War I and especially after World War II. That departure reflects the tragedy of the Croatian national spirit and Croatian emigrants. The departure weakened the Croatian national spirit in the homeland, and this was worsened by the fact that Croatian emigrants who left in large numbers up to World War II, last century and between the two world wars, had not developed sufficient national maturity. That was taken as proof that Croatia lived in Yugoslavia, that some kind of Yugoslav people were being created there, and so on. Therefore, that is the tragedy of it. In the world that was what it was, we ourselves contributed to the notion that Croatia was part of some kind of Yugoslavia, that its place was there, which had repercussions up until today.

But the greatness of the Croatian emigrants lies in the fact that they—especially because there are so many of them—were aware of and worked on maintaining the Croatian national spirit from the very beginning, and especially since World War II, by engaging in political, cultural, and journalistic activity, and especially through direct links between emigrants and their relatives in the homeland. In that respect Croatian emigrants have made a huge contribution to the maintaining of national awareness and the development of political maturity that has now led us to the independent and autonomous Croatian state.

Furthermore, the large numbers of Croatian emigrants acquired different influences in various countries. They were different because cultural, political, and psychological climates were different in the European countries I mentioned earlier compared to the United States or Canada, or Australia, or Argentina, Chile, South Africa, north European countries, and so on.

But still, even in the countries with very different and even opposing political and cultural climates and atmospheres, Croatian emigrants as a whole acquired positive habits and characteristics that prepared them and their homeland for the new democratic era. They acquired businesslike and enterprising skills and the awareness that all the peoples of the world take care of themselves and pursue their own policies, and that the Croatian people, too, must mature to the degree where they will again be capable of taking their place under the sun. They survived the loss of their own statehood, kingdom, and their own rulers, which they had between the 7th and 11th centuries, and by virtue of the fact that they survived in the homeland and abroad they deserved to become stronger in order to take their fate into their own hands once again. That is the positive role of emigrants in general, but we should look especially into the modern role of emigrants in the creation of the independent and democratic Croatian state.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, when I was allowed to go abroad in 1977, for the first time after 1970, when I was allowed to speak to emigrants—true, only about historic topics relevant to our fate in history and our future—I went to Canada. I must say that it was not only because I was banned from speaking in public in the homeland—from 1971 to 1990 I was either in prison or banned from engaging in any public activity—that I found among the emigrants a greater readiness to accept the idea that the time had come for Croatian reconciliation and a struggle for an independent and autonomous Croatian state. Emigrants—everywhere from Canada and the United States that I visited in 1987, 1988, 1989 to European countries—accepted with greater enthusiasm and readiness the idea of reconciliation and the necessity of creating their own state at that critical moment in European history. Grounds for that idea had been prepared among the emigrants through—as I said before—abundant political activity among the emigrants and also through their awareness of the world in which they lived.

Conditions were very unfavorable in the homeland at that time, but when we had an opportunity to present this idea to the Croats in the homeland during preparations for the first democratic elections in 1989 and then at the first democratic elections in 1990, the unity of the Croats in the homeland and abroad came to the surface. The program of uniting Croats at home and abroad, of uniting all generations and classes, all people holding completely opposing political views, all those who fought against each other in World War II, who fought under different flags but all for Croatia and their children, that idea won the day and that idea has enabled us to bring about our freedom, our democracy, our sovereign Croatian state.

We have achieved a national revival unparalleled by any other nation in any other country, at least in Europe. I said all classes, all descendants of Croatian nobility, true Croatian intelligentsia, Croatian peasants and workers, all classes of the Croatian people and Croats at home and abroad found themselves united in the struggle for Croatian freedom and independence. That was the basic strength with which we created Croatia despite the fact that Europe and the world not only did not want to see the establishment of the autonomous and independent Croatian state but did everything to prevent it. They resorted to all means at their disposal and used all their strength, politics, secret and public services, and all their diplomacy. When we consider all that, we must be proud, both at home and in the diaspora, of what we have achieved despite the world. We proved that we are not a nation that survived by chance all hardships history had in store for us, that we are a nation that made a contribution to the European and Western civilization in all spheres.

So let me take this opportunity to say that it is stupid and irrational when some of our petty politicians and commentators write that we should get closer to Europe. Despite the fact that we did not enjoy full sovereignty and independence during the time of the Croatian rulers from the 7th to 11th centuries, Croatia left behind documents, some written in stone of a quality few nations can pride themselves with, and later when we were part of multinational states, the Hapsburg monarchy and Yugoslavia, our people made a contribution to the development of European and Western culture and civilization in all areas.

I leave it up to you to speak more about these achievements. At a recent meeting of the Presidential Council dedicated to [Croatia's] international position I presented facts about our writers that were active before Shakespeare and Moliere and about our philosophers and humanists who worked before others in Europe and were in no way inferior to them. I did not know then, but I was told a few days later that a Kotruljevic from Dubrovnik put forward the first basis for developing a free market and capitalist society. They [the world] either stole these achievements from us and ascribed them to other authors or humiliated us by aligning us with the Balkans and by proposing theses that we do not deserve and must not have an independent Croatia for all sorts of reasons.

What were the real conditions like for the creation of an independent Croatia? In 1990 after the first multiparty elections, even at the time of holding multiparty elections, no one thought that... [pauses] not one of those world sages or the national political players who were in power thought that a party whose program was to create an independent Croatia might win. They had the army, police, and power in their hands and they called us, who came out with such a program, the party of dangerous intentions. They prepared themselves to deal with us in every possible way. When we won despite everything, we were aware of the circumstances we were living in both within the Yugoslav and the world scene. That is why we did not demand on our first day in power that Yugoslavia be destroyed and Croatia proclaimed an independent country. We were empty-handed and we knew the world did not want it [independent Croatia]. We demanded that the Yugoslav crisis be resolved by turning Yugoslavia into a confederal unit. The world, that world, Europe and the United States, which accepted [Josip Broz] Tito and his Communist movement in World War II, when Yugoslavia as the dungeon of nations [phrase frequently used to refer to Yugoslavia between the world wars because of its alleged opression of certain nations] collapsed only because he was renewing Yugoslavia, this world was telling us in 1990: What do you Croats want? You are in power in Belgrade now, after Tito. The government is headed by Ante Markovic [former Yugoslav prime minister], the foreign minister is also a Croat, [Budimir] Loncar, the defense minister, [Veljko] Kadijevic, for them he was a full Croat although he is only half Croat; so what do you want?

You, who are asking for more than this, are being unreasonable, you want to set the world on fire and so on. These were the circumstances [in which Croatia was created].

In such circumstances it is natural that we had to have very reasonable policies and prepare in those circumstances, even when we came to power but were still within the constitutional framework of the Socialist [Republic of] Croatia and the Yugoslav Federation [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], when we were immersed in such a constitutional and legal order, and the international order, too, because Yugoslavia was an international player, even then, when we had already taken power, we had to prepare secretly and in an illegal way to create the police and the army and organize ourselves for everything that was to come.

The world, from Europe to the Americas, from Germany to the United States, offered their support to preserving Yugoslavia by any means. When the Yugoslav Communist Army started with open aggression against Croatia after they had let Slovenia go, there was an agreement between Belgrade and the world players that Slovenia could leave Yugoslavia but Croatia had to stay. After that, aggression by the Yugoslav Communist Army started, after [the events pertaining to] Slovenia and that Army was the fourth most powerful in Europe. At the same time, we had the Serb rebellion in Croatia. There were 587,000 of them and they were all armed in autumn 1991. The circumstances were such that even those most knowledgeable, those armed with the most reliable data, used to say to my associates: It is over with Croatia—this was in September and October 1991—Croatia will be finished by Christmas. What would happen to the Croat people in future was not known. So they used to say to my people: Take your children and go abroad. Croatia cannot be saved.

This was what the most powerful players in Europe and the world were saying.

In addition to the attacks of Vukovar and Dubrovnik, they bombed Banski Dvori in order to throw Croatia into panic. We survived all that by pursuing our wise, resolute, and sagacious policy, by virtue of the maturity of the Croatian people and assistance from the diaspora.

Seeing that this is still an issue, let me say why we did not strike at the Yugoslav Army during that alleged general attack on Slovenia by the Yugoslav Army. Gentlemen, both those in Belgrade and those in Europe and the world had agreed to allow Slovenia to split from Yugoslavia, while Croatia was meant to stay. They were only looking for a pretext, they wanted us to give them an opportunity to strike against Croatia with all their might at a time when we were still empty-handed so they could arrest us, destroy Croatia, force it to its knees, to make it relive a tragedy greater than Bleiburg.

We did not fall into the trap. We held out in 1991 despite all their predictions and hopes. That was the first miracle and the world started to acknowledge us then. The world recognized us primarily owing to the insights of the players that were more closely acquainted with the circumstances in the Balkans, in this part of southeastern Europe. The Vatican was the first to conclude, on the basis of its 2,000 years of experience, that it was no longer possible to deny the Croatian people the right to independence. This was followed by other states such as Germany—which were also in favor of maintaining Yugoslavia, including even the United States and other states—which gradually began to recognize Croatia. But that recognition arose from the necessity to accept the situation that we created and was accompanied by the still existing aspiration to push us back to some old frameworks now without Slovenia.

We should remember that when we agreed to the deployment of the peace force—because at the time we did not have our own military force and we wanted to give ourselves a historic breathing space to create and strengthen the authorities and create our police and Armed Forces—the internal and international enemies of Croatia's sovereignty were making their own plans for our future. These plans included the Z4 plan, drawn up by representatives of the German and U.S. Governments, which was to give the occupied parts of Croatia—and more than one-quarter, almost one-third of Croatia was occupied—the right to be the Serb Republic of Krajina with their own army, currency, and president—all this 30 km away from Zagreb.

At the same time, in Istria they were encouraging ideas about regionalization, ideas that Istria should belong to the region Europe, belong to Europe as a region, which—together with this Serb Republic of Krajina—was a stone around Croatia's neck that hindered us in pursuing free policy. Furthermore, in Istria they preached the creation of a separate nation. They said that the Istrians were a separate nation. So even now when they have recognized us, the policy of hampering independent Croatia has continued.

Despite all this, we knew what kind of policy we needed to pursue not to miss the favorable historical moment of the collapse of the socialist system in Europe and of multiethnic states. This is why we began preparing our Armed Forces, why we created conditions for liberating the Dubrovnik area, Maslenica, western Slavonia, Kordun and Lika, Dalmatia. I want you to know, dear friends, that in any of these steps that we took to liberate Croatian lands—Croatian areas, for instance, liberating Maslenica in order to link northern Croatia with Zadar, Dalmatia and southern Croatia, and including Operation Flash to liberate western Slavonia, Knin, and other areas—in all these steps not only did we receive no support from the international players but, on the contrary, they told us openly not to do it, insisting that any offensive operation to liberate Croatian lands will inevitably result in the further escalation of the war, Yugoslavia and Russia would be drawn in, a world conflict would result, etc. We were told Europe and the United States were conducting a peaceful operation and that it would be contrary to the peace efforts. We knew what it meant. We spoke and were in favor of peace, of ending the war as soon as possible, but at the same time we wanted to liberate our regions, to liberate Croatia, to install Croatia as a genuinely sovereign country that would enjoy good relations with European and world powers but would not allow others to shape its fate.

Recently even the BBC in its program about the last days of Yugoslavia, which was very unfavorable to

Croatia, again revealed that the day before Operation Storm, which finally lifted the occupation of the Croatian land, the [U.S.] ambassador submitted to me both verbal and written demarches that warned that an offensive operation on our part would threaten peace and would have catastrophic consequences internationally and for us because we had no capability of liberating our country. But we had a go, we had the capability because we had Croatia and the diaspora behind us.

The contribution of the diaspora to this policy and its involvement in the government and the army were enormous. Since the beginning there have been seven of my advisors and ministers from the diaspora. In the Croatian Army there have been the same number—six commissioned and one reserve generals. They were among the most prominent fighters. In other words, the contribution of the diaspora to our policy was enormous both because you accepted the idea of a free and democratic Croatia and because of your contribution in human potential. Several thousand fighters remain in the Croatian Armed Forces and, as I said before, in the government and in the army.

I have spoken about unfavorable conditions but I forgot to mention the fact that the United Nations introduced an arms embargo in 1991 when they expected us to disappear, when Croatia proclaimed its independence. You are aware of what this meant. The Yugoslav Communist Army was armed to the teeth with enough military equipment to wage war for years. As I said earlier, they were the fourth largest military power in Europe and we had nothing.

Therefore, the embargo meant that we in Croatia and the other threatened... [changes thought] We had nothing and we were prevented from buying arms while they could arm themselves. In addition to the situation we were in they also wanted to exert their political influence on us, to keep us in a weak position.

Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, when we take all of this into account we can indeed be proud of our accomplishments. Our strategic policy of setting up, defending... [changes thought] and not only defending Croatia but transforming it into a regional power. We created the forces which secured a victory against the Yugoslav Communist Army and liberated the occupied areas which had been armed by the Yugoslav Communist Army, Serbia, and Yugoslavia. Even they admitted that they had never suffered such defeats in their history. Thus, the world had to recognize Croatia and its irreplaceable role. They admit that our victories have changed the strategic relations not only in former Yugoslavia but also in this part of the world. They admit that we have become a regional power which has to be taken into account.

However, our military victories were accompanied by political and economic victories. From the very beginning we have managed to build a democratic order which is still not perfect. In addition to our military miracle we have also accomplished an economic miracle while surrounded by war. We have managed to get rid of the hyperinflation we inherited from former Yugoslavia. We introduced our national currency, the kuna. For two years, now Croatia has had one of the lowest inflation rates in Europe and the world.

Financial circles from the IMF and the World Bank to Japanese financial experts also praise us for doing something that others could not. This is fascinating and it will place Croatia among the most prosperous states once the war is completely behind us.

Therefore, we have gained the trust of serious military and financial players but diplomatic and political circles, both in Europe and the world, are still putting obstacles in the way of Croatia's independence and sovereignty in an effort to return us to some type of Balkan framework.

They tell us that they do not want some new Yugoslavia. However, some in the world are openly writing about the need for the reconstruction of former Yugoslavia, about the need to set up Euroslavia, about the need to set up a Balkan confederation and an Adriatic confederation, and a southeastern European Union. All sorts of names have been proposed in the cause of some kind of regional approach to the resolution of international problems and European integration.

To this we answered, and you should know that this was not just newspaper tittle-tattle. As president of Croatia, I held talks of the most serious nature about this with the president of the European Council of Ministers, the president of the European Commission, and the NATO secretary general. They advocated the view that Croatia's place was in the region, the Balkan region, south of Slovenia. Without a return to [former] Yugoslavia, as Slovenia has left, but we will include Albania. Imagine how nice it would have been, how we would have ended. This was one [pauses] ...but there were other proposals that, in addition to Albania, Bulgaria and Romania should join [the association]. Only in some U.S. proposals, not official proposals but the ones coming from their strategists, was there a hint that perhaps Hungary might join this Balkan [association including] Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria. However, on the whole the view was [the association should include] countries of the former Yugoslavia, except Slovenia, and Albania.

We expressed our view in an excellent manner and that was why Croatia was attacked again. We do not accept such a regional approach to the establishment of the new European and international order for one simple reason. First, Croatia is a constitutive part of Western European civilization and culture on the basis of the whole of its history. Then, on the basis of its geographical and political position, it is a Mediterranean and central European country. It entered this Balkan framework only after World War I; before then it lived within the Western European culture.

It had already collapsed during World War II and [Josip Broz] Tito managed to reestablish it with his Marxist concept which was allegedly supposed to resolve all the class and national issues. The West accepted him, as I said, because he was reestablishing Yugoslavia.

We shall not accept a Balkan region [regional association] of any sort any more because the predictions are that Croatia would have even less favourable conditions in it than it had in the former two Yugoslav states [from the end of World War I to 1991]. Free movement of people would have to be ensured in the region and that means that all those who left voluntarily during this war would have the right [applause] ... would have the right to return. Free exchange of goods, joint telecommunications and so on, all this means even stronger brotherhood and unity than we have already lived through. We made our views known to Europe and the United States.

Speaking about this you have to be informed because you will relay to all the emigres what happened and what is happening with Croatia. Why did Europe, which otherwise is not united although there is the European Union but, within the European Union there are French policies, British policies, German policies, and Italian policies, which is to say that such a Europe is not united but it was almost completely united in its aim to preserve Yugoslavia. They said recently that not only [Hans-Dietrich] Genscher but [Helmut] Kohl also was in favour of the preservation of Yugoslavia. I told you that their representatives took part in the creation of the Z4 plan.

Why do they now.... [changes thought] From their point of view perhaps it was justifiable because if Croatia was in the Balkan region then, from the point of view of France or Great Britain, Croatia would not be under the influence of Germany but of the region which they already had in their hands in line with the Treaty of Versailles. From the German viewpoint, well, if Croatia was in that region then, in that case, Germany would exercise influence through Croatia.

From the U.S. viewpoint we really do have—and it is a great achievement of the Croatian policy and everything we have accomplished—the best relations with the United States as a world superpower. In all spheres. [applause] In all spheres on the state and political level. They say that the U.S. President has not met any president or head of another state, as many times as the Croatian [president] in the last few years. In the military sphere we have excellent relations and also in the sphere of delicate services [as heard].

But, ladies and gentlemen, friends, those who advocated in 1991 the preservation of Yugoslavia and who were suggesting that Croatia would not last until Christmas have not disappeared from the United States. They have not disappeared from U.S. democracy.

They are still there. So it means that among the U.S. ranks we have, not from the official but from their nongovernmental and whatever name they may have in Croatia paid for and supported not only by [George] Soros [U.S. businessman] but by all those anti-Croatian activities we are faced with from FERAL [FERAL TRIBUNE, independent Split newspaper two of whose journalists are currently on trial], GLOBUS and NACIONAL [opposition papers] etc. [sentence as heard]

From the German ranks we also had—just as we did from the U.S. ranks and that means from the countries closest to us—we have had instigations to rally all those who are against this government, against the political powers who have created independent, democratic Croatia.

The creation of small and big coalitions—why? [pauses] Do you think that they really care whether something is being implemented in one or another democratic way? Why are they screaming against Croatian democracy and preventing the entry of Croatia into the Council of Europe while they have accepted [all others], from Albania to Russia, even welcomed when parliaments in some countries were being overthrown by tanks? It is because they still cannot accept the independent and sovereign Croatian state.

We are witnesses to something never before recorded in the history of international diplomacy, the creation of an unnatural, seven-headed coalition, as they say, from fascists to communists, is being instigated in this country. This opposition association is even being officially invited...[changes thought] and is being offered help. Why? In order to overthrow an authority which, in spite of everything I have been talking about, created an independent Croatia, put it on its own two feet, and created a force that must be reckoned with.

They know that it cannot be overthrown from the outside and that it must be overthrown from the inside. My dear Croat brothers and sisters, that is exactly where the problem lies.

It is not only the fault of international circumstances that we have not had our independent state since the 12th century. The reasons were also within us, among the Croatian ranks. And now we cannot allow dilettantes, agents provocateurs, or outside players, who for different reasons would be better off if there was no Croatia, if there was some kind of Yugo-Balkan state. [sentence as heard] So it is up to us to preserve our achievements.

In this fatherland war our casualties were 10 times fewer than in World War II, when we had failed in creating a Croatian state either as the NDH [Fascist Independent State of Croatia] or as ZAVNOH [Regional Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia—communist-led government]. In other words, our casualties were fewer but still large. If we had enough intelligence and common sense to learn the lessons of our history and create what we have created, to prevent another Bleiburg [site of communist revenge against Croatian pro-fascist troops], we must ensure that we have enough political maturity not to allow this in the future. I am convinced that it will be so, that the Croatian people, both here at home and in the diaspora, by endorsing our policy, that the large majority of the Croatian people is a guarantee that we will defend our freedom, our democracy, and our state sovereignty.

One of the reasons behind constant attempts to discredit Croatia's policy was the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the struggle for our Croatian freedom and democracy, this was the third element. As I said, we were initially attacked as the party of intentions that were dangerous for both the Croatian people and the international order. Then there was the psychological war that was cooked up in Belgrade, London, and elsewhere, and which, understandably, had its supporters in Croatia as well. Well, 70 years of life as part of Yugoslavia and 50 years under the communist system inevitably left legacies and people who felt attached to that system. Then later, we were the party of dangerous intentions that had to be thwarted, in other words the Croatian Democratic Union under whose leadership Croatia was made free. The psychological war was continued by attacks on Herzegovinians [Croats from western Bosnia-Herzegovina]. It was said that the Herzegovinians must be stopped in Croatia because they would cost Croatia dearly, their influence on the Croatian policy, on President Tudjman etc., is too strong. This was a catchword that resulted from the belief that regional differences from the past, affecting everyone from the Croatian rulers from our early history to the Croatian situation in World War II, i.e. being on both sides, of the NDH and of the communists, in other words they counted on the regional differences, they wanted to force us to fight the Herzegovinians forgetting that because of the set of historic circumstances, the Herzegovinians left and settled in Croatia and throughout the world and were in the forefront of the struggle for Croatia.

In addition, our allegedly mistaken policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina came under attack. Far from being wrong our policy there was, in fact, the only correct one. At the time when both Belgrade and the world wanted to preserve Yugoslavia, Croatia as a whole, and Bosnia as a whole, and when they could not break either Croatia or Bosnia because we extended help and because the Croat people, primarily in Herzegovina, rose to resist Yugoslav tanks and Yugo-communist aggression there, we knew that given the international circumstances the only way left to us was to rely on our own resources, to give help to the people of Herzegovina who were under enormous threat because the Muslim leadership was not prepared to offer resistance.

As early as in 1990 and the first half of 1991, when we had political talks in Belgrade about resolving the crisis, Izetbegovic said to me: Why do you want to make your relations with the Yugoslav Army tense? For, he said, we think that we will need the Yugoslav Army to defend us, Izetbegovic said to me. I told him: Mr. Izetbegovic, we are not making our relations with the Yugoslav Army tense. We do not want a one-sided battle in which they are armed and we are not. But we can see that the Yugoslav Army is increasingly becoming an instrument of the greater-Serbia policy.

During our political talks, the Muslim leadership also told us the following: The Slovenes want to leave Yugoslavia and the Serbs have nothing against this so they [the Slovenes] should go and Croatia should get more confederal rights while we in Bosnia-Herzegovina will have closer relations with Serbia. These were the standpoints and this was the situation in connection with Bosnia-Herzegovina. What else could we do in those circumstances—entire Croatia had to support the defense effort of the Herzegovina [Bosnian Croat] people as they had helped us to defend Croatia from Vukovar to Dubrovnik [in 1991].

A TV program recently showed the Yugoslav Army's attempt in 1991 to penetrate toward Split in Croatia via Mostar and Siroki Brijeg in Bosnia. They [Bosnian leaders], including Izetbegovic, called on the people to let the Yugoslav People's Army through.

Therefore, in those circumstances when the Serb Republic was being set up in Bosnia and when the Muslims were still unsure about opting for resistance, it is clear what our option had to be—to set up the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia in order to offer resistance so that Yugoslavia could not capture the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their Serbian plan was to capture the whole areas of Zadar...[pauses], they spoke of Serbia and its three seas—the Novigrad, Skradin, and Adriatic sea.

In any case, they wanted to capture all areas east of the Neretva river. Therefore, the right policy was to provide support for the Bosnian Croat people so they could organize themselves. Naturally, they had to have this idea [Herzeg-Bosnia] to know what they were fighting for; when the decision to set up the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was made they [Bosnian Croats] were facing the Bosnian Serb Republic and also the Muslim leadership, which had begun to move toward setting up a Muslim Bosnia after a period of uncertainty and understatements.

We managed to defend not only Croat-populated western Herzegovina but central Bosnia as well. In this context, let me also mention international talks and efforts to find solutions for Bosnian territorial organization—initially cantonal organization was discussed, provinces were mentioned later, and finally a union of three republics was proposed.

Certain irresponsible Muslim politicians told me: You can immediately annex western Herzegovina but this does not apply for central Bosnia. I said: No, central Bosnia includes the Croat areas of Travnik, Busovaca, Vitez, and Kiseljak, and we would have 100,000 more Croat refugees in Croatia and all prospects for Muslim-Croat cooperation would definitely be over.

There is the question of the reason for the Muslim-Croat conflict. The historic truth is that this conflict began when, during the search for a solution to the Bosnian crisis, Europe put forward a proposal providing for a union of three republics—Muslim, Croat, and Serb republics. The prevailing mood among the Muslim leaders, at that moment, was that as much territory as possible should be secured for the future Muslim state as well as direct access to the Adriatic sea. According to the Muslim ideology and strategy, in these circumstances a Muslim state can survive only if it enjoys direct support from another Islamic state or if it has access to the sea.

That was the reason to demolish Mostar, the only town in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the Croats had their cultural and educational institutions. After the Croat forces, the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], liberated Mostar and Stolac from the Yugo-communist occupation...[pauses] Mostar was destroyed in a horrible way but 60 percent of this destruction was caused by the Yugo-communist aggression against Mostar and 40 percent was caused later during the Muslim-Croat conflict.

Therefore, even though there were those among us who thought that there was no reconciliation with the Muslim policy—in a way they [anti-Muslim Croats] were an obstacle to the normalization of relations with the Muslims—objectively speaking this attitude was more common on the Muslim side and objectively speaking the reason was that there was an attempt to create, in a geographical sense too, a Muslim state that could live independently, supported by Islamic states and opposed to the Croats and the Serbs.

For our part, taking into account the interests of Croats in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not just in Herzegovina, we waged war in Bosnian Posavina [northern Bosnia] even when Sarajevo accused us of interfering in internal Bosnian affairs. Our units, Croatian units from Croatia, spilled their blood to defend Bosnian Posavina in the period when the Muslims were still not prepared for war. Bosnian Posavina was not lost because of wrong Croatian policies but because of war developments, we could not preserve that corridor with our Croatian forces facing all the might at the disposal of the Serbs and the Yugoslav Army.

A part of Bosnian Posavina was returned under the Dayton agreement owing to our demands because we had to leave certain Serb areas that we had liberated and captured during our military campaign in 1995 in line with the 51-49 percent [Bosnian territorial division] ratio. We demanded the return of Bosnian Posavina—as much of it as possible. Naturally, the main players—including the United States, the Contact Group countries,the main European powers—did not want to meet all our demands so that in addition to Orasje we also got Odzak.

Therefore, this criticism of Croatian policies in Bosnia-Herzegovina is groundless. With our policies and our victories we have enabled the United States to assume the leading role in imposing peace and reaching the Dayton agreement. Even when negotiations reached crisis point in Dayton, we were the ones who played the crucial role in order to resolve the Dayton agreement...[pauses] before that we had the Washington agreement when we accepted the setting up of the Muslim-Croat federation. Not only did we eliminate the Muslim-Croat hostilities but we also secured the strategic interests of the Croat nation because under the Washington agreement, which preceded the Dayton agreement, this Muslim-Croat federation has to have confederal links with Croatia; the Washington agreement even mentions a direct link.

In this way we have secured the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the strategic interests of the Croatian state, and at the same time we have created conditions for the general interests of Western Europe, the West, which did not want to allow an independent Islamic state to be set up in Bosnia-Herzegovina because, as such, it would be a foothold for Islamic states and Islamic fundamentalists for their policy of conflict, i.e., exacerbating the conflict between the Islamic and Western civilization.

With that agreement we secured the strategic interests of Croatia and the West, but we also assumed a huge responsibility. You know, dear friends, it is one thing to observe developments from abroad and quite another to be down there. I talked to many ordinary people both from Herzegovina and Bosnia. They told me: President, the Serbs are our enemies, our opponents, but how will we go along with those who are not Christians? My answer was: They are nevertheless from the Croatian national genealogy by origin; most of them still speak a Croatian dialect. It will be in their interest—they have no alternative—and it is in our interest to make coexistence work. So we should work toward the federation developing not only formal links with Croatia but also developing such links with Croatia as the Cazin-Bihac region had during World War II and afterward. That region has been both economically and culturally closer to Croatia. We should work toward that.

You see, this [Dayton agreement] is something that proved to be justified in the strategy of establishing the independent Croatian state and achieving Croatian interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the point of view of the Croatian national identity and Western policy—both that of Europe and the United States. The world, which as I said was not favorably inclined toward Croatia's independence, had to acknowledge this and this is what we are building our relations on.

But after criticism directed at the party of dangerous intentions, at Herzegovinians, at wrong policy toward Muslims, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Muslims, in a psychological war concocted, as I said, in workshops from Belgrade to London, over the past year internal and external enemies launched criticism of the existing situation in Croatia, denouncing it as pure criminality.

The passage from the socialist system to the free market economy is something that humankind has not yet come upon. In that respect, in that passage Croatia has committed fewer mistakes or rather achieved better results than other countries of the former socialist system, from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to Romania, where either the communists are returning to power—precisely due to the mistakes and weaknesses in the transformation process—or the countries have taken on too many debts and put themselves in the hands of foreign capital, thus losing their independence. Therefore, there have been mistakes in the process of transformation in Croatia because it was not possible not to make mistakes when our apparatus necessarily contained.... Not only because of our policy of reconciliation, but also because our people are what they are and because free market and capitalism do not allow [word indistinct] one person does well and another fails, but it is not true that everything in Croatia amounts to criminality.

On the contrary, in this sphere we have made achievements from curbing inflation and introducing the national currency to creating conditions for a gradual growth of the national economy. We had such success that even the most eminent world economic experts congratulated us and said: You have done more than many others, you had no shortages of food, gas, or anything else during the war, it is a miracle how you managed to do that. More than one economic expert said: You managed to achieve such successes because you had a leadership that knew what they wanted.

When in the 1992 election they did not manage to do anything with the help of the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS], they passed the same task to the Croatian Peasants' Party [HSS] in 1994. We still cannot touch the president. [sentence as heard] When that also failed they concluded that the president was the person who maintains the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] and its unity, so then they resorted to all the dirty tricks to attack the president of the Croatian family himself. Such was the struggle that was meant to bring about the replacement of the existing state leadership in Croatia and to direct Croatia toward where they would like to see it, in the Balkans and Yugoslavia.

We should not allow the recurrence of what was detrimental for the Croatian people in any way. I believe that if this had not happened, if a large majority of the Croatian people had not accepted the idea of reconciliation, we would not have everything we have now. This is also our guarantee and we do not need to worry about the noise made by those who are trying to thwart that idea and cast doubt on Croatia's independence, which many are against.

Many are so much against it that everything I said recently at a meeting of the HDZ main committee about Dehos [Democratic Croatian General Assembly, opposition group active abroad], not because of Dehos but because of those who stand behind it and their intentions.... When that was unmasked, they continued pursuing under different forms the same goals I mentioned then. The existence of such ideas and party coalitions aimed at toppling a democratically elected authority, and even the involvement of some ministers, are almost unprecedented in international relations. A time will come to speak about that too. It is sad that many opposition party politicians active on the political scene are not aware of this, and it is even sadder that those who are aware of it still dare take part in it.

The Croatian people now have sufficient experience and maturity not to allow this. The Croatia of today—with its democratic order, with all the experience we have gained, with our police and armed forces—has become an international player on which both Europe and the United States must count. I think that our resolute resistance over the past few months to the idea of being pushed back into the Balkans has seriously undermined their demands. After the talks we had over the past month in Croatia and abroad they have begun to say that if Croatia plays a positive role in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the sense of maintaining the federation, then they will not insist on pushing us back into the Balkans.

I have spoken for a long time and I apologize. I heard your president Sito [newly appointed president of the Croatian World Congress] speak about the work of the Croatian World Congress. Dear friends, we have created Croatia, a democratic, sovereign, and strong Croatia. A Croatia such as has not been seen on the international scene since the times of [Croatian medieval kings] Tomislav and Kresimir. On the basis of our overall experience, I think we can be positive that we will preserve it. If we survived despite all misfortunes and antagonism throughout history, despite all the straying on the part of the Croatian people, then I think that now, on the basis of what we have achieved, we can rest assured.

Let me tell you something—this is not an anecdote but a true event. It was one of my closest associates who asked me: Do we dare introduce the Kuna [Croatian currency]? I said: Regardless of whether others will like it or not, we will have our national currency. But one of those who after Operation Flash [in western Slavonia], when we made the world stand in awe and surprise by liberating western Slavonia in 30 hours, when we were preparing, when here on Brijuni I gave my generals tasks and instructions for the liberation, after we had already liberated territories in western Bosnia and prepared terrain for the liberation of Knin and other areas [in Croatian Krajina], when we were told on behalf of Europe, of the Contact Group powers and the United States that we must not go on because this would cause a catastrophe, because we were not capable of it—this one, one of my closest associates, said: If we do not succeed, there is nothing we can do but...[pauses] not go abroad, but being shot point blank.

I told my generals, who prepared the plan in a week, I told them that they would be in Knin in four days. So it happened. After our victory, this man, and not only he—I am only making an illustration of the general atmosphere—said: The future of the Croatian people and the Croatian state is now assured even without eastern Slavonia and Baranja.

I replied: My dear friend, it is only now that we will liberate eastern Slavonia and Baranja. It will be easier than it would have been before. [applause]

It is only logical to think that—he said that no nation could ever have ideal borders—but now we can, now when we can travel freely from Zagreb to Split. This is four percent of the Croatian land, 2.8 percent of the whole territory including the sea. There is no Croatia without this. I said: No. Only now can we achieve this.

You should know that we were capable of immediately striking militarily in eastern Slavonia, we were capable of going on to Banja Luka and liberating it. However, first, had we gone for Banja Luka, we would have been proclaimed aggressors because these are not Croatian lands. Second, they would have introduced sanctions against us. So we listened to them.

As for eastern Slavonia, had we struck in eastern Slavonia...[pauses] We did not strike eastern Slavonia with military force—we could have done this, but we would have certainly suffered more losses than the total so far. We have had, as you know, about 13,000 dead in Croatia and around 7,000 dead in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Had we militarily struck eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem—bearing in mind that there was a direct presence of the Yugoslav Army there and Belgrade and Vojvodina are near—they would have totally destroyed our Vinkovci, Osijek, Djakovo, and so on, which means a considerable part of Croatia, in addition to these [previously destroyed parts], and we would have suffered even greater losses. In order to avoid losses, I did not allow the Army to proceed. Also, because I wanted us to prove that...[pauses] Yes, we want a political solution, we are in favor of a peaceful solution. The United States gave us guarantees, since we enabled them to assume a leading role after our victories and after the Dayton agreement changed strategic relations, that they would ensure a peaceful integration of the Croatian Danubian region. This will therefore happen a year later, but it will be without any sacrifices and it will prove our willingness to accept that those Serbs who wish to recognize the Croatian state as their homeland will stay.

We did not demand that all [Serbs] leave Knin and other Serb-populated areas [captured by the Croatian Army last year]. The fact that 90 percent of them left is their own problem. They had wanted to rule Croatia and did not want to stay.

Naturally, we are not going to allow them all to return to Knin and western Slavonia. We will allow those in eastern Slavonia to stay, those who have no blood on their hands and who are prepared to recognize the Croatian state, now that they will no longer be able to act as an instrument of a greater Serbian or Yugoslav policy.

This is a way to prove what we are about to this world which accuses us of striving for an ethnically pure state, of inheriting the Independent State of Croatia [Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska—NDH, the pro-Nazi Croatian state set up in 1941], of being racist, fascist, etc. Therefore, we will prove that we want a democratic solution but that we want Croatia to be sovereign. That is why we have acted in this manner and I believe...[pauses] We are already there in Podunavlje [eastern Slavonia].

The return of Croatian refugees is about to begin; some of them are already there. Our police are already there, our flags are flying on the border with Hungary, and they [Croatian police] are being deployed on the River Danube. Therefore, we will have a peaceful resolution in eastern Slavonia.

As far as the number of Serbs who will stay in eastern Slavonia is concerned, some say that 30 percent of them [Croatian Serbs] will leave while others say that between 60 and 70 percent of them will leave. In any case, full Croatian sovereignty will be established there [in eastern Slavonia].

Under these circumstances I would like to ask you as the World Croat Congress, which should link up all Croat associations: Direct all efforts of the Croat emigrants so that they know that they have their free, democratic state and that they can be proud of it because it was set up in a democratic way and with military victories when necessary. They can be proud of this state that has been recognized by the world, which did not support it. This state is a partner of the United States, the greatest international superpower.

However, we have to be aware that even though we have the best possible official relations with the United States, certain circles in the United States supported Yugoslavia and are working in various ways to direct us there [toward Yugoslavia]. This is because they are a democratic society to the extent that they can have different opinions even when it comes to official politics.

We also have to be aware that the United States have friendly relations with the EU but that in many areas their interests are not the same. These differences between a disunited Europe—it is internally disunited but it is united when dealing with the United States—these different European and U.S. standpoints sometimes affect us Croats too. Many in Europe wanted the Dayton agreement to fail and to blame Croatia for it.

The case of [Hans] Koschnick [former EU administrator accused of anti-Croat bias] in Mostar is proof of this. Therefore, the situation is very complicated but we are aware of this and we can cope. I want you to inform the Croats abroad about these circumstances. They should represent their state, they should interpret the interests of their state.

Dear friends, our people occasionally—previously some had illusions about the Slav, Yugoslav, Panslav, Austroslavism, internationalism—some of our people here and abroad still belive in certain ideas, unable to see that all state policies are being conducted in the interest of individual states or groups of states.

It transpires from talks and written documents that they are very interested in whether we will allow a company from this or that country to start doing business in Croatia, whether Croatia will go for Eurobus, Airbus, or Boeing, and so on. All democrats—not only from the world of business, but also those in power, ministers, prime ministers, and heads of state—are interested in this. So we should learn to harness all our powers, all our thoughts, and all our efforts in the interests of the Croatian state, to interpret Croatia's position and interests.

And today especially: Come back. There are so many of you all over the world, from the North to the South Pole, from Chile to New Zealand, from Argentina to Australia and Sweden, Canada, and so on, as many throughout the world as in Croatia. Our homeland is empty and there is no country more beautiful than this one. I know that not all of you and all people can return. But if some, 100,000, 200,000, 300,000 Croatian people returned, it will mean a lot to the homeland, it will be like giving bread to a hungry man.

I know there are many difficulties in connection with that. I will tell you openly that, first of all, we in the homeland must overcome psychological, moral, and legal obstacles that are being deliberately raised by representatives of the old regime who are here. We could not drive them away to Mars. But as you see, we are overcoming these obstacles. There are one-quarter of you, Croatian emigrants, in the Croatian Government, the Croatian Army, Croatia's diplomatic service. Thousands of emigrants took part in the war for the homeland. Around 30,000 have returned to the homeland already and have become active in business. The problem of collecting assistance for parties or any other purpose is no longer an issue. The problem is to focus on the return of as many people as possible, from the elderly to the youngest, or if they stay abroad, on them investing in companies from their home towns, buying shares in Croatian companies that have earned a good reputation in international business and financial circles.

Be a true Croatian World Congress, which will unite all Croatian forces and efforts, which will curb internal friction among emigrants, just as we must do in the homeland in the interests of Croatia's future. Be those who will give concrete proposals about what needs to be done in Croatia as a whole and in individual areas in order to strengthen the unity of Croats at home and abroad and make a return possible. Thank you for everything that you, our Croatian emigrants, have done to preserve the Croatian identity, to establish and defend independent Croatia.

In the end let me just say something that confirms the need and necessity of the policy of reconciliation that has made possible all our victories, freedom, and democracy. We are here in Brijuni now. Brijuni has a history that dates back 3,000 years. Look at the archeological sites and all that. German, Austrian, and Italian tsars and kings used to spend their summers and vacations here. But Brijuni and Istria were never part of the Croatian state. After the victory of Croatian antifascism—of course as part of Yugoslav antifascism—Istria became part. That Tito was at the head of that antifascism, whom we can accuse, and he is guilty for Bleiburg and many other things, but I must say that it is also owing to the ZAVNOH Croatia that today we can be here in Brijuni, in the area that has 3,000 years of history and where the Croatian identity survived even if only as a framework, the Croatian spirit that has been manipulated. If you have an opportunity, if German, Austrian, and Italian kings used to come before. In Tito's time this place was occasionally visited by most—around 100—statesmen from all over the world.

So this is another positive trait of Croatian history which does not justify those negative traits, just the same as the NDH, on the other hand—which is, likewise, a positive thing as I said at the first HDZ assembly. It was not only a quisling creation, it was the embodiment of the Croatian people's desire for their own freedom and their own state.

This is our history which we have managed to overcome through reconciliation. We have understood what was positive and what was negative. We should not allow mistakes to reccur in the future, not to allow our Croatian areas such as Istria, Dalmatia here up to Medjimurje, and Baranja to be under someone else's control. I would like you to know that in the resolution of this crisis in the homeland war—I am not aware whether Lord Owen wrote about it in his book, but he advised me if we wanted to stop the war, in order to achieve a normalization of relations with Serbia, that we should give up Baranja, or something in eastern Slavonia, to Serbia.

Therefore, we have always been, and the Croatian state will be in the future unless we preserve that unity, that wisdom with which we have created Croatian freedom and democracy [sentence as heard]. That there is not enough of it [unclear reference] here is yet another confirmation. [sentence as heard]

Recently they have returned the remains of Dr. Vlatko Macek to the homeland. There is no doubt that Macek was one of the more prominent Croatian politicians from 1928 to 1941. In my opinion as a historian, he was one of the most consistent Croatian politicians of his time—in the period between the death of Stjepan Radic and 1941. But both he and his party [the Croatian Peasants Party] ceased to be players of any consequence after 1941. He was an emigre from 1945 to 1956, when he died. I think you could not consider him really as a political activist. Therefore, Macek, a great Croatian politician, a consistent Croatian politician, played his role at the time. His party shared a similar destiny. However, while burying him in Mirogoj [Zagreb cemetery], none of those present—this is why I say we need to be wise—no one said that the fact that the late Macek was able to return to his homeland was made possible because we created a sovereign and independent Croatian state. I want to say that many people—and this is why I am mentioning this—many people have not yet realized fully what we lived through back in our history and more recently, and what we need today so that we may not live to see again that even people like Macek, who was once the leader of the Croatian people, and Ante Pavelic, who was at the head of the Croatian state in World War II, who also deserves some merit but is at the same time culpable of many things—so everyone in Croatian history should be given his proper place—both in the sense of resting in the Croatian land and also his place in history with all the positive and negative aspects. We should just not make the mistakes they used to make.

I think that modern generations, the generations that took part in this, showed that they know how to draw conclusions and that on the basis of our historical experience in how necessary is the awareness that all Croatian forces, both in the homeland and abroad, regardless of the political differences—some may be democratic Christians, some conservatives, some socialists—but they always have to act in the interest of their Croatian state, as is the case with other nations. There is hardly any difference— perhaps only a bit in domestic policy—whether the U.S. President is a Republican or a Democrat, as far as American interests and American policies toward the rest of the world are concerned. There is hardly any difference whether Gaullists are in power in France or the Socialists, the Christian Democrats or the Socialists in Germany, and so on. There is no difference—they are all used to...[pauses] They have their state and they know that they need to work for their state. Our problem is that we have not had independence for centuries. This has left not only some traces but also something that, in a psychological sense, we have to check. [sentence as heard]

But judging on the whole, there is a prevalence of positive things so far which helped us achieve these historic victories. This is, naturally, the merit of the homeland Croatia, but the victories could not have been achieved without Croatian emigres.

I want to appeal to your heart and soul to be a reflection of these achievements the Croatian people accomplished on their historic path toward their freedom and their democracy. Be conscious that the Croatian people, even when they did not have full sovereignty, made their contribution to the general culture, the culture and the development of the countries where you live, in particular in Europe and the United States. We can be proud of everything we have achieved today. It is up to us alone to make sure that Croatia—Croatia that is so beautiful and so rich—that Croatian men will not have to leave it any more, because we will be building it in the interest of the Croatian man, the Croatian people, the Croatian homeland in its entirety. You know, I have heard more than one foreigner who has travelled the world, say: Well, why did the Croats have to leave their country? Or: What sort of policies did those from Belgrade pursue that led to the situation whereby they lost their grip and cannot be seen from Brijuni to Dubrovnik? [laughs, applause]

I am convinced, ladies and gentlemen, dear Croatian brothers and sisters, that we have assured, all of us together, the future of our dear and only Croatia for a long, long time. Thank you.

Croatia: Suspect in Ahmici 'Massacre' To Be Sent to Hague

AU1007100396 Paris AFP in English
0944 GMT 10 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, July 10 (AFP)—Croatia is to hand over a Croat suspected of committing war crimes in Bosnia to The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY], authorities said Wednesday.

A local court in the Adriatic port of Split said in a communique that Zlatko Aleksovski would be turned over to the war crimes tribunal which has charged him with killings in central Bosnia in 1993. Aleksovski has a week to appeal the decision, the tribunal said.

Aleksovski is allegeded to have taken part in the massacre of Moslems in the village of Ahmici, a small settlement in the bitterly contested Lasva valley where much of the Moslem-Croat conflict during 1993 took place.

Born in Croatia, Aleksovski is one of five soldiers held responsible for the Ahmici killings in which more than 100 people were murdered in one of the worst atrocities of the Bosnian conflict.

The slaughter was carried out by the Bosnian Croat militia (HVO) [Croatian Defense Council] of which Aleksovski was a member. Four other HVO soldiers have been indicted for the murders.

Aleksovski is the second Croat to face the war crimes tribunal. In April, Tihomir Blaskic, a Bosnian Croat commander during the war, gave himself up to the court after international pressure on Zagreb. On signing the Dayton peace accords that ended the war in Bosnia last December Croatia pledged to arrest and extradite any suspected war criminal.

Zagreb, which funded and supplied the HVO with arms and equipment, has been reluctant to see its soldiers go to the tribunal. However, last month Croatia's parliament passed a law on cooperation with the ICTY.

Croatia: Granic Denies Media Reports of Conflict With Susak

AU0907152296 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jul 96 p 5

[Interview with Mate Granic, foreign minister and deputy prime minister, by Aleksa Crnjakovic; place and date not given: "I Am Not in Conflict With Susak"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We asked Minister Mate Granic to comment on the frequent accusations against him and the ministry that he heads and about rumors of a new round of negotiations between the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] and the opposition.

[Crnjakovic] Why is it that certain media have lately been attacking you so vociferously?

[Granic] You should ask them! However, all the accusations presented so far are a complete fiasco on their part. First they said that we had not disclosed Mr. Linden's letter, which testifies to a lack of knowledge about the basic rules of diplomacy, because a diplomatic letter can only be published by the one who sent it, although even this is considered inappropriate in diplomacy, since, as a rule, letters are only disclosed to the public if both sides agree to this. [passage omitted]

[Crnjakovic] Why are there attempts to provoke a conflict between two of the most influential ministers in the government?

[Granic] There are no conflicts either in the government or the HDZ, which, as a large party, must obviously have different currents within it; this is a characteristic of all large parties in the world. Certainly, there are people whose clumsy statements or deeds contribute to such opinions in the public, but it is also certain that neither I personally nor anyone else in our ministry is contributing to this. In any case, my relations with Minister Susak are very good.

[Crnjakovic] In addition to all your obligations, you are actively involved in party activities. You were involved in negotiations with the Liberals and there is rumor that a second round of negotiations with other opposition parties is under way. Is this true and how far have the negotiations progressed?

[Granic] As far as negotiations with the Liberals are concerned, Mr. Budisa has said it all and there is nothing to add. We suggested to the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS] that we cooperate. I asked Budisa whether state interests could make it possible for us to find a solution, and he replied: "Are you interested in comprehensive cooperation at the level of government, the Sabor, and local administration?" I said that we would probably be interested in that, but that I would check with the president. He responded that he was speaking in his name, and that he would convey what I said to HSLS President Gotovac. We conveyed this to our respective presidents and they accepted it. Therefore, the negotiations were held at presidential and party council level. I have only spoken with Budisa once, but not about the distribution of ministerial posts, but rather about comprehensive state interests that would follow from such cooperation, which I strongly support. I did not even discuss this with my brother, with whom I have excellent relations. I thought it was particularly significant that the HDZ Presidency unanimously accepted and supported this.

[Crnjakovic] The negotiations were suspended. Will they be continued?

[Granic] I am very sorry that the negotiations were suspended in accordance with the Liberals' wishes. A great number of foreign ministers and other distinguished people worldwide were delighted that Croatia was negotiating with the leading opposition party and stressed that this is Croatia's internal affair which would have positive reactions worldwide. We in the HDZ are still open to comprehensive cooperation at state level with the HSLS and with the Croatian Peasants' Party. As for Zagreb, we are open to cooperation with all democratic parties. There has been an exchange of signals for such cooperation, but we have not progressed as far as negotiations. But the HDZ is ready for them. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Hadzic Accuses UNTAES of Biased Decisions

AU0907181096 Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Goran Hadzic, the president of our province, talked to the presidents of all the provincial assemblies in Erdut today about the problems that have arisen in the implementation of the Erdut Agreement, mostly because, under the [words indistinct] of cooperativeness, the Serb side is being asked to carry out what the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] and the Croatian side had agreed upon.

In discussing the problems that have arisen on the ground, president Hadzic said the Erdut Agreement states that, after the UNTAES mandate expires, the Serb people have the right to form a council of Serb municipalities, and that, in view of the present state of affairs, the process is not going as planned.

"Unfortunately, we no longer have the two sides that signed the agreement; there is only one—the Croatian side and UNTAES. Our side is presented with the decisions that result from their agreements, and we are asked merely to execute them," said president Hadzic, adding that the Serb side would not tolerate this kind of behavior.

Poland: Visit of Hillary Clinton Reviewed

WS1007133696 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 14 Jul 96 p 18

[Article by Marian Turski: "Her Husband's Emissary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] She knows how to listen.... Who knows, perhaps this is the most important trait a statesman (stateswoman?) should have. I took part in only one of the meetings with Hillary Rodham Clinton, but I was told that the other three during her short visit to Poland were the same. She kept the conversation going, she helped people give answers by asking additional questions, she showed genuine—at least so it seemed—interest in what her interlocutors were saying.

She is outspoken—a very important trait for a public figure—and completely unpretentious. This was visible when she received a bouquet from the market flower sellers in Krakow and when "evaluating" the Polish president; she said she was "convinced that Messrs. Clinton and Kwasniewski would like each other so much that the White House would find it difficult to separate them."

As the First Lady of the United States, she entered the realm of politics unlike any of her predecessors. Eleanor Roosevelt must have been very similar, except that throughout her husband's lifetime she dealt with social issues rather than with politics.

It is a fact that the U.S. President often assigns his wife special missions (such as the health-care project, which failed in this term) or tasks that he himself chooses not to carry out as "the President of all Americans." It is known, for example, that the President does not speak in public about the radical youth movement of the late 1960's, in which he took an active part. Young liberals, sometimes calling themselves "Clintonites," manifested huge sensitivity to social issues. Mrs. Clinton is one of the foremost (appointed) social reformers, particularly where family matters, children's rights, and education are concerned. She acts on her own behalf but also—undoubtedly—represents her husband in a sense.

In this capacity, she toured several Central European states, among them Poland. We thus heard that "this was intended to help Bill Clinton garner votes from those who came from this region."

Poland: Weekly Comments on Kwasniewski's U.S. Visit

WS1007121996 Poznan WPROST in Polish 14 Jul 96 p 13

[Commentary by Tomasz Wroblewski in Washington: "The Polish President in the United States; A Lukewarm Visit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This week the pace of Polish foreign policy in the United States was dictated by Benjamin Netanyahu and...Janusz Marszalek [head of construction for the Auschwitz shopping center]. President Kwasniewski's hopes for obtaining lucid declarations from the White House on NATO enlargement were overshadowed by the "rival" visit of the Israeli prime minister and the controversy raised by the construction of a shopping center at Auschwitz.

Polish diplomats who prepared Aleksander Kwasniewski's visit had difficulties scheduling nearly every evening. The political world in Washington revolved around the visit of the Israeli guest. The Polish president's meeting with senators was rescheduled three times—in all three instances, when the timing of Netanyahu's speech was changed. The only time Warren Christopher was available was at 1930.

The White House gave assurances that the timing of both visits was a coincidence. Republican sources in the Congress, however, suggest the opposite. Clinton's aides, who are against a speedy enlargement of NATO, are irked by Polish lobbying in the Congress, supported by Bob Dole, the Republican presidential candidate.

Although Polish-U.S. relations have never been so good as since World War II, the Clinton administration looks upon Warsaw with reserve. This is due not so much to the Polish president's political past as to a lack of effectiveness in several important areas. Despite the promise made to Richard Holbrooke during his visit to Poland, no independent Security Council has yet been established. Neither has revenge on those responsible for uncovering the so-called Oleksy case stopped. Aleksander Kwasniewski was also sapped by the announcement that construction work had resumed in the proximity of the Auschwitz extermination camp. Reports on conflicts within the governing coalition mean that Clinton's aides do not exclude the possibility of a new wave of political wrangling and advise the president to keep politely aloof just in case.

Poland: President Comments on European Security Before U.S. Visit

WS1007124896 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 13 Jul 96 p 13

[Statement by Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski in Warsaw, received by the POLITYKA editorial office between 5 and 10 July: "What We Have To Offer to America"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If the voices of Lech Walesa, Aleksander Kwasniewski, and other Polish politicians from right, left, and center sound the same in America, the better for Poland. This is a principle we should adhere to.

We can have different opinions about ourselves, but there are issues on which we should not criticize each other in America. I appreciate the U.S. visit of my predecessor, who spoke about issues of fundamental importance for Poland. I myself will want to speak about them without raising Polish conflicts on American soil because this does not make any sense.

I believe the Americans truly support NATO enlargement. New members are joining the system, which has been safeguarding European security, freedom, and democracy since 1949. This is an undeniable success of these values and those who watch over them. I do think, however, that today we need to discuss the issue because Poland is not yet a member of the alliance.

My meeting with President Clinton provides an opportunity to speak about NATO enlargement in the very special context of the Russian elections. It also provides the opportunity to consider arguments and action that should—and I believe this will take place soon—ultimately lead to the enlargement of NATO, to Poland's membership in the alliance. We expect that NATO will include us in the system of European security; we want guarantees. We are prepared to share the responsibilities and risks involved.

What can we offer NATO? Well-organized military structures that could, in the technical sense, play a role in times of crises; enthusiasm and the conviction that Europe has not lost its vital powers, that it is capable of creating a situation in which the vision of a continent without conflicts, where German, Russian, British, French, and Polish interests can meet is becoming real.

The alternative is to retain the division into a better and a worse Europe. Were I asked to be more specific today, I would say that the alternative to NATO enlargement should be its dissolution. The question thus arises: Should we build a new European security system on the basis of NATO and enlarge it, or do we want something entirely new and the dissolution of NATO as a relict of the past? As a realist and pragmatist, I believe we should choose to enlarge NATO and build a new European security system around it.

Poland: Restructuring of Defense Ministry Detailed

LD0907214296 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1900 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The General Staff is an integral part of the Ministry of National Defense [MON], states a decree adopted by the Council of Ministers on granting a statute to the Defense Ministry. Such a decision is in accordance with the requirements imposed on us by NATO as a condition for joining the pact. The statute and the decree on the detailed range of responsibilities resting with the [defense] minister constitute the implementation of last December's law and, in the opinion of the leaders of the ministry, the first such law after the end of World War II.

[Unidentified correspondent] After the reorganization of the ministry, which will happen over a period of several months, the civilian head will be directly in charge of everything that happens in the ministry. In peacetime, the chief of General Staff commands the Army on his behalf. The statute on martial law and the constitution will define who does this during a war situation. In the near future, the number of organizational units in the ministry will shrink from 52 to 32, and there will be 20-percent fewer permanent posts. There will also be from 30 to 40 fewer posts for generals also held by civilians. There will be five organizational departments at MON, and one of the departments will deal with cooperation with NATO and the European Union. The reform of the structure of the ministry, in the view of its leaders, will intensify civilian control of the Army and will free the officers' cadre from political influence.

[Begin recording Andrzej Karkoszka, deputy minister of National Defense; identified by caption] All of the functions in the ministry are fairly well or rather precisely defined, and the responsibilities or, rather, the sphere of the responsibilities are clearer than ever before, and the functions of the defense policy department or the functions of the minister himself are separated from command matters. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The final legal act to the law on the Minister of National Defense concerns regulations governing the Defense Ministry. The Council of Ministers will be working on this next week.

Poland: Cimoszewicz Promises Help for Croatian Reconstruction

LD0907194896 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1730 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz has declared that Polish firms will help in the reconstruction of Croatia after the damage it suffered in the war. Croatian Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa has come on an official visit to Poland for the first time.

The prime ministers of Poland and Croatia said they want to achieve an increase in trade turnover between Poland and Croatia, which, at present, amounts to not quite $100 million annually. Preparations will start in a month's time for the signing of a free trade agreement. Prime Minister Cimoszewicz also promised that Polish firms will help in the reconstruction of Croatia.

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] We have presented our offer connected with the reconstruction of certain parts of Croatia and with measures being undertaken in the sphere of infrastruture investment, transport, power engineering, and the preservation of monuments. [end recording]

Prime Minister Matesa thanked Poland for its contribution to the peace process in former Yugoslavia.

[Begin Matesa recording, fading into superimposed Polish translation] I would particularly like to thank the Polish soldiers serving in the UN forces in Croatia. We assess highly Poland's contribution to stabilizing the situation in the Balkans. [end recording]

Tomorrow, the Croatian prime minister will have talks with Polish politicians and businessmen on our experiences in trying to join the European Union.

Poland: White Book on Oleksy Case Due Out in Aug

WS0907143896 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 9 Jul 96 p 1

[Article by Malgorzata Dragan: "White Book on Sale in August; Oleksy for 15 Zlotys"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The white book containing a collection of documents on the alleged espionage activities of former Prime Minister J. Oleksy will probably hit the bookstores in August. It will cost 15 or 16 zlotys [Z]. "It depends upon how many photographs it contains," said Krzysztof Pomes, deputy director of the Government Information Center. If there are a lot of photographs (for example, Xerox copies of documents), the white book will appear later, in September.

"It will definitely be a thick volume," says K. Pomes. "Our calculations show it will have at least 640 pages in an A-4 format."

The first edition of the white book will be issued in 10,000 copies. "We do not know how many people will be interested in buying it. If it sells well, we will print more copies," says Pomes. Preliminary estimates show that the Office of the Council of Ministers will invest Z54,000. As we have learned, the white book will not include any sensational items or comments; it will only be a compilation of investigative material. Particular chapters of the book are currently being read by Justice Minister Leszek Kubicki and Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski.

"The ministers, as safekeepers of state secrets, have to see to it that personal data on agents and traces that could lead to deciphering their identity do not reach the public," said Ryszard Hincza, spokesman for the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Poland: Old Nomenklatura Being Named as Ambassadors

WS0907134796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Jul 96 pp 1-2

[Article by "K.Gr., P.W.R.": "Staffing Policy at the MSZ; Ambassadors With a Past"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati most often recommends longstanding diplomats from the times of the Polish People's Republic [PRL] for ambassadorial assignments. He frequently recommends people who have had no previous experience in the diplomatic service. Nearly all were members of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]. The minister's two most recent recommendations for ambassador to states of the former USSR—still unofficial—are the most controversial to date.*

The foreign minister wants to send Andrzej Zalucki, currently an under secretary of state at the Ministry of National Defense and former head of [former] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy's office, to replace Stanislaw Ciosek as ambassador to Moscow. Rosati has already submitted his candidacy to the office of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission. Ewa Spychalska, chairwoman of the All-Polish Trade Union Agreement, is to be appointed ambassador to Minsk.

The foreign minister is expected to submit further candidacies soon. Still vacant are ambassadorial positions in, among other places, Chile, Bulgaria, and Iran. Unofficial sources claim that Daniel Passent, a publicist writing for the POLITYKA weekly, is to be appointed shortly as an ambassador.

Minister Rosati's Candidates

Rosati most willingly appoints diplomats who have been working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] for dozens of years and who were PZPR members just as long. Many waited out the period of the Solidarity ministers at MSZ headquarters. Boguslaw Kaczynski is headed for Uzbekistan, Slawomir Dabrowa for the new Yugoslavia, Eugeniusz Noworyta for Argentina, Roman Czyzycki for Portugal, Tadeusz Mulicki for Tunisia.

There are also longstanding MSZ employees who took a break in the 1990's to work in the private sector and are now returning to the ministry: Jan Truszczynski, a candidate for ambassador to one of the European structures, worked for Bank Inicjatyw Gospodarczych, from where he went on to work at the Polish representative office of Creditbank. Stefan Meller, a candidate for ambassador to France, illustrates a reverse trend: He came to work for the MSZ when Krzysztof Skubiszewski was minister. He is currently under secretary of state. He used to work as an accountant for the Izis cosmetics cooperative. Krzysztof Suprowicz (candidate for Yemen) worked for Budimex [construction company] and French and U.S. companies. In the 1990's he became a diplomat, but then left to work for one year for a private company.

Some candidates do not have any previous experience in the diplomatic service—for example, Bronislaw Klimaszewski, candidate for Zaire, former director of LOT [Polish airlines], most recently Agriculture Minister Roman Jagielinski's aide; Eufemia Teichmann, a professor from the Higher School of Commerce, who is to go to Lithuania and who is Dariusz Rosati's friend from university days; Maciej Gorski, who worked for INTERPRESS and most recently headed the Polish Information Agency, which INTERPRESS transformed itself into, (to Italy); Krzysztof Mroziewicz, former foreign correspondent for the POLISH NEWS AGENCY, most recently head of the foreign desk at POLITYKA (to India); Andrzej Bilik, who was press attache in Algeria at the end of the 1960's and who then went on to pursue a career in television (where he was newscast editor), will go to Algeria.

Politicians

Andrzej Urbanczyk, a deputy of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and member of the Foreign Affairs Commission, claims that the MSZ policy of selecting cadres for diplomatic missions is sensible.

"People who have earned a reputation as publicists—for example, Krzysztof Mroziewicz—or who have been uninterruptedly working for the MSZ are being chosen. These are people who have some idea about the diplomatic service," said the SLD deputy, adding that he does not oppose any of Minister Rosati's hitherto appointments.

Janusz Dobrosz of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] maintains that people who had once been strongly involved with the PZPR apparatus are being appointed.

"This causes emotions to run high. I am surprised that our coalition partner and the MSZ cannot find less controversial candidates for some of the posts," said the PSL politician.

Krzysztof Krol of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] also noted that the old party *nomenklatura* is returning to ambassadorial positions.

"Some nominations are shocking—for example, Andrzej Bilik and the candidate for ambassador to Moscow. In my view, people without qualifications and experience are returning to the MSZ. Many of them used to run their own companies. They constitute about one-third of the new appointments. The staffing policy visibly changed when Minister Rosati took over. I would describe it as opening the door for the old *nomenklatura*," said the KPN politician, until recently deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission.

"The two candidacies to our missions in Minsk and Moscow that are to be discussed at the next session of the commission are like crossing the Rubicon," says Piotr Nowina-Konopka of the Freedom Union [UW]. "I think the deputies will have a tough talk with Minister Rosati."

Konopka claims that some of the earlier nominations could have been considered ordinary slips. Now, however, it is becoming clear that "we are dealing with a comeback of people who were once part of the PRL system into the diplomatic service." He gives the example of Maciej Gorski, who, as head of INTERPRESS, used to sit next to Jerzy Urban [spokesman of the last communist government] at news conferences. The UW deputy claims that some of the candidates are being sent to countries they know absolutely nothing about.

"The process of purging embassies of people appointed by Skubiszewski, Olechowski, and Bartoszewski [former foreign ministers] has begun. The passiveness of the president is astounding. I think he should make a public statement on the staffing changes," says the UW politician, adding that he hopes the president's reaction could reverse the current trend.

The MSZ

MSZ Spokesman Pawel Dobrowolski: "I am aware that over the past six months the state administration has done nothing to show its recognition of the diplomatic service. I do not mean only salaries. No system has been established within which the diplomatic corps of the Third Polish Republic could feel it is part of a homogeneous group cognizant of its pupose. The MSZ reform has not been completed. Hence the controversial ambassadorial appointments.

"The most recent candidates for ambassadors are either MSZ employees whose fields of interest are related to the countries they are going to or individuals appointed on the basis of political criteria. Political criteria are applied the world over and always raise controversies. Problems arise when their professional abilities have to be assessed. At this point, I have to refrain from further comment."

Poland: Rifts Within SLD Examined

WS1007081296 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 1 Jul 96 p 4

[Article by Grzegorz Wojcik: "The Power of Fear and Feigned Rifts; Democratic Left Alliance Regroups Forces and Decides To Engage Intensively in Preelection Campaign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Since a few weeks ago, the opposition groups and the press have shared a fickle thought that the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is bursting from inner faction fights.*

A desperate and hopeful watch for rifts in the Alliance is still going on. The impatient are even trying to base on this thesis new and positive—from their point of view—scenarios. But opposition politicians will sooner lose their eyesight than notice significant symptoms of actual SLD disintegration. And if they build their own political careers on their illusions, they are likely to lose another election battle.

The SLD is divided. Perhaps it may even be wrong to underestimate this truth. But the essence of the Alliance lies in the fact that its inner divisions and differences of opinion are of secondary importance.

Fear Cements

Jan Maria Rokita of the Freedom Union [UW] is correct in saying that the Alliance is a typical power group in which views, ideas, and programs do not count as much as the very fact of ruling. The whole history of the postcommunist formation proves it. However, Rokita's thesis does not exhaust the topic. Something else is the key to the unity of the Alliance—the feeling of threat shared by all people connected with this formation.

This SLD-cementing sense of threat is incomparable with the opposition's fear of departure into political nonexistence. It is something much more powerful, almost tangible. There are still vivid memories of the declarations of a bloody revenge on communists made by some opposition circles in the 1980's. The specter of decommunization hovers in the lobbies, and still new crowds of prosecutors rattle at the gates of postcommunism.

It was no accident that Wojciech Jaruzelski and not, for instance, Antoni Macierewicz, got hit with a stone. Nor were the struggles at Aleksander Kwasniewski's preelection meetings and the egg on Jerzy Wiatr's face accidental. Today, it is difficult to explain a chain of such events with the imprecise term of "crackpot" because the idea of delegalization of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] was born in the UW, which so eagerly issues certificates of morality.

Postcommunist activists, although displaying self-satisfaction and arrogance, are afraid. They would be idiots if they did not realize that in a fraction of society—how big a fraction remains an open question—they evoke such aversion and aggression, which the blackest characters of the present right will never rouse in their opponents. And the SLD can be suspected of anything but stupidity. Having an influence on whatever is happening in the country—something pleasant in itself for a politician—is considered by the SLD to be a condition for the survival of its representatives, even though they may not be entirely aware of it.

Large Fear Zone

The members of the imperiled group have one common, basic aim: to suppress the threat. Born is a strong union of people with often contradictory temperaments, characters, and views. Such a group may survive and stamp out the menace only when it has proper power at its disposal. For that reason, the imperiled formation is interested in increasing the community. Therefore the feeling of threat must be as widespread as possible.

The process of "infecting society with menace" is extremely complicated and proceeds on several planes. Postcommunists have no monopoly in this sphere, but they still turn out to be the most effective. They have managed to distribute responsibility for the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] evenly over all party members and their families. They have managed to persuade a large part of society that everybody who lived in the Polish People's Republic [PRL] is to a great extent responsible for whatever happened in it. The postcommunists are also efficient on other platforms, where they take advantage of the human natural apprehension of new phenomena—for instance, they reforge the fear of the free market and the necessity of taking risk into partiality for the PRL. They change detestation of the bad parish priest into anticlerical hysteria. They flatter anybody who has ever made a mistake in his life or who has done something wrong. And they invite him—for instance, via Jerzy Urban—to their defense community. Thus, such people as a Security Administration [UB] criminal, a divorcee, and somebody who has had an abortion find themselves side by side in the cozy mud. The community will equally defend each consciousness. Equally, in order to maintain strong community ties, the threatened group must restrain from gradation of the alleged or real offenses of its members and from "gradation of fear." Only on such foundations can a gorgeous facade of platitude, promises, film-star smiles, well-tailored suits, and so forth be built. Solid foundations, the creation of which took years, have allowed the postcommunists to erect an impressive construction.

Regrouping Forces

If we realize what the postcommunist formation really is and what its governing principles are, it will be easier to wade through the meanderings of its recent policy. The SLD, despite the hopes of the opposition, still remains the same single team it was a few years ago. However, the circumstances in which it functions have changed considerably. What can now be observed—conflicts over the church, the Concordat, the constitution, All-Polish Trade Union Agreement [OPZZ] and the Polish Teachers Association [ZNP] protests, Aleksander Kwasniewski distancing himself from the SLD, Jozef Oleksy and the SdRP distancing themselves from the government—are not symptoms of disintegration but, in military terms, of regrouping forces.

Everything seems to indicate that the postcommunist formation is in its prime. It has its president and prime minister and exerts complete control over the parliament and the country's most important institutions. However, surveys indicate that the SLD's popularity is beginning to slump. The Alliance's image became impaired in numerous clashes, and in some situations it was even embarrassing. Postcommunist rule is not associated with any significant turning points in the situation of Polish society, and many socioeconomic forecasts for the coming year reveal much less optimism than the smile of Grzegorz Kolodko.

According to Janusz Piechocinski of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], SLD activists who gathered in Mierki prepared a scenario of earlier parliamentary elections. We do not know the details, but a lot seems to indicate that the thesis is true, with one stipulation—preliminary decisions were made in the Alliance probably at the beginning of the year, when the so-called Oleksy case was in full "bloom." It was then decided to take the offensive. In Mierki in the spring, the details were specified and the main roles were finally assigned to the actors.

Assigning Roles

Oleksy's withdrawal from the function of prime minister and his shift to the post of SdRP leader has caused significant changes. Oleksy, the sober, seemingly open man, the "nonconcrete" mainstay of the social democracy, has been transformed into a postcommunist hawk. His place was taken by the hitherto "free electron" of the Alliance, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who had never joined the SdRP but nevertheless became more "partylike" over the course of time. Cimoszewicz's role was gradually taken by Kwasniewski; his presidency (of all Poles, of course) was conducive to it. Playing Cimoszewicz's role also gives Kwasniewski a better chance for reelection.

The first signal about earlier elections was given after one of the SLD conferences. May 1997 was mentioned. It is in the interest of the Alliance for Poles to go to the polls as soon as possible—preferably this fall. Of importance are not only economic forecasts or next year's Papal visit. Keeping all of the trump cards in their hands is also at stake. It is easy to imagine a situation in which the postcommunists, thanks to the contradictory moves of the open Kwasniewski and the ultra Oleksy, manage to hold the Concordat bogey until the elections and manage to change the election, thanks to its merger with a constitution referendum, into a plebiscite on moral and sexual freedom. Once again it will be possible to appeal to human fear.

Seeking an Excuse

The SLD has actually started, though perhaps less noisily than the Right, the preelection campaign. Oleksy spends a lot of time on tour. In the fall, a wide discussion about the program is to take place within SdRP ranks. All SLD subjects are distancing themselves more and more from the government, and the OPZZ, for instance, in its style of the 1980's, is shifting to the opposition. The ZNP likewise. Jozef Zych, the first to express fierce protests against earlier elections, has been spectacularly neutralized by Jerzy Urban's weekly. Just now, though the speaker's past has been known to the SLD for a long time. And it was the Alliance, not the PSL, that wanted Zych to replace Oleksy as prime minister. What will the desperate voices of PSL members say today to make the parliament's present term of office last as long as possible?

It is now difficult to predict whether there will be an earlier dissolution of parliament. An excuse is being sought. Could it have been the PSL's partial support for the no-confidence vote in Kaczmarek? Or the fall reform of the administration center, which is about to incite significant personnel shuffling?

In its struggle for power and survival, the SLD has a mighty adherent. It happens to be the...opposition. If it remains in a state of permanent contention with facts and does not change its rhetoric, the Alliance will not be hurt even by a postponement of the election date. An overwhelming part of the electorate will seek medicine for its imaginary, deluded, and real fears in the "diversified" offer of the postcommunists.

Poland: Coalition Partner Fears Return to One-Party Rule

LD1007113896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 10 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] This afternoon, the Senate is to resume voting on amendments to 11 bills that are to reform the central administration and economic authorities. The decision on the postponement of the voting was made by Senate Speaker Adam Struzik a week ago in order to resolve discrepancies that had arisen as a result of the reform debate.

Waldemar Pawlak, chairman of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL, junior party in the ruling coalition], said that a week ago the PSL had blocked the adoption by the Senate of the package of bills on central administration reform, fearing the takeover of all power in the country by the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD, senior partner in the coalition]. We are afraid that old habits may return and one party will assume dominating power, the PSL chairman told Polish radio:

[Begin Pawlak recording] We are worried that old habits may return and one political formation will start to dominate the political scene by taking advantage of the new constitutional order. In particular, lawyers have pointed out that some of the provisions contained in the law on the Council of Ministers should be included in the constitution and thus adopted by a two-thirds majority. When you look at the way the government functions in practice today, there are fears about whether these provisions may not result in history repeating itself. [end recording]

Poland: Jewish Monument Destroyed in Kamien Pomorski

WS0907145996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by "EKI," PAP under the "Yesterday" rubric: "Monument Demolished in Kamien Pomorski"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Saturday [6 July] in Kamien Pomorski, a Jewish obelisk commemorating Jews who inhabited the town before World War II was destroyed. It stood on the site of a cemetery that had survived the war. In 1940, Hans Hoffman, the German mayor at the time, had the cemetery surrounded by a wall to prevent the scarp on which it lay from sliding. In 1968, at the order of the interior minister, the cemetery was completely liquidated. The site was razed, and elements of tombstones were taken out of town. The initiative of constructing the obelisk originated a few months ago, and the monument was uncovered on 14 June 1996. It was demolished on 6 July. The police suppose this was an act of hooliganism that had nothing to do with nationalist animosities.

Poland: Bishops Protest Wiesel Speech at Pogrom Celebrations

WS0907130696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 9 Jul 96 p 2

[Article by the Catholic News Agency: "The Episcopate on Eli Wiesel's Statement; Respect the Crosses"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Yesterday the Committee for Dialogue With Judaism of the Polish Episcopate issued a statement criticizing the speech made by Eli Wiesel, in which he demanded that crosses be removed from the former extermination camp at Birkenau.*

Eli Wiesel, former Auschwitz prisoner and Nobel Peace Prize winner, delivered a speech at celebrations held on 7 July in commemoration of the Kielce pogrom. He said that "the presence of crosses on the sacred soil covering uncounted Jewish victims in Birkenau was and remains an offense."

In the statement issued yesterday by the bishops, signed by Bishop Stanislaw Gadecki, we read:

"Jews and Christians often assess events and symbols from completely different standpoints. This might very well apply also to the symbol of the cross, which to Christians is the fundamental symbol of redemption and love, whereas to Jews it is a deeply rooted symbol of fear and hatred and the source and foundation of Christian anti-Semitism. That is why the symbol of the cross is one of the key topics of the Christian-Jewish dialogue. For the same reason, there has been the longstanding argument about the presence of the cross on the territory of the former Nazi concentration camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau, the site of suffering and death for nearly 1.5 million people, predominantly European Jews.

"Apart from the overwhelming majority of Jews, Christians of many nationalities were killed at the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp. It is also a burial ground of Christians for whom the cross is a symbol of resurrection.

"A pluralist society will be possible only if it is based on mutual respect for the dignity and rights of every human being. Instead of eradicating religious signs and symbols, we should educate the young generations to respect the signs and symbols of other religions, to allow everything that has the highest value for each individual to coexist in harmony. That coexistence does not by any means deprive our Jewish brothers of the right to have their own symbols on the site of the greatness and the fall of man.

"For the Poles, the history of Nazi fascism and the history of postwar communism was the history of a war waged against the cross, targeted at systematically eliminating the symbol from public life in the name of atheistic ideology. Not only was religion to be eliminated from public life, but also the belief was to be instilled that religion is harmful, that it alienates man and deprives him of his inner dynamics. In both instances, secularism was imposed, people opposed it as best they could, fighting for their right to express their beliefs. Hence, whoever speaks out against the cross unwillingly, in good faith even, is no different from those who were against the Jews and against the Christians.

"In Poland, moreover, the cross has become the symbol of liberation from the occupiers, and many antidictatorship insurrections were launched under the sign of the cross, uniting people not only of different convictions but also of different religions, thus constituting not only a religious but also a national value. To us, speaking out against the cross sounds like a negation of those upheavals.

"Many Christians lost their lives in the quest for this truth. This fact can neither be disrespected nor neglected."

[Also on 9 July, Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish carries on page 3 an 800-report by Anna Wielopolska entitled "Elie Wiesel's Controversial Speech in Kielce; Dissonance." "It is significant," Wielopolska writes, "that the text of Wiesel's speech that reporters were handed did not have the paragraph on the problem of Catholic crosses at Auschwitz. It might have been added at the last minute." She points out that the Polish hosts of the Kielce pogrom celebrations "emphasized gestures of conciliation." The report concludes: "The young Jewish people [present at the Kielce ceremony] who do not understand Polish will remember Elie Wiesel's speech. They will not remember the apologies to the Jewish nation. The did not hear them. They did not understand. They might return to Poland within the framework of the Israeli project piloted by the [Israeli] Education Ministry, which teaches the young generations about the tragic history of the Jewish nation and finances trips to Auschwitz, Treblinka, Majdanek, and Kielce."]

Federal

FRY: Milosevic, OSCE Official Discuss Bosnian Elections

LD0907154196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1458 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 9 Jul (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Ambassador Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and colleagues.

The talks related to current questions and preparations for the forthcoming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Milosevic said that it was vital to try to allow all political parties to participate in the elections on the basis of equality.

Special attention was devoted to the efforts to ensure full freedom of movement, equal access of all political parties to the media, and other important preconditions for the elections to be carried out successfully.

Also taking part in the talks was Milan Milutinovic, Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs.

FRY: Kontic on Importance of Attendance at Salzburg Forum

AU0907195596 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 9 Jul 96

[Interview with FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic by Tatjana Lenard in Salzburg on 9 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lenard] The economic summit of Central and East European countries ended in Salzburg today. Prior to his return to Yugoslavia, we asked our federal prime minister why it was important for Yugoslavia to participate in such international meetings.

[Kontic] There are several reasons why it is important to participate in such meetings. Our two-day stay here in Salzburg has shown that Yugoslavia is indeed experiencing exceptional affirmation. There are several reasons for this. First, Yugoslavia is being paid its due for its contributions to the conclusion and implementation of peace agreements. Everyone we spoke to also said they expected Yugoslavia to have crucial influence on the strengthening of good-neighborly relations and stabilization in this region.

In addition, I would say it is very important to attend such meetings because they offer opportunities to meet a large number of the most prominent politicians and statesmen of Europe and to agree on measure to improve bilateral cooperation. Our talks have shown that these politicians are very prepared to support our return to the international political, financial, trade and other organizations. They are aware that Yugoslavia cannot play peacemaker or contribute to regional stability if it is not part of the international community.

Finally, I would like to say that our talks contributed significantly toward dispelling existing prejudices and stereotypes about Yugoslavia and Yugoslav policy. Despite the fact that there are undoubtedly still some dissonant tones, I think it is extremely important to participate actively in this and similar forums. We have done so on this occasion with a very experienced and competent state and business delegation.

Serbia

Serbia: OSCE's Frowick, Milosevic Discuss Karadzic's Future

AU0907173096 Paris AFP in English 1716 GMT 9 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 9 (AFP)—The Bosnian Serbs created a new power base for their leader Radovan Karadzic on Tuesday [9 July] in an attempt to sidestep international efforts to oust him from positions of influence.

The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said that the parliament of the Serb entity in Bosnia created a 55-member Senate as a "consultative body."

"The meetings of the Senate will be called and presided over by the president of the republic," the agency said, in a report received in Belgrade.

Under the Dayton peace accords, Karadzic, who has been indicted by the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague, is barred from holding any public office or from standing in general elections slated for September.

The new body would appear to be aimed at giving Karadzic an alternative power base which he could occupy unelected and in which he could claim that he no longer holds public office.

The head of the European security body organising the September 14 elections in Bosnia, Robert Frowick, met Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic here Tuesday for two hours of talks to discuss the threat posed by Karadzic to Bosnia's first post-war vote.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) envoy said the "constructive" talks had broached among other things his own threat to ban Karadzic's SDS party from the election as long as he retains overall control of the party.

"We are both hoping that the electoral process can go forward in a way that all parties will be able to participate, and that we will have an optimal result," Frowick said.

In London meanwhile, the commander of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), Admiral Leighton Smith said Tuesday that Karadzic and Bosnian Serb military chief Gen Ratko Mladic, who is also indicted by the tribunal, were still "100 percent" in control of the Serb Republic.

"Mladic is still in complete command of his army. Karadzic is still in (the Bosnian Serb stronghold) Pale and still exercises considerable influence," he said.

Asked why both were still at liberty, despite the warrants for their arrest, Smith said IFOR was doing what it could.

"We are doing what we can within the limits of our mandate. Any Western military is governed by poltical bodies so, if I get told to go get Karadzic and Mladic, I will go get them," he said.

Smith said that there was still hatred, fear and bad will between the communities in Bosnia and if IFOR were to leave right now, it would pose big problems for peace.

Serbia: SRS Asks Officials To Warn Tudjman Over Krajina Serb

AU0807210296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1304 GMT 8 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 8 Jul (BETA)—The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) today demanded that all relevant organs and institutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "warn Croatian President Franjo Tudjman that the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina belongs to the Serb people," and that the "occupation of that area is in no way permanent, but only temporary."

The SRS stresses in its communique that Tudjman's statement calling for the prevention of the Serb population to return to their homes "illustrates in the best possible way the nature of the neo-fascist regime in Croatia, as well as the hypocrisy of those who are giving him orders according to which the destruction of the entire Serb nation would represent a solution to the problem in a democratic way."

The RS demands that all issues concerning the status of the expelled Serb population from the Serb Krajina be regulated immediately and that their difficult material position in Serb be improved.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Albania Said To Open New Terrorist Training Camp

AU1007093796 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by M. Kovacevic: "Dressed To Kill"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The activists of the Shiptar separatist organizations in Kosovo and Metohija are, according to the latest information, letting it known among their followers that "our police" (police of the Republic of Kosovo) has started to function in their environment and that the terrorist attacks on the members of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the threats that they would take revenge on the Yugoslav Army are their work. Here they emphasize, not without pride, that its members are highly trained as they have completed their training in Albania.

The same well-informed sources claim that these so-called policemen are being trained in one particular center, which is situated in the town of (Ukrina) and that from there they are being illegally transferred to FRY. After Lobinot, Fush, Kukes, and Durres, our southern neighbor opened yet another terrorist training center with the wholehearted support of its patrons, the United States, Turkey, and Germany with whose assistance Albania was admitted into the Council of Europe (NATO association) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

The ruthless international terrorism that Albania is waging against FRY, instead of condemnation by the international community, brought it a series of other perks. The worldwide figures of power accepted it and admitted it in the Partnership for Peace program (what an irony) and parallel with this Albania also received generous U.S. assistance. This, primarily, involves the complete arming of its army and police while its people are starving and migrating on a large scale to Italy.

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